# LW Baudrillard Kritik

This was another generic kritik we had against new affs. This one was heavily frontlined because I found Baudrillard kind of hard to defend against the intuitive responses.

## 1NC/Overview

### 1NC race affs

#### Identity politics merely plays with signs within capitalism, reaffirming consumerism – difference is just another position within the code

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

But if Marxist theory fails to engage with and challenge the system of signs, so too, for Baudrillard, do many Structuralist, Poststructuralist and Postmodernist theorists of desire, difference and liberation. To defy the system it is never sufficient to ‘play with signs’, that is to play with plural, ‘different’ or multiple identity positions. Here we encounter Baudrillard’s total rejection of what would later be called ‘identity politics’ and also a central misunderstanding of his position on signs.[4] For Baudrillard to play with signs – signs of consumption and status, signs of gender, sexuality or ethnicity is simply to operate within the Code. It is an unconscious or unwitting complicity with the Code’s logic of the multiplication of status positions, it is to assist it in the production of ‘diversity’ and ‘choice’. It is deeply ironic that many of Baudrillard’s critics have claimed, or assumed, that Baudrillard himself merely ‘played with signs’ and that through his notion of seduction he advocated a playing with signs. Yet Baudrillard is clear, in order to oppose the system “[e]ven signs must burn” (1981: 163). Crucially his controversial work Seduction (1979/1990) does not advocate a playing with signs. In it Baudrillard draws an important distinction between the “ludique” meaning playing the game of signs, playing with signification (to enhance one’s status position or to assert one’s identity through its ‘difference’), and “enjeux” meaning to put signs at stake, to challenging them or annul them through symbolic exchange (1990: 157-178).[5] For Baudrillard signs play with us, despite us, against us, limiting and defining us. Any radical defiance must be a defiance of signs and their coding within the sign system. Unfortunately the distinction between ‘playing with signs’ – playing with their decoding and recoding, and defying the sign system has not penetrated the mainstream of Media and Cultural Studies. Eco’s influential notion of “semiotic guerrilla warfare” (Eco 1967/1995) and Hall’s even more influential notion of “resistant decoding” place their faith in the sovereign, rational consumer to negotiate mediated meanings. For them the consumer citizen confronts media content as the subject confronts the object. Hall does not consider that much media content is ‘encoded’ in an ‘oppositional’ form which renders the moment of ‘oppositional decoding’ one of conformity (see Hall et al 1973/2002: 128-138). Examples would include much ‘youth’ advertising, Channel Four (UK) documentaries on poverty, third-world debt and racism and specialist programming slots for ‘minorities’ such as Sharia TV. In other words the terms for ‘resistant’ readings are pre-set as positions within the Code where resistance is already reduced to sign regime. From VO5 ‘punk’ hair to leftist and feminist identity politics – try them if you like, no-one cares one way or the other. Critique is rendered meaningless by coded assimilation because the system sells us the signs of opposition as willingly as it sells us the signs of conformity. Can we even tell them apart? In which category would we place Sex and the City, for example?[6] The realm of symbolic exchange or seduction does not come about when individuals ‘play with signs’ but when (signs of) individuality, identity, will and agency are annulled through an encounter with the radically Other. Radical otherness, or radical alterity, for Baudrillard, refers to the Other beyond representation, beyond all coding. Not only beyond consumer status position but also beyond performative, ‘oppositional’ or “ludique” de/re-codings. The Code as system of “total constraint” then does not merely produce similarity and identity but also difference, diversity and hybridity. It does not seek to promote passivity or apathy among consumers but quite the contrary: to thrive and expand the system requires active, discriminating, engaged consumers, jostling for position, competing for advancement. The Code exists “to better prime the aspiration towards the higher level” (1981: 60). The Code delivers diversity and choice at the level of sign content (the goods that we choose to eat, the products and services that we choose to wear, watch, download) and requires in return … nothing much at all: merely that we understand ourselves as consumers. Consumption is not, of course, a homogenising process but a diversifying one. The aim of the system is to make ‘the consumer’ the universal form of humanity but within this form an almost infinite variety of differential contents or positions are possible. Since ‘humanity’, for Baudrillard, as for Nietzsche, is already constituted as a universal form by the Enlightenment (1993: 50) this task is close to completion, though the final completion, the “perfect crime” against Otherness will never, according to Baudrillard, come to pass (Baudrillard 1996).[7] To summarise: the Code has a pacifying effect on society by promoting a largely agreeable universal – the free consumer, spoilt for choice, and it provides clearly sign-posted routes for advancement as well as constant reminders as to what could happen if we don’t play the game (of signs).

#### Wage struggles, rather than challenging exploitation, allow it to continue by embedding laborers into the logic of capitalism

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Instead of labour we have signs of labour. In other words, labour as living historical agency, as force with the power to transform social relations, becomes a 'dead' abstraction in the economic calculations of capitalism. This process was well under way in Marx's time and Marx produced the concepts of abstract labour and commodity fetishism to describe the way in which the living force of labour is hidden behind finished commodities. But, for Baudrillard, the living agency of labour is not just hidden or reified into commodities, it is also rendered symbolically dead - it is less and less a living principle of exchange. In an age of structural, permanent high unemployment, labour cannot be exchanged for employment, for a salary or for a comfortable life: Labour power is instituted on death. A [hu]man must die to become labour power . . . the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on [her] him by his [her] definition as a productive force. (1993a: 39) Labour, then, is a slow death; it is neutralisation by slow death, by 'total conscription'. Labour no longer possesses a determinate relationship to production, having no meaningful equivalence in wages. Further, production no longer exists in a determinate relationship to profit or surplus value. There, is in political economy, Baudrillard contends, a general loss of representational equivalence: 'the monetary sign is severed from every social production and enters a phase of speculation' (1993a: 21). In this new reign of indeterminacy there is 'nothing with which to fight capital in determinate form' (1993a: 19; see also 1993b: 26-35). Capital flows in global, deregulated money markets without reference to labour, work, production - without equivalence in terms of a 'gold standard'. Similarly, Baudrillard contends, strikes once functioned within a binary system of equivalence held in dialectical tension, that of labour and capital, unions and management. But this notion of the strike is now 'dead' because striking cannot affect capitalism as 'the reproduction of the form of social relations' (1993a: 24). Capitalism can endure the lowering of profit margins, strike disruption and even the collapse of share values. These 'contents' are no longer fundamental to its opera- tion. Capital need only impose itself as form in order to reproduce itself endlessly and it achieves this by investing all individuals with needs, wants and desires - the apparatus of the active consumer. Any 'gains' won by unions, such as pay increases or improvements in working conditions, are immediately realised as benefits to the functioning of the system; for example, as wages poured into consumer spending or in proliferating signs of an attractive progressive workplace. Baudrillard allows that new fractures and instabilities emerge. He gives the example of non-unionised immigrant workers destabilising the game of signs carried out by managers and unions. However, such instabilities are quickly neutralised by strategies of incorporation and assimilation. Increasingly management is able to appeal directly to workers without the intermediary of unions; such strategies, Baudrillard argues, were central to the events of May 1968 when unions backed down, compromising with management to maintain their role as representatives of labour. Nevertheless, Baudrillard never suggests that the integrated, coded system is complete or invulnerable. Quite the reverse! The system's construction of the person as individual, productive, rational unit never really convinces anyone and is 'beginning to crack dangerously'. Further, the system is constantly under threat from symbolic challenges, as we shall see in the next chapter. Finally, wages, Baudrillard argues, do not measure the amount we produce in our jobs, as both liberal and Marxist theories proclaim; instead, they are now 'a sacrament, like a baptism (or the extreme Unction)' (1993a: 19). They mark us as full and genuine citizens of the consumer capitalist system. Workers today are less producers of measurable, determinate value than consumers, and their wage is access to the world of consumerism. Moreover, achieving wage status makes one a 'purchaser of goods in the same way that capital is the purchaser of labour' (1993a: 19). We are, according to Baudrillard, invested, colonised, occupied by capital, and apply a 'capitalist mentality' to all affairs. Wages do not guarantee any 'thing' in particular - that you are able to support yourself, afford somewhere to live, afford to have children - they simply insert us within the system of consumption. Consumption - the understanding of oneself as consumer and of the 5 system around us as consumerist - becomes 'obligatory and so is a symbolic relation. In Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard expands this argument, and in doing so moves further from Marx than he had been in Mirror, the supposed 'break' with Marxism. Baudrillard argues that the system of production has always depended, fundamentally, on symbolic relations.

#### Consumer capitalism simulates liberation to enforce social control – politics does nothing to challenge the symbolic underpinnings of the system

Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more complete form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and assimilation which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’ politics is defused by the code; they are designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feeding consumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system. The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption. The code simulates choice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer society by allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition. The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation. The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.

#### The code’s effacement of alterity guarantees hatred and violent lashout

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

Hatred is undoubtedly something which outlives any definable object, and feeds on the disappearance of that object (Baudrillard 1995/1996: 145). What then is the relationship between the Code and violence and hatred? The Code, it seems, both pacifies and produces hate: indeed it produces hatred through pacification. The Code integrates as it differentiates, it culturates and multi-culturates. Baudrillard acknowledged that consumer capitalism had, partially, achieved a pacifying or ameliorative effect on ‘structural’ hatred such as the racism of biology or skin colour. However, the system, through its compulsory registration of all within the Code, generates, according to Baudrillard, new hatreds and new violence that cannot be ‘treated’ by socialisation, education and information. On racism specifically Baudrillard argues: Logically it [racism] ought to have declined with progress and the spread of Enlightenment. But the more we learn how unfounded the genetic theory of race is, the more racism intensifies. This is because we are dealing with an artificial construction of the Other, on the basis of an erosion of the singularity of cultures (Baudrillard 2002a: 55). If the dialectical violence of difference (self v. other) is ameliorated, the post-dialectical violence of indifference seems to grow in intensity. The violence of in-difference or “the hate” is a viral form and like a hospital ‘superbug’ it cannot be treated by the standard measures and cures because the over-use of those very measures produced it (Baudrillard 1996: 142-147; 2005: 141-155). The Code’s vast edifice of signs diversifies and assimilates producing ‘positive’ representations at the same time as the divide, both economic and cultural, between rich and poor deepens and ramifies. The richer get richer and the poor get humiliated. For Baudrillard the edifice of signs actually “deters”, prevents or displaces the possibility of genuine social progress by delivering “simulated” social progress: signs of inclusion, signs of empowerment. Further the masses (everyone, “nous, vous, tout le monde”) reject, ultimately, the system of signs; we become increasingly indifferent to it, disengaged from its prescriptions. The hate cannot be treated by the use of signs because the over-use of signs produced it. The hate, as Baudrillard figures it, cannot be broken down and understood through the binary or dialectical categories of self and other, black and white, inside and outside, us and them. The hate does not emanate from a recognisable position: a self, ideology or culture, nor does it emerge from the self, ideology or culture of the other. The verb ‘to hate’, like the self or ego has become autonomous: uprooted it flows and seeps crossing any boundary, any limit (Baudrillard 2005c: 141). The hate flows, is networked, travels at the speed of information; it has not one object or target but all and any. Because it is not, primarily, hatred of something or someone, it is not reflective or critical nor does it propose alternatives. Having no definite object, goal or purpose, no programme or ideology, the Hate is a particularly intractable and corrosive form of hatred. According to Baudrillard it devours the social relation: “it is certainly the end of the social” (Baudrillard 1996: 146). Baudrillard’s major example is terrorism which he discussed many times during his career. Terrorism, he asserts, does not oppose a state or ideology, still less proposes alternatives: terrorism refuses meaning, it aims at the social Code itself, it is “senseless and indeterminate, like the system it combats” (1983: 51). I have discussed terrorism elsewhere (Pawlett 2007: 133-149) and would like to offer alternative examples here. If we take the violent protests by some Muslim groups provoked by the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, publishing cartoons of the prophet Mohammed – what precisely was the object of the protester’s hate? It was not a particular newspaper, it was not the Danish state or people, it was, perhaps, not even ‘The West’ as such, it was the dominance of a system of representation that recognises no outside, no sacred, no ‘beyond’; that reduces all meanings, beliefs and sensations to sign fodder.[8] To offer other empirical cases, recent examples of the ‘serial killer’ in the UK include Levi Bellfield who hated and murdered the sign-type ‘blondes’ and Steve Wright who murdered the sign-type ‘prostitute’. Yet, moving away from such extreme behaviour into the quotidian, the middle classes hate and fear the sign-types ‘hoodie’ or the baseball-capped ‘chav’. The BNP hate the sign-type ‘Muslim’ though, increasingly ‘tolerate’ the Hindu or Sikh. But tolerance is always useless, always strategic and is generally indistinguishable from indifference. What Baudrillard’s position suggests is that we do not hate the Other – the radically Other, we merely hate the other – as transcribed and signified through the Code. The Code reduces the radically Other to the “dangerously similar”: dangerously similar because they differ only in sign content or position (Baudrillard 1993: 124-138). In our superficial or unwitting acceptance of the Code we hate (and ‘we’ do all hate) the other as sign, as merely a signified ‘reality’. We encounter an other who is no more than the ‘reality’ of their signification; at best we are indifferent to the other and tolerate them. Indeed we cannot but be indifferent to the other because it is through indifference that, socially, we tolerate. But Baudrillard’s position is not one of despair, nor, clearly, is it an elitist rejection of the masses and their behaviour. As mass we also defy the system, our acceptance is only ever partial and superficial. Transcription always fails, or else we fail the demands of transcription: in failing we defy and re-open the space of ambivalence (Baudrillard 1981: 205-10). In sum, the Code feeds “the hate” by replacing the potential for symbolic relations between people – the ambivalence of reciprocal exchange – with an insertion or transcription into the terms of the Code. Thus transcribed an individual person is merely a conglomeration of signs which fabricate their ‘reality’ – and if this is what we are reduced to, why wouldn’t we hate each other? Acting-out Here I want to examine a specific feature of Baudrillard’s approach to the issue of agency and violence. It has been claimed that Baudrillard has no theory of agency and that this constitutes a fundamental weakness in his work (Kellner 1989: 216). Baudrillard position was that the illusion of agency was an effect of the Code, and a powerful one. Yet even as we are transcribed into the terms of the Code we remain singularities in radical ambivalence – hence Baudrillard did not reduce embodied experience to an effect of language. Within the Code there is no meaningful agency or resistance in the conventional sense, but there are, Baudrillard insisted, other forms of agency. One which his later work developed was “acting-out”. Within the Code we are not merely ‘internalised’ as the work of Nietzsche, Weber and others suggests. For Baudrillard we are now in a new phase where the inner-directed self must compare, contrast and differentiate themselves in relation to others in term of coded positions on a hierarchical scale. The Code generates, according to Baudrillard, a state of “annoyed indifference”. Yet indifference may suddenly, inexplicably, accelerate into a violent “acting-out” – that is into ‘real’ acts of violence. Baudrillard’s use of the Freudian term “acting-out” (Agieren) requires some clarification. In fact Baudrillard used a number of terms which bear the stamp of Freud and Lacan throughout his career: real, symbolic and imaginary, seduction, abreaction, transference and counter-transference, though curiously these have not attracted the attention of most critics and commentators. In contrast, Mike Gane has suggested that Baudrillard’s ideas concerning symbolic exchange can be understood as his ‘version’ of the Freudian Unconscious. For Freud the notion of ‘acting-out’ concerns repressed memories of past events which return by expressing themselves in actions that the actor ‘responsible’ cannot understand and which appear irrational or ‘out of character’ (Freud 1920/1991). For Lacan acting-out occurs when the capitalised or ‘big’ Other (which I will define simply as the Code at this stage, but see below on ‘radical alterity’) refuses to listen to the subject or rules out in advance any recognition of the subject’s desires or hopes.[9] In acting-out the humiliated subject unconsciously or unwittingly expresses a message to society: you will listen, you will take notice. However neither the ‘agent’ of this acting-out, nor society at large, comprehend this failed act of communication. Baudrillard adapts the Lacanian sense of the term and it becomes vital to his later work on hatred, violence and terrorism. Acting-out, for Baudrillard, may well be incomprehensible to the people involved and to society’s official discourses of criminology and criminal justice, but it is far from meaningless. We are all humiliated by the Code, by transcription and transparency, by competition and anxiety but some are humiliated far more than others. We cannot oppose anything so nebulous, evanescent, so abstract as the Code but acts of violence, defiance and hatred become as nebulous, as formless, as ubiquitous as the Code. Hatred and violence are destructured, become less and less comprehensible through the well-worn categories of self and other. Indeed hatred “outlives any definable object and feeds on the disappearance of that object” (1996: 145). The “absent other of hatred” can be literally anybody at anytime. We might hate someone for their religion or ‘culture’, or for their music collection or hairstyle, we might even kill someone for the way they looked at us. To cite other recent cases in the UK: a ‘Chav’ kills a ‘Goth’ because the Goth was “different”. Yet, the difference involved is merely a semiotic difference from the Chav.[10] Not a relation of radical difference or alterity but, as Baudrillard terms it a “dangerous similarity”: Chavs wear white, Goths wear black. Both are popular cultural youth styles, both exist for the other as differential sign display, each positions the other as the other positions them. But, according to Baudrillard, the Goth is not the Chav’s object of hate. The hate is sudden, eruptive “acting-out”; it evaporates as suddenly as it flared.[11] We can find support for Baudrillard’s ideas in academic criminology. Kenneth Polk (1994) presents a number of fascinating case studies of “male confrontational homicide” and emphasises both the similarity, in terms of age, class and income (as well as gender) of victims and aggressors, and the sudden evaporation of hostility after the event. Typically young males arrested for fatal attacks on their peers do express remorse, as well as disbelief, and, according to Polk, a curious sense of being unable to define or locate any reason for hostility. After the event comments such as “he seemed a decent bloke” are apparently common, the protagonists recalling no dislike and unable to offer any rationalisation to the police (Polk 1994: 111). For Baudrillard acting-out as failed communication, where communication is impossible, is not, fundamentally, a cry of the dispossessed or impoverished. It is rather a response of the relatively affluent, of those on the ‘right’ side of the global divide, it is a communication that says ‘Be other’, it is “a desperate form of the production of the other” (2005c: 147). But this is still the lower case other, the other of the Code, not the Other of radical alterity. We do not hate the Other, the Other in their unfathomable singularity, we suffer from an object-less hate, a vague sense of unfulfillment and ennui that in acting-out we project at anyone who can function, however momentarily, as our other, our enemy. In such a situation it is an ‘other’ not the Other that is hated; indeed any ‘other’ will do.

#### The alternative is to recognize radical alterity – refusing to ascribe a fixed identity to the Other means the system cannot assimilate the Other

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

Baudrillard’s position was not one of despair; it is not without hope. The Code is not total; it merely aims at totality. Though we may act as though we believe in the system, ultimately we do not. Baudrillard wrote “I am not a pessimist … singularity (or radical otherness) is indestructible” (2005). There is always a “principle of secret disaffection” (1996: 142) against the system, disaffection is felt by all, despite their relative position in the hierarchy of the Code. The absorption, integration and channelling of all negative elements by the Code inevitably gives rise to “violent, virulent, destabilising abreactions” (ibid.). In this, as in much else, Baudrillard’s position did not change, remaining consistent from the writing of The Consumer Society in the late 1960s right through to The Intelligence of Evil (2005a) and late essays such as The Pyres of Autumn (2005). We hate the other as sign, as signifying regime which allows us, momentarily, to act-out our frustrations through them. As we hate the other as sign, we must, as Baudrillard demanded, “burn signs” (1981: 163). If we acknowledge that the Code humiliates us all, some far more than others, and that humiliated people will, occasionally and not in any predictable way, act-out to communicate disaffection and defiance we must not play the game of signs, we must not play with the humiliation of the other through signs. Because of the violence of the Code as system of assimilation and absorption, violent ‘acting-out’ is always, for Baudrillard, a counter-offensive or counter-gift. This process does not take place at the conscious, rational, goal-directed level of the Liberal subject: it is an “abreaction”, a rising to the surface of a ‘repressed’, ingrained violence – our positioning by the Code. We are all humiliated by the Code; we are all rubbished and “ripped apart” by it. How do we defy the Code? We might begin with counter-violence: a counter-gift or “subtraction” directed against our-‘self’ as constituted by the Code. Not self-hatred or ressentiment but defiance of the Code’s violent construction of our ‘identity’ as signified and defined through the “ludique” game of signs. We allow the other to become Other, singular, non-identical. We do not place or define ourselves or others. We do not reduce the other to a ‘reality’ – neither what we imagine to be a positive, endorsing, empowering ‘reality’ or to a negative, stereotyped ‘reality’. To reduce the other to a ‘reality’ in order to confer them rights and representation is, for the conferrer, a form of control and limitation over the conferee. Yet this form of control is never stable or complete, the recipient of rights or entitlements may not believe in them as the system does. To be in the Code is to be able to defy the Code, and, according to Baudrillard, behind our superficial acceptance of the system we do, in any case, practice a poetics of “distance”. A “distance” not from the Other, but from ourselves: a distance that recovers proximity to the Other (Baudrillard 2001: 45-50, 70-73). We might look for the singularity of the Other, and for oneself as Other, as radical alterity, as ambivalence and “secret” that cannot be incorporated by the system because it cannot be read, understood or positioned. To experience self and other as CODE is the vital precondition to individualise, commodify and hate. Without a self the other cannot be the same and without self or other there is little scope for hate. Do not fight over signs: fight the sign system.

### 1NC Short Version

#### Wage struggles, rather than challenging exploitation, allow it to continue by embedding laborers into the logic of capitalism

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Instead of labour we have signs of labour. In other words, labour as living historical agency, as force with the power to transform social relations, becomes a 'dead' abstraction in the economic calculations of capitalism. This process was well under way in Marx's time and Marx produced the concepts of abstract labour and commodity fetishism to describe the way in which the living force of labour is hidden behind finished commodities. But, for Baudrillard, the living agency of labour is not just hidden or reified into commodities, it is also rendered symbolically dead - it is less and less a living principle of exchange. In an age of structural, permanent high unemployment, labour cannot be exchanged for employment, for a salary or for a comfortable life: Labour power is instituted on death. A [hu]man must die to become labour power . . . the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on [her] him by his [her] definition as a productive force. (1993a: 39) Labour, then, is a slow death; it is neutralisation by slow death, by 'total conscription'. Labour no longer possesses a determinate relationship to production, having no meaningful equivalence in wages. Further, production no longer exists in a determinate relationship to profit or surplus value. There, is in political economy, Baudrillard contends, a general loss of representational equivalence: 'the monetary sign is severed from every social production and enters a phase of speculation' (1993a: 21). In this new reign of indeterminacy there is 'nothing with which to fight capital in determinate form' (1993a: 19; see also 1993b: 26-35). Capital flows in global, deregulated money markets without reference to labour, work, production - without equivalence in terms of a 'gold standard'. Similarly, Baudrillard contends, strikes once functioned within a binary system of equivalence held in dialectical tension, that of labour and capital, unions and management. But this notion of the strike is now 'dead' because striking cannot affect capitalism as 'the reproduction of the form of social relations' (1993a: 24). Capitalism can endure the lowering of profit margins, strike disruption and even the collapse of share values. These 'contents' are no longer fundamental to its opera- tion. Capital need only impose itself as form in order to reproduce itself endlessly and it achieves this by investing all individuals with needs, wants and desires - the apparatus of the active consumer. Any 'gains' won by unions, such as pay increases or improvements in working conditions, are immediately realised as benefits to the functioning of the system; for example, as wages poured into consumer spending or in proliferating signs of an attractive progressive workplace. Baudrillard allows that new fractures and instabilities emerge. He gives the example of non-unionised immigrant workers destabilising the game of signs carried out by managers and unions. However, such instabilities are quickly neutralised by strategies of incorporation and assimilation. Increasingly management is able to appeal directly to workers without the intermediary of unions; such strategies, Baudrillard argues, were central to the events of May 1968 when unions backed down, compromising with management to maintain their role as representatives of labour. Nevertheless, Baudrillard never suggests that the integrated, coded system is complete or invulnerable. Quite the reverse! The system's construction of the person as individual, productive, rational unit never really convinces anyone and is 'beginning to crack dangerously'. Further, the system is constantly under threat from symbolic challenges, as we shall see in the next chapter. Finally, wages, Baudrillard argues, do not measure the amount we produce in our jobs, as both liberal and Marxist theories proclaim; instead, they are now 'a sacrament, like a baptism (or the extreme Unction)' (1993a: 19). They mark us as full and genuine citizens of the consumer capitalist system. Workers today are less producers of measurable, determinate value than consumers, and their wage is access to the world of consumerism. Moreover, achieving wage status makes one a 'purchaser of goods in the same way that capital is the purchaser of labour' (1993a: 19). We are, according to Baudrillard, invested, colonised, occupied by capital, and apply a 'capitalist mentality' to all affairs. Wages do not guarantee any 'thing' in particular - that you are able to support yourself, afford somewhere to live, afford to have children - they simply insert us within the system of consumption. Consumption - the understanding of oneself as consumer and of the 5 system around us as consumerist - becomes 'obligatory and so is a symbolic relation. In Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard expands this argument, and in doing so moves further from Marx than he had been in Mirror, the supposed 'break' with Marxism. Baudrillard argues that the system of production has always depended, fundamentally, on symbolic relations.

#### Consumer capitalism simulates liberation to enforce social control – politics does nothing to challenge the symbolic underpinnings of the system

Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more complete form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and assimilation which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’ politics is defused by the code; they are designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feeding consumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system. The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption. The code simulates choice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer society by allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition. The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation. The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.

#### The impact is necronomy—an economy of death that destroys value to life and condemns us all to extinction

Bifo 11 [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went¶ wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economist the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed¶ to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the¶ conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of¶ financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two¶ centuries.¶ Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word¶ “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist.¶ The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that¶ exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme.¶ Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a¶ narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: ¶ Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and¶ perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything¶ within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the¶ Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows¶ itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value,¶ bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity,¶ demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to¶ behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold¶ the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a¶ process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented¶ activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth¶ is making scarce both water and air.¶ Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of¶ producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx¶ did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of¶ economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies¶ richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to¶ the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried¶ work. ¶ In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very¶ foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of¶ material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the¶ Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic¶ categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. ¶ The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of¶ John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be¶ privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple.¶ But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without¶ cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and salary.¶ The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational¶ expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has¶ finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The¶ theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic¶ agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best¶ deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies¶ has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the¶ theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational¶ factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading¶ information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional¶ tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. ¶ The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural¶ law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in¶ control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times¶ on September 6th 2009:¶ After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may¶ have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance¶ policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life¶ expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies,¶ in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds.¶ They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will¶ receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the¶ policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than¶ expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money.¶ Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would¶ absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay¶ the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I¶ 113die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the¶ insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure.

#### The impact outweighs – massive violence outweighs slight decreases in poverty and controls the root cause of war. It also destroys value to life – the lives the aff saves are meaningless because the aff erases the value in them

#### The alternative is to symbolically challenge the system by rejecting the gift of work and wage. The system’s power requires the unilateral giving of these gifts, which the alternative reverses

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

For Baudrillard, the system is so 'indifferent' it is scarcely meaningful to call it capitalist. Asked in 1997 what capitalism had become, Baudrillard replied, I really don't know ... a sort of dilution of the universal... purely operational... an automatic transcription of the world into the global' (1998b: 11). How might we oppose such a diffuse, indifferent yet 'automatic' system? The only possibility is to re-engage the symbolic level. The system operates through symbolic violence. The only genuinely defiant strategy, Baudrillard asserts, is the symbolic reversal or 'counter-gift' (contre-don). According to Baudrillard the events of May 1968 'shook the system down to the depths of its symbolic organisation'. The system responded to the symbolic challenge, the refusal of work and education, with another symbolic challenge by giving 'official status to oppositional discourse' (1993a: 34). The power of the system is based on the monopoly of gift giving, 'the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift' (1993a: 36). The system gives the gifts of self and identity through advertising and consumption; it gives the gift of work and wage through the economy; it gives the gift of knowledge through the education system and the gift of information and interactivity through media and communication (1981: 164-84). These gifts are unilateral, they forbid response, they must and can only be accepted: they are, for Baudrillard, 'poisonous' gifts. The power of the system is completely dependent on 'the impossibility of responding or retorting' (1993a: 37). The system might be shattered, or at least momentarily suspended, by a counter-gift of the rejection of the gift and a reversal of power relations through a symbolic challenge that forces the system to respond, to raise the stakes further. We might reject, or refuse to accept, the 'gifts' of self, career, status and information.

#### 2 implications:

#### Alt solves the case – it destroys the capitalist system which is the root of the aff impacts

#### The perm is impossible – the alt requires rejecting the gift of wages the aff gives

### 1NC Long Version

#### Wage struggles, rather than challenging exploitation, allow it to continue by embedding laborers into the logic of capitalism

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Instead of labour we have signs of labour. In other words, labour as living historical agency, as force with the power to transform social relations, becomes a 'dead' abstraction in the economic calculations of capitalism. This process was well under way in Marx's time and Marx produced the concepts of abstract labour and commodity fetishism to describe the way in which the living force of labour is hidden behind finished commodities. But, for Baudrillard, the living agency of labour is not just hidden or reified into commodities, it is also rendered symbolically dead - it is less and less a living principle of exchange. In an age of structural, permanent high unemployment, labour cannot be exchanged for employment, for a salary or for a comfortable life: Labour power is instituted on death. A [hu]man must die to become labour power . . . the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on [her] him by his [her] definition as a productive force. (1993a: 39) Labour, then, is a slow death; it is neutralisation by slow death, by 'total conscription'. Labour no longer possesses a determinate relationship to production, having no meaningful equivalence in wages. Further, production no longer exists in a determinate relationship to profit or surplus value. There, is in political economy, Baudrillard contends, a general loss of representational equivalence: 'the monetary sign is severed from every social production and enters a phase of speculation' (1993a: 21). In this new reign of indeterminacy there is 'nothing with which to fight capital in determinate form' (1993a: 19; see also 1993b: 26-35). Capital flows in global, deregulated money markets without reference to labour, work, production - without equivalence in terms of a 'gold standard'. Similarly, Baudrillard contends, strikes once functioned within a binary system of equivalence held in dialectical tension, that of labour and capital, unions and management. But this notion of the strike is now 'dead' because striking cannot affect capitalism as 'the reproduction of the form of social relations' (1993a: 24). Capitalism can endure the lowering of profit margins, strike disruption and even the collapse of share values. These 'contents' are no longer fundamental to its opera- tion. Capital need only impose itself as form in order to reproduce itself endlessly and it achieves this by investing all individuals with needs, wants and desires - the apparatus of the active consumer. Any 'gains' won by unions, such as pay increases or improvements in working conditions, are immediately realised as benefits to the functioning of the system; for example, as wages poured into consumer spending or in proliferating signs of an attractive progressive workplace. Baudrillard allows that new fractures and instabilities emerge. He gives the example of non-unionised immigrant workers destabilising the game of signs carried out by managers and unions. However, such instabilities are quickly neutralised by strategies of incorporation and assimilation. Increasingly management is able to appeal directly to workers without the intermediary of unions; such strategies, Baudrillard argues, were central to the events of May 1968 when unions backed down, compromising with management to maintain their role as representatives of labour. Nevertheless, Baudrillard never suggests that the integrated, coded system is complete or invulnerable. Quite the reverse! The system's construction of the person as individual, productive, rational unit never really convinces anyone and is 'beginning to crack dangerously'. Further, the system is constantly under threat from symbolic challenges, as we shall see in the next chapter. Finally, wages, Baudrillard argues, do not measure the amount we produce in our jobs, as both liberal and Marxist theories proclaim; instead, they are now 'a sacrament, like a baptism (or the extreme Unction)' (1993a: 19). They mark us as full and genuine citizens of the consumer capitalist system. Workers today are less producers of measurable, determinate value than consumers, and their wage is access to the world of consumerism. Moreover, achieving wage status makes one a 'purchaser of goods in the same way that capital is the purchaser of labour' (1993a: 19). We are, according to Baudrillard, invested, colonised, occupied by capital, and apply a 'capitalist mentality' to all affairs. Wages do not guarantee any 'thing' in particular - that you are able to support yourself, afford somewhere to live, afford to have children - they simply insert us within the system of consumption. Consumption - the understanding of oneself as consumer and of the 5 system around us as consumerist - becomes 'obligatory and so is a symbolic relation. In Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard expands this argument, and in doing so moves further from Marx than he had been in Mirror, the supposed 'break' with Marxism. Baudrillard argues that the system of production has always depended, fundamentally, on symbolic relations.

#### Consumer capitalism simulates liberation to enforce social control – politics does nothing to challenge the symbolic underpinnings of the system, which means zero aff solvency

Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more complete form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and assimilation which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’ politics is defused by the code; they are designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feeding consumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system. The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption. The code simulates choice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer society by allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition. The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation. The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.

#### Fiat is also link – A. The 1AC is playing pretend-politics – this farce of a political process ignores the fact that politics in the “real world” is already dead

#### B. Fiat is a simulation of a policy – this representation of policymaking comes to stand in for policymaking in the “real world,” just as every other sign comes to replace reality.

#### The impacts--- first, capitalism destroys value to life, and makes the land, time, and life itself scarce – turns the root cause of the aff, which means they can’t solve

Bifo 11 [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economist the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of the devitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme. Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost?

#### This means zero aff solvency – exploitation is inevitable even if the aff increases wages since they make people’s lives net worse

#### Value to life also outweighs the aff – the lives the aff saves are meaningless because the aff erases the value in them

#### Second, necronomy – as the foundations of capitalism erode, war and violence are used to respond

Bifo 11 [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational¶ expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has¶ finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The¶ theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic¶ agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best¶ deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies¶ has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the¶ theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational¶ factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading¶ information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional¶ tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. ¶ The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural¶ law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in¶ control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times¶ on September 6th 2009:¶ After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may¶ have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance¶ policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life¶ expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies,¶ in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds.¶ They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will¶ receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the¶ policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than¶ expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money.¶ Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would¶ absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay¶ the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I¶ 113die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure.

#### This means the aff’s use of wage-labor further exposes these contradictions in capitalism, which causes further violence and extinction

#### The impact also outweighs – massive violence outweighs slight decreases in poverty and controls the root cause of war

#### Third, a consumption-driven system causes every impact

Smith 10 [(Richard G. Smith, Associate Professor of Geography at Swansea university) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

According to Baudrillard, a ‘perverse’ logic (SC, 97) drives consumer societies. A logic that fuels, not just the use and abuse of drugs, but also the growth of other phenomena: terrorism, violence, depression, fascism and so forth. These phenomena are all, says Baudrillard, the product or outcome of ‘an excess of organization, regulation and rationalization within a system’ (SC, 97). In other words, those societies which are defined and ‘saturated’ by their system of consumption tend to suffer from an excess of systemic rationalisation (logic and rationality, surveillance and control), which perversely leads to the emergence – for no apparent reason – of ‘internal pathologies’, ‘strange dysfunctions’, ‘unforeseeable, incurable accidents’, ‘anomalies’ (SC, 97), which disrupt the system’s capacity for totality, perfection and reality invention. It is the logic of an excessive system to fuel the growth of anomalies, which along with AIDS and cancer are pathologies in that they have not come from elsewhere, from ‘outside’ or from afar, but are rather a product of the ‘over-protection’ of the body – be it social or individual. The system’s overcapacity to protect, normalise and integrate is evidenced everywhere: natural immunity is replaced by systems of artificial immunity – ‘hygienic, chemical, medical, social and psychological pros- thetics’ (SC, 98) – in the name of science and progress.

#### That means order-driven solutions like the aff’s policy approach can’t solve – they paradoxically increase disorder in the system which causes their own impacts

#### The alternative is to symbolically challenge the system by rejecting the gift of work and wage. The system’s power requires the unilateral giving of these gifts, which the alternative reverses

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

For Baudrillard, the system is so 'indifferent' it is scarcely meaningful to call it capitalist. Asked in 1997 what capitalism had become, Baudrillard replied, I really don't know ... a sort of dilution of the universal... purely operational... an automatic transcription of the world into the global' (1998b: 11). How might we oppose such a diffuse, indifferent yet 'automatic' system? The only possibility is to re-engage the symbolic level. The system operates through symbolic violence. The only genuinely defiant strategy, Baudrillard asserts, is the symbolic reversal or 'counter-gift' (contre-don). According to Baudrillard the events of May 1968 'shook the system down to the depths of its symbolic organisation'. The system responded to the symbolic challenge, the refusal of work and education, with another symbolic challenge by giving 'official status to oppositional discourse' (1993a: 34). The power of the system is based on the monopoly of gift giving, 'the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift' (1993a: 36). The system gives the gifts of self and identity through advertising and consumption; it gives the gift of work and wage through the economy; it gives the gift of knowledge through the education system and the gift of information and interactivity through media and communication (1981: 164-84). These gifts are unilateral, they forbid response, they must and can only be accepted: they are, for Baudrillard, 'poisonous' gifts. The power of the system is completely dependent on 'the impossibility of responding or retorting' (1993a: 37). The system might be shattered, or at least momentarily suspended, by a counter-gift of the rejection of the gift and a reversal of power relations through a symbolic challenge that forces the system to respond, to raise the stakes further. We might reject, or refuse to accept, the 'gifts' of self, career, status and information.

#### 2 implications:

#### a. Alt solves the case – it destroys the capitalist system which is the root of the aff impacts

#### The perm is impossible – the alt requires rejecting the gift of wages the aff gives

### Alt---FPIK and FW

#### The alternative is to reject the symbolic value of a living wage. Rather than endorsing a living wage because it is an effective reform, you should endorse a living wage for no reason. The system’s power requires the unilateral giving of these gifts, which the alternative reverses

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

For Baudrillard, the system is so 'indifferent' it is scarcely meaningful to call it capitalist. Asked in 1997 what capitalism had become, Baudrillard replied, I really don't know ... a sort of dilution of the universal... purely operational... an automatic transcription of the world into the global' (1998b: 11). How might we oppose such a diffuse, indifferent yet 'automatic' system? The only possibility is to re-engage the symbolic level. The system operates through symbolic violence. The only genuinely defiant strategy, Baudrillard asserts, is the symbolic reversal or 'counter-gift' (contre-don). According to Baudrillard the events of May 1968 'shook the system down to the depths of its symbolic organisation'. The system responded to the symbolic challenge, the refusal of work and education, with another symbolic challenge by giving 'official status to oppositional discourse' (1993a: 34). The power of the system is based on the monopoly of gift giving, 'the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift' (1993a: 36). The system gives the gifts of self and identity through advertising and consumption; it gives the gift of work and wage through the economy; it gives the gift of knowledge through the education system and the gift of information and interactivity through media and communication (1981: 164-84). These gifts are unilateral, they forbid response, they must and can only be accepted: they are, for Baudrillard, 'poisonous' gifts. The power of the system is completely dependent on 'the impossibility of responding or retorting' (1993a: 37). The system might be shattered, or at least momentarily suspended, by a counter-gift of the rejection of the gift and a reversal of power relations through a symbolic challenge that forces the system to respond, to raise the stakes further. We might reject, or refuse to accept, the 'gifts' of self, career, status and information.

#### 2 implications:

#### Alt solves the case – it destroys the capitalist system which is the root of the aff impacts. The alt also is compatible with the aff’s policy – it’s their justifications the kritik rejects

#### The perm is impossible – the alt requires rejecting the gift of wages the aff gives

#### If I win framework, the debate is about competing intellectual stances against the system, not the simulated effects of the plan. A neg ballot is a vote to return the gift to the system, not something workers do because that's not something the judge can do in this round. The alt is still mutually exclusive with the aff - the 1AC speech attributes symbolic power to the gift of wages which the judge should use their ballot to reject, symbolically rejecting the gift and returning it to the system.

### Extra Alt Solvency

#### Symbolic exchange resists the logic of power

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together.

### OV---System

#### There is a reason every attempt to challenge the dominant order has failed – material challenges like Marxist revolution and ideological challenges all failed – because consumer capitalism is built not on policy decisions, but on simulation.

#### Social domination is not material domination, but operates through the symbolic order, the interplay of ideas and their referents. The system can assimilate challenges by turning those challenges into simulations – rather than referring to something in objective reality, ideas become meaningless abstractions. Revolutions and reforms become floating abstractions, simulating liberation without actually allowing it, to pacify dissent – rather than challenging the system or even improving conditions within it, reforms merely make the system more deadly – the code means the aff can ONLY makes things worse – only the K has the potential to create change.

#### A living wage strengthens the system’s domination – the first Pawlette card says labor is removed from exchange and becomes an abstraction, and can no longer be exchanged for a comfortable life – even if the aff increases wages they don’t make people’s lives better. Pay increases benefit the functioning of the system as an illusion of liberation.

#### A living wage inserts workers into consumption – pay increases are realized as increased consumption, so that laborers are colonized by capitalism, instead of having better lives.

#### 3 impacts:

#### First, scarcification – extend the Bifo evidence---

-Capitalism makes basic needs scarce to artificially create need, which is the root cause of poverty–the aff can’t solve the root causes of their impacts

-Capitalism defines humans as calculating machines and strips the value from their lives, causing panic, depression, and suicide

-Extend that people are forced to devote their life-time to salaried work, which destroys value to life – even if the aff increases wages, they still make people’s lives net worse and have no solvency

-Extend value to life outweighs – the lives the aff saves are MEANINGLESS absent value to life, so they can’t access an external impact

[blue] Turns case – loss of social values makes economic collapse inevitable

#### Second, necronomy -

Digitization erodes the link between time used for production and value – capitalism must therefore enforce its law with violence, causing mass violence

-Extend that the aff’s use of wage labor further erodes this link, which independently causes more violence

-Also, the impact outweighs – wars and death outweigh the slight decrease in poverty

#### Third, disorder –

Smith says the drive to consume produces internal pathologies like violence, poverty, fascism, and terrorism

-Extend that the aff’s attempt to use order-driven politics to find a solution makes violence inevitable and turns the case

### Alternative XT/Perm Answer

#### The system’s power is based on unilaterally giving gifts we can only respond to by complying with the system. For example, the system gives us work, wages, and prestige whose utility we are forced to recognize. The alternative rejects the symbolic value of these gifts, symbolically returning them to the system so that the system is forced to respond by collapsing. This challenges the system at the level of the symbolic, at the level the code operates at, so it cannot assimilate the alternative.

#### A lot of their answers argue Baudrillard is nihilistic – the fact that there is an alternative means the kritik isn’t nihilistic, since there is a solution. It’s try or die for the alt – the totalizing control of the system means the aff CERTAINLY fails; the only possible solution is the alternative

#### The perm fails---

1. The aff IS the symbolic gift of a higher wage that allows the system to dominate, which makes the system MORE powerful. The alternative requires rejecting the symbolic power of these gifts, which requires rejecting the aff – the perm either severs out of the aff, which is a voting issue because it destroys stable ground to generate neg offense; or it can’t solve the kritik.

2. the perm has no net benefit – all the reasons the aff can’t solve were also above and prove including the aff does nothing

3. the alt is sufficient to solve the entire case – it tears down the system of capitalism that’s the root cause of aff impacts, so there’s no reason to include the aff

4. Links are disads – voting aff is to vote for the entire 1AC, any reason the aff causes the K impacts is a reason you shouldn’t vote aff – doing the alt alone is better

### 1NC Marxism Bad

#### Marxist critique props up capitalism. It fails to address the symbolic order and is therefore ineffective; it reinforces the capitalist system by focusing on production and need, which are part of capitalist ideology; and the prediction of a dialectical struggle between classes is wrong since the capitalist order operates not through class dominance but through simulation. The symbolic regime outweighs class domination.

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Nature as object constituted by science and technology is understood as a 'potentiality of forces' submitted to 'operational finality': the 'forces' of nature are put to use in order to achieve a particular goal or end, such as the fuelling of industry. The previous understanding of nature as totality, great law or principle did not lend itself to such operational ends. A scientific understanding of Nature that was suited to industrial society was required and was generated by scientists because they theorised from within the code or matrix of industrial society; that is, their thinking was dominated, at an unconscious level, by the metaphysical principle of production. Science, then, does not deal in 'objective', timeless truths but, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is always 'timely', always restricted by the socio-historic context and ideas about what constitutes the truth (epistemology) current at the time. This line of argument is directed at Marxism itself, with Baudrillard's mock incredulity that 'the reality of production enters the scene at precisely the moment when someone is discovered who invents the theory of it' (1975: 113). However it is also directed at other targets - particularly Western notions of Nature, Civilisation, Science and Progress. For Baudrillard this new understanding of Nature realises a definitive split between the subject or person and the 'Nature-object'.6 In this splitting Nature and Man become separate or autonomous, both are 'liberated' yet 'dominated' in the same movement. As separated elements both Nature and Man can be coded; that is, they are understood as subject to 'abstract, linear, irreversible' (1975: 56) processes of development or 'progress'. Once split, both are then split again as the unquestioned criteria of rationality erects a 'bar' or barrier separating rational and irrational, good and bad into binary oppositions. Good Nature (food, abundance and beauty) is separated from bad Nature (disease, catastrophe), just as good Humans (white, hard-working) are separated from bad Humans (black, lazy). Marxism, according to Baudrillard, sought to overcome 'bad' Nature by the increased effort to conquer and master Nature as the fundamental signified.7 Baudrillard also attacks science and history as they are constituted by Western reason. His theoretical manoeuvres here lead us to the first formulations of the concepts of simulation and the notion of the revenge of the object: It is only in the mirror of production and history, under the double principle of indefinite accumulation (production) and dialectical continuity (history), only by the arbitrariness of the code, that our Western culture can reflect itself in the universal as the privileged moment of truth (science) or of revolution (historical materialism). Without this simulation...our era loses all privileges. It would not be any closer to any term of knowledge or any social truth than any other. (1975: 114-15) The recurrent and important theme of the revenge of the object is first developed in relation to Marxism. Because Marxist epistemology cannot question the primacy of needs, use-value and production, Marxist theory is ultimately, for Baudrillard, a 'simulation model' - a coding system that reduces all human activities to the model of production. Marxist theory tries to produce a general account of the course of human civilisation. It attempts this by sketching the respective modes of the production of goods that are said to characterise various historical epochs. However, in attempting to understand pre-industrial societies Marxist theory encounters, according to Baudrillard, cultures without the pretence of universality, without history, without relations of production, without a distinction between infrastructure and superstructure. In the attempt to analyse such cultures, by projecting its categories on to the Other, Marxism fails and is actually analysed by its object. This is the revenge of the object: Marxism's chosen object of analysis tells us far more about the state of Marxist theory than Marxist theory can tell us about 'its' object - 'primitive' society. The Marxist critique of political economy was, for Baudrillard, insufficiently radical because it was unable to perceive the operation of symbolic forces within the system\* of capitalist economy. Baudrillard pursues the hypothesis that there has been an important shift from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism. While Marxism had considerable critical purchase on the workings of competitive capitalism it has little grip on the new phase. The dialectic, which had functioned in the phase of competitive capitalism, is undermined by the operation of the code as a system of 'total abstraction' where the signified and the referent are now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers... of a generalised formalization in which the code no longer refers back to any subjective or object- ive 'reality', but to its own logic. The signifier becomes its own referent and the use-value of the sign disappears to the benefit of it commutation and exchange value alone. The sign no longer designates anything at a l l . . . all reality becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structural simulation. (1975: 128) According to Baudrillard there is no more dialectic of meaning, either in representation, the dialectic between sign and reference, or in economics, between supply and demand. The code absorbs these through 'predictive anticipation' and 'planned socialisation', which extends far beyond the production and consumption of goods and incorporates 'needs, knowledge, culture, information, sexuality' as terms of the code (1975: 126). All that once had an 'explosive force' (ibid.) is defused, deterred or contained; there may still be signs of the dialectic, but they are precisely that: only signs. Signs of revolt and 'liberation' abound: images of Che Guevara on T-shirts, spiky 'punk' hair on V05 adverts, gay couples in soaps. But these are signs generated by the capitalist system and any 'revolution' they generate is at the level of the sign and of fashion. Content (of T-shirts and hair products for the young, of soap opera characters) changes constantly, it is always being revolutionised. There are, of course, healthy profits in niche and 'diversity' marketing, yet more important than profit margins, according to Baudrillard, is the level of form, of the sign as form and as code. The production and consumption of signs is the form through which we understand ourselves. The code sets all the terms in advance, of conformity and resistance, playfulness and seriousness. It promotes signs of revolt and signs of conformity because it constructs 'conformists' and 'rebels' as types of consumer, as alternative poles that structure patterns of consumption. The implication is clear: even 'pushed to the limit' Marxism is unable to critique the sign-form, the general principle of the code. The passage from the commodity-form to the sign-form or the political economy of the sign is one of the passage of all values to sign-exchange value, under the hegemony of the code. That is, of a structure of control and of power much more subtle and more totalitarian than that of exploitation' (1975: 121). The code is 'illegible', it cannot be read, it is instead the form that allows 'reading\* to take place. 'Production' as metaphysical principle is the principle of the code: desire, sexuality, even knowledge is understood in terms of production. The code destroys social relations as live symbolic exchanges. It is far more destructive than ownership of the means of production, and, for Baudrillard, this represents a revolution as profound as the industrial revolution was two centuries earlier. According to Baudrillard we have now reached the 'end' of production. Production still takes place of course, but it leads an increasingly shadowy, obscure existence: banished to the third world, operating within closed and guarded compounds, non-unionised, off the radar (see, for example, Klein, 2001: 195-229). But Baudrillard's 'end' of production is not only geo-political but also epistemological. The sign-code or 'structural law of value' signals the end of production: the structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation. Strictly speaking, neither the 'classical' economy not the political economy of the sign ceases to exist: they lead a secondary existence becoming a sort of phantom principle of dissuasion. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 8) So, for Baudrillard the logic of economic production, analysed by Marx, and the logic of representation, analysed by Saussure, follow the same form: they establish principles of equivalence. Equivalence establishes regulated, ordered exchange, linear development and accumulation. In the economic sphere money is the abstract principle of equivalence: everything has a price and that price is directly comparable with the price for anything else. An academic, for example, is paid twice as much as a nurse, a doctor or lawyer three times as much as an aca- demic and so on. Similarly, in the sphere of language or representation a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified, and between sign and referent, enables 'meaning' to be produced, exchanged and accumulated. The signifier 'tree' invokes the same 'thing' whether it is used by a child, a horticulturist or a poet. This Baudrillard dubs the 'classical' representation or 'the second order of Simulacra' (1993a: 53-7). The spheres of economy and of representation are linked by the same underlying form, but at the level of content they are distinct, they can be distinguished, and Baudrillard terms this a relation of 'determinate' equivalence. The 'end' of production occurs with the shift from determinate to increasingly 'indeterminate' equivalence. Signs circulate in the code and are able to do so because they tend to become detached from determinate signifieds. As the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is weakened the 'referential dimension' of meaning is undermined because it was the signified that supposedly 'captured' meaning out there in the world (the referent). Of course we do not live in a world of free-floating signs or signifiers that mean nothing, or alternatively anything (Callinicos, 1989: 145). This is a ludicrous misreading of Baudrillard given his emphasis on the constraining power of the code and his deconstruction of individual 'needs' and 'wants'. Signifiers simulate the effect of meaning and reference: a 'reality-effect' is crucial to the operation of the capitalist system. It might be objected that signifiers have only ever simulated the effect of meaning and reference. In a sense, this is not far off the mark, since Baudrillard insists that the world is illusion, is simulacrum (1996c: 16-19, 2005d: 39-46). But there are, he asserts, meaningful, qualitative differences within simulacra, different and distinguishable orders of simulacra that have direct, meaningful and theorisable effects on lived relations and social experience. Baudrillard's approach is, then, more sociological than is acknowledged, 8 at least given a broad definition of the sociological! With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather than to a 'real', or referent. A 'hyperreality' of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real . . . they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real . . . . Neither Saussure nor Marx had any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real... the 'classical' period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7) The tensions, contradiction, oppositions and sheer unpredictability the dialectic tend to be neutralised by simulation, although Baudrillard is clear that the dialectic does not disappear, nor of course is it transcended or obliterated. It endures, as do aspects of the first order of simulacra, but in tattered, fragmented form in the firmament of ideas that have had their moment but do not die (see also Baudrillard, 1994b: 21-7). This, in itself, is a paradoxical, other-than-dialectical process because, according to dialectics, one state is supposed to be definitely raised, resolved and transcended by another state. The dialec- tic rolls on, but it no longer captures our imagination. In a characteristic reversal strategy, directed at Marxist theory, Baudrillard argues that capitalism, rather than being 'transcended' by socialism, has actually leapt over the dialectic as it 'substitutes the structural form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system's strategy' (1993a: 7). Given this metamorphosis, Baudrillard asks whether we are we still living within capitalism. 'Hyper-capitalism' may be a more accurate term, he suggests, but what is not in doubt is that 'the structural law of value is the purest, most illegible form of social domination ...... it no longer has any references within a dominant class or a relation of forces' (1993a: 10-11).

#### In fact, Marxist critique only props up the system, and since the system derives its power from the symbolic, is incapable of transforming it.

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

In a highly original theorisation of capitalism, Baudrillard argues that the system depends on political economy as 'internal critique', in order to maintain the fiction of its reality. Capitalism, as an integrated system, has so outmoded Marxism that the latter plays the role of a 'dialectical stimulus' to capitalism - providing the illusion of depth and difference. Political economy, then, is a 'simulation model' (1993a: 31-9) providing capitalism with an 'alibi' or a 'screen', and is kept alive or meaningful through the efforts of Marxist critics. The power and dominance of the capitalist system is not dependent on economics, it derives more fundamentally, Baudrillard insists, from the symbolic. Capitalism exerts a 'symbolic domination' over 'life and death, estab- lished by the code' (1993a: 31) and is not susceptible or vulnerable to Marxist critique. Any vulnerability of the system exists only at the symbolic level. The economic system, the systems of production, reproduction and consumption mask the symbolic level and thereby occlude 'the possibility of its symbolic destruction' (1993a: 31). According to Baudrillard, capitalism 'never confused itself with production, as Marx did': capital is content to extend its laws in a single movement, inexorably occupying all the interstices of life. If it has set men to work it has also impelled them to culture, needs, languages and functional idioms, information and communication; it directs them to rights, to liberty, and sexuality, it forces the instinct of preservation and the death instinct upon them; it has set them up everywhere in accordance with myths that are simultaneously opposed and indifferent. This is its only law: indifference. (1993a: 34)

#### The alternative is exhaustion – the aff’s focus on active solutions makes resistance impossible

Bifo 11 – Whit Whitmore’s pen name (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, After the Future pg 106-108)

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

## Link

### 1NC ID Politics

#### Identity politics merely plays with signs within capitalism, reaffirming consumerism – difference is just another position within the code

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

But if Marxist theory fails to engage with and challenge the system of signs, so too, for Baudrillard, do many Structuralist, Poststructuralist and Postmodernist theorists of desire, difference and liberation. To defy the system it is never sufficient to ‘play with signs’, that is to play with plural, ‘different’ or multiple identity positions. Here we encounter Baudrillard’s total rejection of what would later be called ‘identity politics’ and also a central misunderstanding of his position on signs.[4] For Baudrillard to play with signs – signs of consumption and status, signs of gender, sexuality or ethnicity is simply to operate within the Code. It is an unconscious or unwitting complicity with the Code’s logic of the multiplication of status positions, it is to assist it in the production of ‘diversity’ and ‘choice’. It is deeply ironic that many of Baudrillard’s critics have claimed, or assumed, that Baudrillard himself merely ‘played with signs’ and that through his notion of seduction he advocated a playing with signs. Yet Baudrillard is clear, in order to oppose the system “[e]ven signs must burn” (1981: 163). Crucially his controversial work Seduction (1979/1990) does not advocate a playing with signs. In it Baudrillard draws an important distinction between the “ludique” meaning playing the game of signs, playing with signification (to enhance one’s status position or to assert one’s identity through its ‘difference’), and “enjeux” meaning to put signs at stake, to challenging them or annul them through symbolic exchange (1990: 157-178).[5] For Baudrillard signs play with us, despite us, against us, limiting and defining us. Any radical defiance must be a defiance of signs and their coding within the sign system. Unfortunately the distinction between ‘playing with signs’ – playing with their decoding and recoding, and defying the sign system has not penetrated the mainstream of Media and Cultural Studies. Eco’s influential notion of “semiotic guerrilla warfare” (Eco 1967/1995) and Hall’s even more influential notion of “resistant decoding” place their faith in the sovereign, rational consumer to negotiate mediated meanings. For them the consumer citizen confronts media content as the subject confronts the object. Hall does not consider that much media content is ‘encoded’ in an ‘oppositional’ form which renders the moment of ‘oppositional decoding’ one of conformity (see Hall et al 1973/2002: 128-138). Examples would include much ‘youth’ advertising, Channel Four (UK) documentaries on poverty, third-world debt and racism and specialist programming slots for ‘minorities’ such as Sharia TV. In other words the terms for ‘resistant’ readings are pre-set as positions within the Code where resistance is already reduced to sign regime. From VO5 ‘punk’ hair to leftist and feminist identity politics – try them if you like, no-one cares one way or the other. Critique is rendered meaningless by coded assimilation because the system sells us the signs of opposition as willingly as it sells us the signs of conformity. Can we even tell them apart? In which category would we place Sex and the City, for example?[6] The realm of symbolic exchange or seduction does not come about when individuals ‘play with signs’ but when (signs of) individuality, identity, will and agency are annulled through an encounter with the radically Other. Radical otherness, or radical alterity, for Baudrillard, refers to the Other beyond representation, beyond all coding. Not only beyond consumer status position but also beyond performative, ‘oppositional’ or “ludique” de/re-codings. The Code as system of “total constraint” then does not merely produce similarity and identity but also difference, diversity and hybridity. It does not seek to promote passivity or apathy among consumers but quite the contrary: to thrive and expand the system requires active, discriminating, engaged consumers, jostling for position, competing for advancement. The Code exists “to better prime the aspiration towards the higher level” (1981: 60). The Code delivers diversity and choice at the level of sign content (the goods that we choose to eat, the products and services that we choose to wear, watch, download) and requires in return … nothing much at all: merely that we understand ourselves as consumers. Consumption is not, of course, a homogenising process but a diversifying one. The aim of the system is to make ‘the consumer’ the universal form of humanity but within this form an almost infinite variety of differential contents or positions are possible. Since ‘humanity’, for Baudrillard, as for Nietzsche, is already constituted as a universal form by the Enlightenment (1993: 50) this task is close to completion, though the final completion, the “perfect crime” against Otherness will never, according to Baudrillard, come to pass (Baudrillard 1996).[7] To summarise: the Code has a pacifying effect on society by promoting a largely agreeable universal – the free consumer, spoilt for choice, and it provides clearly sign-posted routes for advancement as well as constant reminders as to what could happen if we don’t play the game (of signs).

### 1NC Needs/Production Link

#### The assumption of innate human needs and of production is constructed by the capitalist system and destroys value to life

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Baudrillard's major contention in this work is that production is far more than a mode of creating goods for distribution and sale: production is, in Western culture, a metaphysical system. A 'metaphysics' is a system of thought that bases its arguments on an abstracted or 'meta' principle that cannot be shown to be valid and has to be taken on trust. The implication is that metaphysical principles are spurious and fanciful, and Baudrillard uses the term 'metaphysical' in the most derogatory sense to mean something like empty, abstract nonsense. To produce goods to satisfy basic survival needs is very widely understood as the fundamental law of the human species. According to Baudrillard productionism, as metaphysical principle, functions as an abstract principle that codes all human practices, desires, aspirations and forms of exchange as production. Yet, following Durkheim (1961) and Bataille (1986), Baudrillard insists that very little human action can actually be understood in terms of production. Instead, profound meaning, joy and intensity are experienced in taking risks, in wastefulness and even in destruction. The metaphysics of production locks us within a system of the production of value - whether as goods, services or signs. Further, we are expected to produce and reproduce ourselves as value, we must maximize ourselves, exploit our potential, and this, for Baudrillard, is the most fundamental, insidious and developed form of social control. According to Baudrillard, Marxism, though a powerful critical force in some respects, is confined within the metaphysics of productionism. Marxism departs sharply from liberal economic theory in that it emphasises the importance of the social relations of production, not merely the abstract forces or conditions of production (such as available technology, raw materials, markets for the sale of goods). Marx focuses on the social relations involved in any practice or process of production and asks awkward questions such as who benefits the most from such a system. Baudrillard still has a reputation as an anti-Marxist, forged largely by Marxist critics of his work, particularly Kellner (1989: 33-59) and Callinicos (1989:144-54). However, there is no question that Baudrillard was inspired and deeply influenced by Marx even in the formulation of his notion of symbolic exchange and of sign-value, which, ultimately, Baudrillard deploys as a critique of Marx. Symbolic exchange and the logic of sign-value are developed to critique the integrating power of capitalism. It is therefore simplistic and misleading to suggest that these are anti-Marxist concepts and that by developing them Baudrillard entirely rejects Marxism (Kellner, 1989: 58; Cdlinico^ 1989: 147). However, Baudrillard attacks Marxism explicitly on several related fronts. First, Baudrillard argues, Marx failed to see the interconnections between the system of political economy (of labour, the production of goods, the market) and the system of representation (language, the sign, meaning). For Baudrillard these two orders are parallel and 'inseparable' such that 'it becomes impossible to think outside the form production and the form representation' (1981: 43-63, 1975: 29). Other, more substantive criticisms flow from this principle. Because it does not question the abstract or metaphysical principle of production as a means of satisfying needs, Marxism tends to naturalise and universalise use-value. For the sake of clarity this point is explored in some detail. In a section of Critique entitled 'The Myth of Primary Needs' (1981: 80-2) Baudrillard contests what he terms the 'bio-anthropological postulate' of primary needs. The notion of need is ideological in the sense that it is based on an insupportable abstraction: the separation of '[hu]man as essence' from the social environment. One implication of this way of flunking is that the social system could be said to obscure the 'true essence of humanity', but Baudrillard denies that 'true', 'objective' survival needs can be identified, since 'it is always the production of the surplus that regulates the whole. The survival threshold is never determined from below, but from above' (1981: 81). That is, 'needs' and their satisfactions are always ideological, always implicated in power relations, never 'natural'. For Baudrillard needs are defined as: a function induced (in the individual) by the internal logic of the system: more precisely not as a consummative force liberated by the affluent society, but as a productive force required by the functioning of the system . . . there are only needs because the system needs them. (Baudrillard, 1981: 82-3, original emphasis) Baudrillard attacks the very principle of needs, uses and wants. To speak of needs, uses or wants is already an abstraction because it covertly assumes a great deal. It assumes an already existing, taken-for- granted individual separated from other individuals and separated from the world. It assumes that this 'individual', itself an abstraction, will naturally abstract or break down the world into useful things (and less useful things)and make use of the useful things to survive and reproduce. This assumes a natural state of scarcity and of competition for these scarce resources. It assumes that all of these components - 'objects', 'individuals', 'scarcity', 'usefulness' and 'competition' - exist in nature or reality, independently of social or cultural meanings and representational practices. It suggests that these facts of reality or nature are the cause of cultural meanings and practices, which are merely a 'reflection' of them. Baudrillard's contention, and it is by no means an original one, is that these components are effects, not causes, of cultural practices. It follows that each of these contentions can be contested and, for Baudrillard, must be if the capitalist system is to be challenged. Crucially, the idea that the individual pre-exists society, culture or community is patently absurd - although it is widely held. Every 'individual' is born into a community with values, norms and a language, or rather the notion of the 'individual' is only constituted through relations with the community's values, norms and language. That an individual can be recognised, and function, as 'an individual' is a mea- sure of the community's success in producing individuals. Moreover, what we refer to as an 'individual' is an idea generated by our cultural practices and meanings, which are capitalist, and which are built upon the 'barring' of symbolic exchange relations between people. These points relate to Baudrillard’s theories in two important ways. First, the notion of symbolic exchange invites us to think about social relations without the abstractions and separations we are accustomed to: symbolic exchange expresses a 'pact' that defies abstraction into separate poles, terms or individuals. Second, Baudrillard continues to explore the ways in which the individual - with his or her needs, wants and uses - are coded by the capitalist system. Capitalist exchange-value represents use-value as residing beneath or beyond it in a natural relationship of human beings to objects, but this is, for Baudrillard, a mirage on the horizon of exchange-value, 'a code effect' (1975: 25). The capitalist system of exchange-value claims to base exchange-values, or prices, on the solid reality of use-values. For example, a strong well made tin opener may cost twice as much as a flimsy poorly constructed one but it should last twice as long. But the relationship between use-value and exchange-value is not nearly this transparent. It obscures the fact that we live in a culture where people are unable to produce their own food and where they feel that they do not have time to prepare food. It obscures the appropriation of surplus-value or profit accrued by those who own the factories that produce tinned food. The Marxist critique enables us to theorise these relations, but it does not enable us to question the metaphysical principle of the individual with his or her needs and use-values because it accepts the reality of 'natural' needs and uses. Marxism allows capitalism this 'alibi' because it tries to locate and 'rediscover' a natural relation to use-value undistorted by capitalist exchange-value, but there is no 'natural' relation to use-value. Baudrillard focuses on the concept of labour, which is divided into two forms in Marx's Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (originally published in 1857). The labour used to produce use-value is 'concrete, immediate and special' but the labour used in producing exchange-value is 'abstract, universal and homogeneous' (1975: 26). Yet this distinction has the effect of 'autonomizing and generalising labour as the essence of human practice'. This amounts to 'an incredible simplification of social exchange' (1975: 29), which, according to Baudrillard, actually 'intensifies' the abstractions and separations made by liberal theorists of political economy: Marxism assists the cunning of Capital. It convinces men that they are alienated by the sale of their labour power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labour power, as the 'inalienable' power of creating value by their labour.

### ---2NR Production = Power

#### Production and accumulation establishes power and violence – symbolic exchange is better

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

At this stage in his argument Baudrillard refers less to the writings of Karl Marx and increasingly to 'Marxist' theorists of the twentieth century, particularly Louis Althusser and the Marxist anthropologist Maurice Godelier. Baudrillard's argument is that humanity, in all the richness of its relations of exchange, is circumscribed, contained and domesticated by Marxists because they 'generalise the economic mode of rationality over the entire expanse of human history' (1975: 33). The important distinction between symbolic and economic understanding of wealth is expanded in a chapter titled 'Primitive Societies' (1975: 91-6), where Baudrillard develops the notion of 'anti-production', which he perceives as operating within such societies: Baudrillard begins with the contention that the institutions of 'primitive' (meaning non-industrial) societies do not correspond to anything that can be recognised by the metaphysics of production. Such societies are not merely 'other' or different but radically other, inassimilable. According to Baudrillard they have no distinction between infrastructure and superstructure; moreover, they produce no surplus even though they are technically capable of doing so. The notion of symbolic exchange is immediate proffered as the principle that embodies this radical difference. Symbolic exchange 'excludes any surplus: anything that cannot be exchanged or symbolically shared would break the reciprocity and institute power... this exchange excludes all "production" ... production appears nowhere as an ends or a means: the meaning occurs elsewhere' (1975: 79-80). To clarify, it is not that culture or religion obstructs the potential for production or limits it to an underdeveloped state: for Baudrillard these are Eurocentric prejudices. Instead, social exchange is based on kinship ties of reciprocity, which are animated and maintained through the ritual destruction of wealth. The influence of Georges Bataille (1897-1962) on Baudrillard's theory is apparent at key points in the argument and is mobilised in the attack on Marxist anthropology. Following Bataille (1986), Baudrillard distinguishes between social wealth, which is material, and 'symbolic wealth', which is 'sacrificial'. The central distinction between productive economy and 'sacrificial economy' resides in radically different, 'irreconcilable' understandings of what constitutes wealth. Within 'sacrificial economy' the production of wealth is strictly limited and its destruction is an intensely meaning, expressive social practice. The rites and festivals of gift exchange cannot be considered forms of production, Baudrillard insists. To produce is not a spontaneous act of survival; production and even 'survival' are only meaningful in particular cultural contexts. In Western modernity it is thought desirable to maximize production, in other cultures it is not. In 'pre' or 'non'-industrial societies (there is no felicitous term) production is limited, and surpluses are not produced despite the 'potential' to do so. Surpluses or excesses are considered dangerous or disruptive because they carry the threat of a transformation of power relations, and an unleashing of violence and upheaval. Instead surplus is devoted to festivity or sacrifice, where power and violence are expressed in symbolic form and limited by strict social rules. As we have seen, the relationship between production and wealth is not straightforward. Does production produce wealth? In this equation production is conceived as a force and wealth is defined in terms of an abstract equivalent - money. However, among what Baudrillard terms 'primitive' societies (a term he uses to offend academic anthropologists) the gift establishes reciprocity: the obligatory act of exchanging or circulating wealth such that one's possession of it is 'sacrificed', either to gods or spirits or to other human beings. The cultural meanings expressed and experienced through sacrifice are 'impossible', not reducible to an abstract equival- ent and therefore in a sense 'priceless' or 'absolute'.

### 1NC Fiat

#### Fiat is a link – A. The 1AC is playing pretend-politics – this farce of a political process ignores the fact that politics in the “real world” is already dead

#### B. Fiat is a simulation of a policy – this representation of policymaking comes to stand in for policymaking in the “real world,” just as every other sign comes to replace reality.

#### It also primes us towards violence and destroys personal agency

Shaffer 7 (Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007)

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

### ---2NR A2 Deliberation Good

#### If I win Baudrillard is right about the code, deliberation can’t be good. Acts of deliberation about policy insert "reality" back into the simulation – this sign begins to point to nothing as reality is replaced by illusion

### 1NC Equality

#### Equality isn’t revolutionary; it only feeds the symbolic order

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Baudrillard pushes further. Life and death are separated by a 'bar' or 'line of social demarcation'; the bar actually constitutes understandings of both life and death, of the properties on both sides of the bar. Life and death are still conjoined, contiguous: the bar of their separation also joins them. The barred symbolic exchange (of life and death) is present in the very process of its barring. Death as symbolic exchange with life is barred, but separated out from symbolic meaningfulness death is devoid of meaning, an 'unprogammable' horror, an 'unthinkable anomaly'. Yet life too, separated from death, loses its meaningfulness, reduced to 'the indifferent fatality or survival' (1993a: 126). In other words the separation of life and death does not result in a profit accruing to life. Although life is shielded from death it must end in death; moreover, a death now devoid of symbolic meaning. Life, then, is reduced to survival, not living but literally ‘living-on', not (yet) dead. No matter how we deny or hide death it touches life. Similarly, it is possible to define sanity only by separating it from insanity, so the meaning of sanity depends upon the existence of insanity. The 'excluded', negative or demonised term exerts a certain power over the positive term. So, according to Baudrillard, the spectre of death haunts life, just as the spectre of madness haunts sanity, disorder threatens order and Evil stalks the Good. The excluded or 'pathological' term casts a shadow over 'normality' because, in the terminology Baudrillard borrows from Lacan, it become its Imaginary, its phantasy. Capital and economic power are, for Baudrillard, ultimately only the 'fantastic secularisation' of the power to separate living and dead. Humanism, democracy and even revolution alter nothing fundamental because they do operate at the level of symbolic exchange - that is, they do not challenge the bar of binary oppositions. Indeed, by aiming for equality they actually nourish the systemic or structural nature of binary oppositions, Baudrillard suggests. Political movements based on improving matters for the repressed term, in terms set by the dominant term, cannot, for Baudrillard, ever be revolutionary: on the contrary, 'the revolution can only consist in the abolition of the separation of death, and not in equality of survival' (1993a: 129).

### 1NC Labor = Gift

#### Labor, no longer related to production or meeting basic needs, merely ensures the domination of the code

Paulsen 14 [(Roland Paulsen, postdoctoral researcher at Lund University and author) “Empty Labor: Idleness and Workplace Resistance” google books] AT

Jean Baudrillard has famously driven this argument to extremes. Not only has Saussure’s signiﬁer been decoupled from the signiﬁed, Baudrillard argues, the distinction between exchange-value and use- value of modern political economy has equally imploded. Long before the “ﬁnancialization” of the economy became the popular concept that it is today, Baudrillard described how the “the monetary sign” escapes “into inﬁnite speculation, beyond all reference to a real of production, or even to a gold-standard” (Baudrillard, 1993 [I976]: 7). Similarly, work is decoupled from production. This is the essence of what Baudrillard calls “the death of labour.” Labor still exists, but it has lost every contact with the basic needs (which according to Baudrillard also have dispersed) to which the concept of use-value refers. Instead, its main purpose is its own reproduction: It remains, however, more necessary than ever to reproduce labour as a social ritual [affectation], as a reﬂex, as morality, as consensus, as regulation, as the reality principle. The reality principle of the code, that is: an immense ritual of the signs of labour extends over society in general - since it reproduces itself, it matters little whether or not it produces. (Baudrillard, 1993 [1 976]: 11) This “code” of reproduction concerns all institutions related to labor - even the strike is incorporated: “Corresponding to the absurd circularity of a system where one labours only to produce more labour is the demand for strikes for strikes’ sake” (Baudrillard, 1993 [1976]: 28). The point of these reproductions is to hide the new power shift in which capital no longer buys labor from workers. What shines through mainstream political debates is that labor really is a gift from capital to the people — a gift that the people can receive only if they are clever enough to vote for a government that will guarantee great rewards to capital for giving labor to the world. That is why wages are not paid for what we actually produce, wages are given for subjecting ourselves to the simulation of work: “Wages are the mark of this poisonous gift, the sign which epitomizes the whole code. They sanction this unilateral gift of labour, or rather wages symbolically buy back the domination exercised by capital through the gift of labour” (Baudrillard, 1993 [1976]:41).‘

## Impacts/Satellites/Case Tricks

### Poverty Not Objective

#### The aff’s attempt to study poverty fails – it’s exists not objectively but is defined by capitalist accumulation

Po-Keung 10 [(Hui, Associate Professor in the Department of Cultural Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong) “Poverty and Wealth in Hong Kong” March 2010 edition of MoKung, Oxfam Hong Kong's Chineselanguage magazine] AT

Giving students the opportunity to engage with a low-income community, if not done too superficially, does help students with a relatively privileged social background to broaden their horizons. Focusing on poor people's material life in this kind of poverty tour, however, imposes a non-traversable limit of cognition, because poverty is largely a relative concept in high-income cities such as Hong Kong. As pointed out by sociologist Jean Baudrillard (1981), in modern capitalist society, poverty is not determined by objective biological imperatives such as calorie intake, but by capitalist society's most fundamental logic of operation. In the process of capital accumulation, most wealth and resources flow toward rich people, while the residue defines the basic needs of low-income groups. In contemporary Hong Kong, high-profit luxury homes have always been the first priority for land developers. Our best land and other resources are hence reserved for wealthy luxury home-buyers; the residue is then channelled to meet poor people's basic needs, such as constructing public health facilities and low-income housing. In other words, the needs of poor people are determined by the logic of capital accumulation and reproduction: poor people can only consume leftovers from rich people, instead of securing basic inputs (defined by biological imperatives) for survival. Baudrillard reckoned that modern consumerism is governed by the logic of difference. By constructing linguistic signs, modern capitalism's production and consumption systems create differences (e.g. classes and genders) among everything in the society. Individual "needs" form only after a system of signs distinguishing such differences emerges. For example, the symbol of "luxury homes" demarcates its class differences with "public estates", generating our needs for "first home buying" and "upward purchasing" (i.e. buying larger and more expensive homes). In other words, consumers' personal needs are being produced and summoned by the operation of capitalism. Baudrillard denied the existence of "real" or "essential" needs, asserting that needs are not inherent but determined by differences specified in the capitalist system of signs. As different societies possess distinctive logic of differences, their "basic needs" differ. For example, clothing can be an expression of taste, not merely a display of wealth or the lack of it. Thus, the meaning that a sign signifies is not universal. Needs are created by the entire capitalist production and consumption system, and our necessities and desires are constructed by signs. Thus, it is impossible to isolate poverty as a subject of research because poverty is not a separated and autonomous entity. Poor people's "basic needs" are defined by the residue of the wealthy class. The formation of poverty is also at the same time the construction of luxury consumption. Therefore, poverty and affluence must be studied together; visiting poor people should also be complemented by understanding the formation of the rich's opulent lifestyle.

### Can’t Solve Poverty

#### The existence of a consumer society means the aff can’t solve poverty

Ritzer 98 [(George, American sociologist, professor, and author who studies globalization, metatheory, patterns of consumption, and modern and postmodern social theory) “Société de Consommation: Ses Mythes, Ses Structures” by Jean Baudrillard. Introduction – written by George Ritzer] AT

Rather than an affluent society, Baudrillard argues that we live in a 'growth society'. However, this growth brings us no closer to being an affluent society. Growth produces both wealth and poverty. In fact, growth is a function of poverty; growth is needed to contain the poor and maintain the system. While he is not always consistent on this, Baudrillard argues that the growth society is, in fact, the opposite of the affluent society. Its inherent tensions lead to psycho­logical pauperization as well as systematic penury (see later) since 'needs' will always outstrip the production of goods. Since both wealth and shortage are inherent in the system, efforts like those proposed by Galbraith to solve the problem of poverty are doomed to failure. Thus, in various ways, Baudrillard not only critiques, but also builds in very modern ways upon, Galbraith's work.

### Death Deferred Sat

#### The aff’s use of a system of wage labor destroys value to life – labor is a death deferred, an extension of the master’s domination of the slave by removing the slave from the symbolic order and defining the slave as a mere productive force

Baudrillard 93 Jean Baudrillard (French dude that looks strikingly similar to the old guy in ‘Up’). “Symbolic Exchange and Death.” 1993.

Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power. He converts this death into a wage. But the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on him by his definition as a productive force. Faking this equivalence is nothing next to the equivalence, qua signs, of wages and death. The very possibility of quantitative equivalence presupposes death. The equivalence of wages and labour power presupposes the death of the worker, while that of any commodity and any other presupposes the symbolic extermination of objects. Death makes the calculation of equivalence, and regulation by indifference, possible in general. This death is not violent and physical, it is the indifferent consumption of life and death, the mutual neutralisation of life and death in survival, or death deferred. Labour is slow death. This is generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort of death, to the "fulfilment of life", which is the idealist view; labour is opposed as a slow death to a violent death. That is the symbolic reality. Labour is opposed as deferred death to the immediate death of sacrifice. Against every pious and "revolutionary" view of the "labour (or culture) is the opposite of life" type, we must maintain that the only alternative to labour is not free time, or non-labour, it is sacrifice. All this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave. First, the prisoner of war is purely and simply put to death (one does him honour in this way). Then he is "spared" [épargné] and conserved [conservé] (=servus), under the category of spoils of war and a prestige good: he becomes a slave and passes into sumptuary domesticity. It is only later that he passes into servile labour. However, he is no longer a "labourer", since labour only appears in the phase of the serf or the emancipated slave, finally relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why is he freed? Precisely in order to work. Labour therefore everywhere draws its inspiration from deferred death. It comes from deferred death. Slow or violent, immediate or deferred, the scansion of death is decisive: it is what radically distinguishes two types of organisation, the economic and the sacrificial. We live irreversibly in the first of these, which has inexorably taken root in the différance of death. The scenario has never changed. Whoever works has not been put to death, he is refused this honour. And labour is first of all the sign of being judged worthy only of life. Does capital exploit the workers to death? Paradoxically, the worst it inflicts on them is refusing them death. It is by deferring their death that they are made into slaves and condemned to the indefinite abjection of a life of labour. The substance of labour and exploitation is indifferent in this symbolic relation. The power of the master always primarily derives from this suspension of death. Power is therefore never, contrary to what we might imagine, the power of putting to death, but exactly the opposite, that of allowing to live -- a life that the slave lacks the power to give. The master confiscates the death of the other while retaining the right to risk his own. The slave is refused this, and is condemned to a life without return, and therefore without possible expiation. By removing death, the master removes the slave from the circulation of symbolic goods. This is the violence the master does to the slave, condemning [her] him to labour power. There lies the secret of power (in the dialectic of the master and the slave, Hegel also derives the domination of the master from the deferred threat of death hanging over the slave). Labour, production and exploitation would only be one of the possible avatars of this power structure, which is a structure of death.

### 2NR Death Deferred

#### Even if I don’t win this link, the Baudrillard evidence is an independent link and impact. The aff’s use of the wage labor system means laborers are defined as mere productive forces that neutralizes life into mere survival, which destroys value to life. Also, genealogical analysis shows labor is merely an extension of slavery – the master defers the death of the slave so that the slave can work, removing the laborer from the symbolic exchange of life and death and inserting her into the position of the slave.

### Hyperreality Sat

#### Economics is a simulation. The 1AC criticizes mere floating signs, not reality itself.

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

According to Baudrillard we have now reached the 'end' of production. Production still takes place of course, but it leads an increasingly shadowy, obscure existence: banished to the third world, operating within closed and guarded compounds, non-unionised, off the radar (see, for example, Klein, 2001: 195-229). But Baudrillard's 'end' of production is not only geo-political but also epistemological. The sign-code or 'structural law of value' signals the end of production: the structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation. Strictly speaking, neither the 'classical' economy not the political economy of the sign ceases to exist: they lead a secondary existence becoming a sort of phantom principle of dissuasion. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 8) So, for Baudrillard the logic of economic production, analysed by Marx, and the logic of representation, analysed by Saussure, follow the same form: they establish principles of equivalence. Equivalence establishes regulated, ordered exchange, linear development and accumulation. In the economic sphere money is the abstract principle of equivalence: everything has a price and that price is directly comparable with the price for anything else. An academic, for example, is paid twice as much as a nurse, a doctor or lawyer three times as much as an aca- demic and so on. Similarly, in the sphere of language or representation a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified, and between sign and referent, enables 'meaning' to be produced, exchanged and accumulated. The signifier 'tree' invokes the same 'thing' whether it is used by a child, a horticulturist or a poet. This Baudrillard dubs the 'classical' representation or 'the second order of Simulacra' (1993a: 53-7). The spheres of economy and of representation are linked by the same underlying form, but at the level of content they are distinct, they can be distinguished, and Baudrillard terms this a relation of 'determinate' equivalence. The 'end' of production occurs with the shift from determinate to increasingly 'indeterminate' equivalence. Signs circulate in the code and are able to do so because they tend to become detached from determinate signifieds. As the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is weakened the 'referential dimension' of meaning is undermined because it was the signified that supposedly 'captured' meaning out there in the world (the referent). Of course we do not live in a world of free-floating signs or signifiers that mean nothing, or alternatively anything (Callinicos, 1989: 145). This is a ludicrous misreading of Baudrillard given his emphasis on the constraining power of the code and his deconstruction of individual 'needs' and 'wants'. Signifiers simulate the effect of meaning and reference: a 'reality-effect' is crucial to the operation of the capitalist system. It might be objected that signifiers have only ever simulated the effect of meaning and reference. In a sense, this is not far off the mark, since Baudrillard insists that the world is illusion, is simulacrum (1996c: 16-19, 2005d: 39-46). But there are, he asserts, meaningful, qualitative differences within simulacra, different and distinguishable orders of simulacra that have direct, meaningful and theorisable effects on lived relations and social experience. Baudrillard's approach is, then, more sociological than is acknowledged, 8 at least given a broad definition of the sociological! With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather than to a 'real', or referent. A 'hyperreality' of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real . . . they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real . . . . Neither Saussure nor Marx had any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real... the 'classical' period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7)

### No Causality

#### Causality is an illusion

Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

Destiny is intimately linked to some of the most difficult ideas in Baudrillard’s vocabulary, in particular seduction, the object and fatal strategies. Baudrillard is not interested in the notion of individual destiny (you will meet a handsome stranger, and so on), but the destiny of the object, its cycles of appearance, disappearance and reappearance. Indeed, for Baudrillard, ‘[destiny] comes to us from the other. Each is the destiny of the other. There is no individual destiny’ (IEx, 84). There are a number of exchanges, experiences or spaces where what we might ordinarily call the ‘subject’, person or individual, becomes, according to Baudrillard, an object. This notion of becoming- object is crucial to Baudrillard’s understanding of destiny. For Baudrillard destiny is rarely sensed in the ‘indifferent spaces’ of modern life (FS) where people (as ‘subjects’) are confined by instrumental rationality, purpose and time constraints. Yet where action is governed by a set of ‘entirely arbitrary rules’, rather than by norms or laws, in spaces such as those of ceremony and ritual, games and traditional dance, destiny, Baudrillard contends, is given free reign. Ceremonial or ritual space is enchanted not indifferent: time/space relations are altered, ceremonies unfold in their own time, ‘the ceremony contains the presentiment of its development and its end . . . [Time] must have the time to disappear’￼(FS, 207). Further, the rules of the game or ritual leave no place for legal, moral or psychological considerations; indeed, all that holds together ‘the subject’ is suspended, returning only when the game or ritual is over. Baudrillard’s oft-repeated example of the play of destiny is based on the old Iraqi folk tale known as ‘Death in Samarkand’. A soldier, on his way to market, sees the black-cloaked figure of Death apparently beckoning him. Terrified he flees and begs his king to lend him his fastest horse so that he may escape to the distant city of Samarkand. The following day the king asks Death why he frightened his soldier. Death replies ‘I didn’t mean to frighten him. It was just that I was surprised to see this soldier here, when we had a rendezvous tomorrow in Samarkand’ (S, 72). The soldier is destined, inevitably, to meet Death, who is himself ‘an innocent player in the game’ (S, 73). There is a direct line of development from Baudrillard’s positions con- cerning ritual initiation, his arguments on seduction and his thinking on destiny: ‘the initiatory fact of seducing and being seduced . . . consists in giving you a destiny, and not only an existence’ (FS, 165–6). Destiny then comes into play as a dual or ‘double life’ that unfolds beyond biological existence. That which reappears or returns signals a double life of destiny; ‘each individual life unfolds on two levels, in two dimensions – history and destiny – which coincide only exceptionally’ (IEx, 79). Baudrillard seems to derive this thinking from Nietzsche’s notion of the Eternal Return (IEx), though this influence is allusive not formative. Freed from biology, from historical change, from social norms and moral laws that define the ‘subject’, the double life is one of becoming object, becoming other, meta- morphosing not by choice but by the hands of fate. The opposition between chance (randomness) and determination (causal connection), Baudrillard argues, is a modern construction built on the denial of sacred and ceremonial social forms; he insists ‘the truth is that there is no chance’ (FS, 182), ‘Nothing is dead, nothing is inert, nothing is disconnected, uncorrelated or aleatory. Everything, on the contrary, is fatally, admirably connected – not at all according to rational relations [. . .], but according to an incessant cycle of metamorphoses, according to the seductive rapports of form and appearance’ (FS, 185). Games of chance such as gambling involve, for Baudrillard, a passion ‘to upset the causal system and the objective way things proceed and re-engage their fatal linkage’ (FS, 189). But how can events be ‘fated’? Writing on the death of Princess Diana, Baudrillard states ‘if we assess all that would have had not to have happened for the event not to take place, then quite clearly it could not but occur . . . no Dodi and no Ritz, nor all the wealth of the Arab princes and the historical rivalry with the British. The British Empire itself would have had to have been wiped from history’ (IEx, 136). And we prize such fated events, such spaces of destiny; for Baudrillard ‘each of us secretly prefers an arbitrary and cruel order, one that leaves us no choice, to the horrors of a liberal one where . . . we are forced to recognise that we don’t know what we want’ (FS, 206). Our fundamental passion, he asserts, is to be drawn out of the (hyper-)reality of rational- ity and causality and to be placed within a ‘pure unfolding’ of destiny. Further, with causal, temporal and subjectivist illusions suspended, there is, for Baudrillard, renewed potential for symbolic relations with the other: ‘if I am inseparable from the other, from all the others I almost became, then all destinies are linked . . . being is a linked succession of forms, and to speak of one’s own will makes no sense’ (IEx, 84). ‘There is in this symbolic circulation, in this sharing of destinies, the essence of a subtler freedom than the individual liberty to make up one’s mind’ (IEx, 85). According to Baudrillard, the processes of writing poetry and (radical) theory, like ritual, impose a set of rules of the game that must be followed and so can suspend the illusory opposition between a causal determined universe and one of freedom and choice. Words, signs, and things seduce each other with the subject reduced to their conduit, forging connections through ‘chain reaction’; this is the ‘order of destiny’. In both language (wit, slips of the tongue, poetry, theory) and in material, ‘socio-political’ registers destiny appears ‘where events attain their effects without passing through causes’ (FS, 192), moving in a predestined linkage. In ‘chance’ meetings and encounters and in ‘socio-political’ events things sometimes seem to happen in a flash, ‘in advance of the unfolding of their causes’ so that ‘reasons come after’ (FS, 198). We are seduced by the rapid flashes of appearance and disappearance, sometimes following them without thinking. Rationality, by contrast, seeks to invent causes to dispel this play of appearance and disappearance, to make them more ‘solid’. However ‘no event can put an end to the succession of events, and no action can definitively determine what follows’ (IEx, 87). Ultimately, Baudrillard suggests that both the world of destiny and the world of reason and causality are ‘equally groundless’ (FS, 206), but while the former seduces and links us to the Other, the latter bores and frustrates.

### Hatred Sat

#### The code’s effacement of alterity guarantees hatred and violent lashout

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

Hatred is undoubtedly something which outlives any definable object, and feeds on the disappearance of that object (Baudrillard 1995/1996: 145). What then is the relationship between the Code and violence and hatred? The Code, it seems, both pacifies and produces hate: indeed it produces hatred through pacification. The Code integrates as it differentiates, it culturates and multi-culturates. Baudrillard acknowledged that consumer capitalism had, partially, achieved a pacifying or ameliorative effect on ‘structural’ hatred such as the racism of biology or skin colour. However, the system, through its compulsory registration of all within the Code, generates, according to Baudrillard, new hatreds and new violence that cannot be ‘treated’ by socialisation, education and information. On racism specifically Baudrillard argues: Logically it [racism] ought to have declined with progress and the spread of Enlightenment. But the more we learn how unfounded the genetic theory of race is, the more racism intensifies. This is because we are dealing with an artificial construction of the Other, on the basis of an erosion of the singularity of cultures (Baudrillard 2002a: 55). If the dialectical violence of difference (self v. other) is ameliorated, the post-dialectical violence of indifference seems to grow in intensity. The violence of in-difference or “the hate” is a viral form and like a hospital ‘superbug’ it cannot be treated by the standard measures and cures because the over-use of those very measures produced it (Baudrillard 1996: 142-147; 2005: 141-155). The Code’s vast edifice of signs diversifies and assimilates producing ‘positive’ representations at the same time as the divide, both economic and cultural, between rich and poor deepens and ramifies. The richer get richer and the poor get humiliated. For Baudrillard the edifice of signs actually “deters”, prevents or displaces the possibility of genuine social progress by delivering “simulated” social progress: signs of inclusion, signs of empowerment. Further the masses (everyone, “nous, vous, tout le monde”) reject, ultimately, the system of signs; we become increasingly indifferent to it, disengaged from its prescriptions. The hate cannot be treated by the use of signs because the over-use of signs produced it. The hate, as Baudrillard figures it, cannot be broken down and understood through the binary or dialectical categories of self and other, black and white, inside and outside, us and them. The hate does not emanate from a recognisable position: a self, ideology or culture, nor does it emerge from the self, ideology or culture of the other. The verb ‘to hate’, like the self or ego has become autonomous: uprooted it flows and seeps crossing any boundary, any limit (Baudrillard 2005c: 141). The hate flows, is networked, travels at the speed of information; it has not one object or target but all and any. Because it is not, primarily, hatred of something or someone, it is not reflective or critical nor does it propose alternatives. Having no definite object, goal or purpose, no programme or ideology, the Hate is a particularly intractable and corrosive form of hatred. According to Baudrillard it devours the social relation: “it is certainly the end of the social” (Baudrillard 1996: 146). Baudrillard’s major example is terrorism which he discussed many times during his career. Terrorism, he asserts, does not oppose a state or ideology, still less proposes alternatives: terrorism refuses meaning, it aims at the social Code itself, it is “senseless and indeterminate, like the system it combats” (1983: 51). I have discussed terrorism elsewhere (Pawlett 2007: 133-149) and would like to offer alternative examples here. If we take the violent protests by some Muslim groups provoked by the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, publishing cartoons of the prophet Mohammed – what precisely was the object of the protester’s hate? It was not a particular newspaper, it was not the Danish state or people, it was, perhaps, not even ‘The West’ as such, it was the dominance of a system of representation that recognises no outside, no sacred, no ‘beyond’; that reduces all meanings, beliefs and sensations to sign fodder.[8] To offer other empirical cases, recent examples of the ‘serial killer’ in the UK include Levi Bellfield who hated and murdered the sign-type ‘blondes’ and Steve Wright who murdered the sign-type ‘prostitute’. Yet, moving away from such extreme behaviour into the quotidian, the middle classes hate and fear the sign-types ‘hoodie’ or the baseball-capped ‘chav’. The BNP hate the sign-type ‘Muslim’ though, increasingly ‘tolerate’ the Hindu or Sikh. But tolerance is always useless, always strategic and is generally indistinguishable from indifference. What Baudrillard’s position suggests is that we do not hate the Other – the radically Other, we merely hate the other – as transcribed and signified through the Code. The Code reduces the radically Other to the “dangerously similar”: dangerously similar because they differ only in sign content or position (Baudrillard 1993: 124-138). In our superficial or unwitting acceptance of the Code we hate (and ‘we’ do all hate) the other as sign, as merely a signified ‘reality’. We encounter an other who is no more than the ‘reality’ of their signification; at best we are indifferent to the other and tolerate them. Indeed we cannot but be indifferent to the other because it is through indifference that, socially, we tolerate. But Baudrillard’s position is not one of despair, nor, clearly, is it an elitist rejection of the masses and their behaviour. As mass we also defy the system, our acceptance is only ever partial and superficial. Transcription always fails, or else we fail the demands of transcription: in failing we defy and re-open the space of ambivalence (Baudrillard 1981: 205-10). In sum, the Code feeds “the hate” by replacing the potential for symbolic relations between people – the ambivalence of reciprocal exchange – with an insertion or transcription into the terms of the Code. Thus transcribed an individual person is merely a conglomeration of signs which fabricate their ‘reality’ – and if this is what we are reduced to, why wouldn’t we hate each other? Acting-out Here I want to examine a specific feature of Baudrillard’s approach to the issue of agency and violence. It has been claimed that Baudrillard has no theory of agency and that this constitutes a fundamental weakness in his work (Kellner 1989: 216). Baudrillard position was that the illusion of agency was an effect of the Code, and a powerful one. Yet even as we are transcribed into the terms of the Code we remain singularities in radical ambivalence – hence Baudrillard did not reduce embodied experience to an effect of language. Within the Code there is no meaningful agency or resistance in the conventional sense, but there are, Baudrillard insisted, other forms of agency. One which his later work developed was “acting-out”. Within the Code we are not merely ‘internalised’ as the work of Nietzsche, Weber and others suggests. For Baudrillard we are now in a new phase where the inner-directed self must compare, contrast and differentiate themselves in relation to others in term of coded positions on a hierarchical scale. The Code generates, according to Baudrillard, a state of “annoyed indifference”. Yet indifference may suddenly, inexplicably, accelerate into a violent “acting-out” – that is into ‘real’ acts of violence. Baudrillard’s use of the Freudian term “acting-out” (Agieren) requires some clarification. In fact Baudrillard used a number of terms which bear the stamp of Freud and Lacan throughout his career: real, symbolic and imaginary, seduction, abreaction, transference and counter-transference, though curiously these have not attracted the attention of most critics and commentators. In contrast, Mike Gane has suggested that Baudrillard’s ideas concerning symbolic exchange can be understood as his ‘version’ of the Freudian Unconscious. For Freud the notion of ‘acting-out’ concerns repressed memories of past events which return by expressing themselves in actions that the actor ‘responsible’ cannot understand and which appear irrational or ‘out of character’ (Freud 1920/1991). For Lacan acting-out occurs when the capitalised or ‘big’ Other (which I will define simply as the Code at this stage, but see below on ‘radical alterity’) refuses to listen to the subject or rules out in advance any recognition of the subject’s desires or hopes.[9] In acting-out the humiliated subject unconsciously or unwittingly expresses a message to society: you will listen, you will take notice. However neither the ‘agent’ of this acting-out, nor society at large, comprehend this failed act of communication. Baudrillard adapts the Lacanian sense of the term and it becomes vital to his later work on hatred, violence and terrorism. Acting-out, for Baudrillard, may well be incomprehensible to the people involved and to society’s official discourses of criminology and criminal justice, but it is far from meaningless. We are all humiliated by the Code, by transcription and transparency, by competition and anxiety but some are humiliated far more than others. We cannot oppose anything so nebulous, evanescent, so abstract as the Code but acts of violence, defiance and hatred become as nebulous, as formless, as ubiquitous as the Code. Hatred and violence are destructured, become less and less comprehensible through the well-worn categories of self and other. Indeed hatred “outlives any definable object and feeds on the disappearance of that object” (1996: 145). The “absent other of hatred” can be literally anybody at anytime. We might hate someone for their religion or ‘culture’, or for their music collection or hairstyle, we might even kill someone for the way they looked at us. To cite other recent cases in the UK: a ‘Chav’ kills a ‘Goth’ because the Goth was “different”. Yet, the difference involved is merely a semiotic difference from the Chav.[10] Not a relation of radical difference or alterity but, as Baudrillard terms it a “dangerous similarity”: Chavs wear white, Goths wear black. Both are popular cultural youth styles, both exist for the other as differential sign display, each positions the other as the other positions them. But, according to Baudrillard, the Goth is not the Chav’s object of hate. The hate is sudden, eruptive “acting-out”; it evaporates as suddenly as it flared.[11] We can find support for Baudrillard’s ideas in academic criminology. Kenneth Polk (1994) presents a number of fascinating case studies of “male confrontational homicide” and emphasises both the similarity, in terms of age, class and income (as well as gender) of victims and aggressors, and the sudden evaporation of hostility after the event. Typically young males arrested for fatal attacks on their peers do express remorse, as well as disbelief, and, according to Polk, a curious sense of being unable to define or locate any reason for hostility. After the event comments such as “he seemed a decent bloke” are apparently common, the protagonists recalling no dislike and unable to offer any rationalisation to the police (Polk 1994: 111). For Baudrillard acting-out as failed communication, where communication is impossible, is not, fundamentally, a cry of the dispossessed or impoverished. It is rather a response of the relatively affluent, of those on the ‘right’ side of the global divide, it is a communication that says ‘Be other’, it is “a desperate form of the production of the other” (2005c: 147). But this is still the lower case other, the other of the Code, not the Other of radical alterity. We do not hate the Other, the Other in their unfathomable singularity, we suffer from an object-less hate, a vague sense of unfulfillment and ennui that in acting-out we project at anyone who can function, however momentarily, as our other, our enemy. In such a situation it is an ‘other’ not the Other that is hated; indeed any ‘other’ will do.

### Science Bad

#### Science/technology’s emphasis on neutrality turns ends into means in a pure instrumentality which results in a generalized system of domination

Marcuse 89 [(Herbert, cultural critic) “From Ontology to Technology: Fundamental Tendencies of Industrial Society” From Critical Theory and Society: A Reader] AT

￼At first, it was possible to believe that the "denaturation" of reality is masked by the terrible force through which the technical world resists the will and the thinking of the individual; that the pure and simple power of the matter which man should transform and which transforms him was never so overwhelming. But this power is the very power of man. It is through this same human practice that the technical world has congealed into a "second nature," or a false immediacy, schlechte Unmittelbarkeit [bad immediacy], more hostile and destructive than this or that pretechnical nature. The technical reality does not have any substance other than the subject. But the subject—who would make out of this technical reality the world of his liberty—exists only potentially "in itself and not "for itself." Consequently, technical reality is deprived of its logos, or, more precisely, that logos appears as deprived of reality, as a logical form without substance. Contemporary positivism, semantics, symbolic logic, and linguistic analysis define and filter the universe of discourse for the use of technicians, specialists, and experts who calculate, adjust, and match without ever asking for whom and for what. The occupation of these specialists is to make things work, but not to give an end to this process. Neither science nor technics have values in themselves; they are "neutral" with respect to values or ends that might have been attributed to them from outside. This neutrality is nonetheless positive: reality is value, and it is evaluated precisely as if it were conceived in its pure form (or as pure matter: in this context these two terms, although opposite, con- verge) and lent itself to all ends. Being assumes the ontological character of instrumentality; by its very structure this rationality is susceptible to any use and to any modification. Are those notions inherent in science? Don't they too easily correspond ￼to the social conditions of experience in which scientific method devel- oped? Demonstrating the link which exists between mathematical and operative science on one hand, and ascending capitalism on the other, does not exhaust the question. This link deserves to be reexamined. The link existing between science and society is well known. As science was liberating itself, liberating nature from its "external" forces and constituting objectivity as a means in itself, a pure and universal means, an analogous liberation was produced in social relations: man found himself liberated from any individual and "external" dependence. Man entered into the social process as an abstract and universal element, quantifiable in terms of labor power. In the course of this process, the concrete aspect of having different intellectual faculties and individual needs (the secondary qualities!) became reduced to a common denominator, a quantifiable, objective base of exchange, of money, and of means in a universal￼milieu. The parallel between social development and scientific development discloses a common principle: efficiency. The scientific method sees in this principle the most certain warranty of its correctness. But there isn't, there couldn't be, efficiency per se? In the social process, the end (of efficiency) is the production of consumer goods, which purports to satisfy needs and an exchange value which integrates subjects and objects according to a universal, quantifiable standard. It seems, however, that science wasn't originally indebted to such ends; this is a great illusion. Conceptu- ally speaking, science tended towards a different end. First, science made ends abstract—as processes which appeared themselves incompatible not with "reality," but with the ascending industrial reality in which ends become means in a system of "technicity."4 In this way, science constructed the universe of intellectual and physical instrumentality, a system truly "hypothetical." Nevertheless, a system of instrumentality depends, as such, on another system: on a universe of ends. What appears as external, foreign to the terminology of science, is actually part of its structure, its method, and its concepts: of its objectivity. One should therefore reject the notion of technical neutrality, which offers a perspective on techniques beyond good and evil and which appears as objectivity itself, suspectible to social usage in all its forms. Indeed, a machine, a technical instrument, can be considered as neutral, as pure matter. But the machine, the instrument, does not exist outside an ensemble, a technological totality; it exists only as an element of technicity. This form of technicity is a "state of the world," a way of existing between man and nature. Heidegger stressed that the "project" of an instrumental world precedes (and should precede) the creation of those technologies￼which serve as the instrument of this ensemble. People should therefore conceive of reality as a technical ensemble (technicity) before attempting to act upon it as a technician. In fact, such "transcendental" knowledge possesses a material base in the needs of society and in the incapacity of society to either satisfy or develop them. I would like to insist on the fact that the abolition of anxiety, the pacification of life, and enjoyment are the essential needs. From the beginning, the technical project contains the requirements of these needs: these requirements are part of the notion of world harmony, of physical laws, and of the mathematician God (the highest idea of universal equality throughout all inequality!). These requirements are intrinsic to the very notion of modern science, which demands the free play of intellectual faculties against repressive powers. If one considers the existential character of technicity, one can speak of a final technological cause and the repression of this cause through the￼social development of technology. The question is whether neutrality, in relation to values, is a scientific notion, that is to say, a requirement inherent in the structure of modern science. In my opinion, the neutrality of technology (which is a mere manifestation of the neutrality of science) is a political concept. Industrial society clearly developed a notion of technology which undercuts its inherent character. Indeed, as a historical project, technicity has an internal sense of its own: technicity projects instrumentality as a way to release man from labor and anxiety, as a way to pacify the struggle for existence. This is the ultimate purpose for that methodical transformation of the world implied in technicity. Developed as "pure" instrumentality, technology has rendered this concrete purpose into an abstraction. It has ceased to be the goal of technological development. Consequently, pure instrumentality deprived of its ultimate purpose, has become a universal means for domination. Indeed, technicity requires domination: the control of nature as a hostile, destructive, and violent force; the control of man as part of that nature; the exploitation of natural resources for the satisfaction of needs. In these ways, industrial society appropriately exercises its technological domination; but insofar as society has made an abstraction of technology's ultimate purpose, technology itself perpetuates misery, violence, and destruction. The interdependence of productive and destructive forces, which characterizes technicity as domination, tends to suppress any difference between the "normal" and the abnormal "use" of technology. The difference between the use of "technology" and science by the Nazis and by democracy is dubious. A missile remains a missile whether it destroys London or Moscow, and Mr. von Braun remains Mr. von Braun whether he works for the Brown House or the White House. The absence of an ultimate purpose in technology manifests itself equally in politics, where it becomes open to suspicion and contestation. If the creation of the technical world did not abolish the domination of man over man, it was because a particular development of technicity— which is more profound and more ancient than technique itself—continued to make out of life merely a means of living. Up to the present, technical progress remains the progress of an alienated labor, of a repressive productivity. Technicity became the most efficient method, the most fruitful way, to subjugate man to his instrument of labor.

### 1NC The Code [in Long 1NC]

#### Consumer capitalism simulates liberation to enforce social control – politics by itself can’t solve

Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more complete form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and assimilation which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’ politics is defused by the code; they are designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feeding consumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system. The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption. The code simulates choice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer society by allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition. The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation. The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.

### 2NR Code – Top

#### The code assimilates challenge by converting challenges into floating signs that have no reference in reality, for example in “revolutionary” signs reproduced on consumer goods – the aff’s progressive stance is a mere sign used to promote consumption, driving an exploitative logic that is founded not on labor exploitation but on the code, which means the aff solves nothing

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

The dialectic, which had functioned in the phase of competitive capitalism, is undermined by the operation of the code as a system of 'total abstraction' where the signified and the referent are now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers... of a generalised formalization in which the code no longer refers back to any subjective or object- ive 'reality', but to its own logic. The signifier becomes its own referent and the use-value of the sign disappears to the benefit of it commutation and exchange value alone. The sign no longer designates anything at a l l . . . all reality becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structural simulation. (1975: 128) According to Baudrillard there is no more dialectic of meaning, either in representation, the dialectic between sign and reference, or in economics, between supply and demand. The code absorbs these through 'predictive anticipation' and 'planned socialisation', which extends far beyond the production and consumption of goods and incorporates 'needs, knowledge, culture, information, sexuality' as terms of the code (1975: 126). All that once had an 'explosive force' (ibid.) is defused, deterred or contained; there may still be signs of the dialectic, but they are precisely that: only signs. Signs of revolt and 'liberation' abound: images of Che Guevara on T-shirts, spiky 'punk' hair on V05 adverts, gay couples in soaps. But these are signs generated by the capitalist system and any 'revolution' they generate is at the level of the sign and of fashion. Content (of T-shirts and hair products for the young, of soap opera characters) changes constantly, it is always being revolutionised. There are, of course, healthy profits in niche and 'diversity' marketing, yet more important than profit margins, according to Baudrillard, is the level of form, of the sign as form and as code. The production and consumption of signs is the form through which we understand ourselves. The code sets all the terms in advance, of conformity and resistance, playfulness and seriousness. It promotes signs of revolt and signs of conformity because it constructs 'conformists' and 'rebels' as types of consumer, as alternative poles that structure patterns of consumption. The implication is clear: even 'pushed to the limit' Marxism is unable to critique the sign-form, the general principle of the code. The passage from the commodity-form to the sign-form or the political economy of the sign is one of the passage of all values to sign-exchange value, under the hegemony of the code. That is, of a structure of control and of power much more subtle and more totalitarian than that of exploitation' (1975: 121). The code is 'illegible', it cannot be read, it is instead the form that allows 'reading\* to take place. 'Production' as metaphysical principle is the principle of the code: desire, sexuality, even knowledge is understood in terms of production. The code destroys social relations as live symbolic exchanges. It is far more destructive than ownership of the means of production, and, for Baudrillard, this represents a revolution as profound as the industrial revolution was two centuries earlier. According to Baudrillard we have now reached the 'end' of production. Production still takes place of course, but it leads an increasingly shadowy, obscure existence: banished to the third world, operating within closed and guarded compounds, non-unionised, off the radar (see, for example, Klein, 2001: 195-229). But Baudrillard's 'end' of production is not only geo-political but also epistemological. The sign-code or 'structural law of value' signals the end of production: the structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation. Strictly speaking, neither the 'classical' economy not the political economy of the sign ceases to exist: they lead a secondary existence becoming a sort of phantom principle of dissuasion. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 8) So, for Baudrillard the logic of economic production, analysed by Marx, and the logic of representation, analysed by Saussure, follow the same form: they establish principles of equivalence. Equivalence establishes regulated, ordered exchange, linear development and accumulation. In the economic sphere money is the abstract principle of equivalence: everything has a price and that price is directly comparable with the price for anything else. An academic, for example, is paid twice as much as a nurse, a doctor or lawyer three times as much as an aca- demic and so on. Similarly, in the sphere of language or representation a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified, and between sign and referent, enables 'meaning' to be produced, exchanged and accumulated. The signifier 'tree' invokes the same 'thing' whether it is used by a child, a horticulturist or a poet. This Baudrillard dubs the 'classical' representation or 'the second order of Simulacra' (1993a: 53-7). The spheres of economy and of representation are linked by the same underlying form, but at the level of content they are distinct, they can be distinguished, and Baudrillard terms this a relation of 'determinate' equivalence. The 'end' of production occurs with the shift from determinate to increasingly 'indeterminate' equivalence. Signs circulate in the code and are able to do so because they tend to become detached from determinate signifieds. As the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is weakened the 'referential dimension' of meaning is undermined because it was the signified that supposedly 'captured' meaning out there in the world (the referent). Of course we do not live in a world of free-floating signs or signifiers that mean nothing, or alternatively anything (Callinicos, 1989: 145). This is a ludicrous misreading of Baudrillard given his emphasis on the constraining power of the code and his deconstruction of individual 'needs' and 'wants'. Signifiers simulate the effect of meaning and reference: a 'reality-effect' is crucial to the operation of the capitalist system. It might be objected that signifiers have only ever simulated the effect of meaning and reference. In a sense, this is not far off the mark, since Baudrillard insists that the world is illusion, is simulacrum (1996c: 16-19, 2005d: 39-46). But there are, he asserts, meaningful, qualitative differences within simulacra, different and distinguishable orders of simulacra that have direct, meaningful and theorisable effects on lived relations and social experience. Baudrillard's approach is, then, more sociological than is acknowledged, 8 at least given a broad definition of the sociological! With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather than to a 'real', or referent. A 'hyperreality' of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real . . . they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real . . . . Neither Saussure nor Marx had any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real... the 'classical' period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7) The tensions, contradiction, oppositions and sheer unpredictability the dialectic tend to be neutralised by simulation, although Baudrillard is clear that the dialectic does not disappear, nor of course is it transcended or obliterated. It endures, as do aspects of the first order of simulacra, but in tattered, fragmented form in the firmament of ideas that have had their moment but do not die (see also Baudrillard, 1994b: 21-7). This, in itself, is a paradoxical, other-than-dialectical process because, according to dialectics, one state is supposed to be definitely raised, resolved and transcended by another state. The dialec- tic rolls on, but it no longer captures our imagination. In a characteristic reversal strategy, directed at Marxist theory, Baudrillard argues that capitalism, rather than being 'transcended' by socialism, has actually leapt over the dialectic as it 'substitutes the structural form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system's strategy' (1993a: 7). Given this metamorphosis, Baudrillard asks whether we are we still living within capitalism. 'Hyper-capitalism' may be a more accurate term, he suggests, but what is not in doubt is that 'the structural law of value is the purest, most illegible form of social domination ...... it no longer has any references within a dominant class or a relation of forces' (1993a: 10-11).

### 2NR Code – Signs

#### Reality is constituted by a system of signs – all we know is not reality itself, but our perception of it, or signs. The code is able to control these signs in order to control us

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

The Code as form is preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology “precessional”; that is, as grid or network it precedes individual experience, perception, choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract, arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified, the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself. The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Baudrillard calls this the “logic of equivalence”. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or grid whereby all points can be compared, contrasted and exchanged. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be converted into sign form, it rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’, essences, identities and differences.[2] Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot process ambivalence (or becoming) as these are not ‘things’ with identity but relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis. The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental. At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together. Baudrillard was particularly interested in the moment of the “counter-gift” (contre don), that is the refusal of the gift or its return with interest to the giver in a kind of status war (the latter often referred to, rather imprecisely, as “potlatch” (1993: 125-194). Baudrillard defines the Code as the “structural law of value”; a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production, social identities. His early emphasis was the Code’s “ obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68). The Code produces a “hierarchy of differential signs” and, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned by the Code, and are positioned through it by others. We all know the value of a professional career, an elite education or a cute butt whether we like it or not. Further each of these ‘sign-values’ are classifiable and comparable through the sign’s logic of equivalence: traditionally wealthy businessmen trade on their financial wealth to offset their ailing physique and secure the affections of a younger and more physically attractive partner, that businesswomen now do the same only demonstrates the universalisation of the Code’s sign system. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence and in the barring produces equivalence – the regulated play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false, good/evil, self/other, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. Binary oppositions are central features of Baudrillard’s first and second orders of the sign (or “orders of simulacra”). The third order, of the Code proper, simulates choice, difference, freedom and diversity by allowing the privileged term to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’, ‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion and cosmetics advertising or pop music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign form, that is as “simulation”. In his early studies, The Object System and The Consumer Society Baudrillard depicts the Code as performing a pacifying effect on society; it soothes away once clear-cut, binary divisions of class and status by registering all people as individual consumers on a single universal scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations: but an illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard did not contend that other forms of violence and dissent would be deterred by the Code. Indeed he wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, not binary but post-dialectical (Baudrillard 1998: 174-185). He later proposed the term “disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996: 142-147). The later sections of the paper explore “the hate” in some detail.

### Excess of Rationalization [in Long 1NC]

#### A consumption-driven system makes every impact inevitable

Smith 10 [(Richard G. Smith, Associate Professor of Geography at Swansea university) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

According to Baudrillard, a ‘perverse’ logic (SC, 97) drives consumer societies. A logic that fuels, not just the use and abuse of drugs, but also the growth of other phenomena: terrorism, violence, depression, fascism and so forth. These phenomena are all, says Baudrillard, the product or outcome of ‘an excess of organization, regulation and rationalization within a system’ (SC, 97). In other words, those societies which are defined and ‘saturated’ by their system of consumption tend to suffer from an excess of systemic rationalisation (logic and rationality, surveillance and control), which perversely leads to the emergence – for no apparent reason – of ‘internal pathologies’, ‘strange dysfunctions’, ‘unforeseeable, incurable accidents’, ‘anomalies’ (SC, 97), which disrupt the system’s capacity for totality, perfection and reality invention. It is the logic of an excessive system to fuel the growth of anomalies, which along with AIDS and cancer are pathologies in that they have not come from elsewhere, from ‘outside’ or from afar, but are rather a product of the ‘over-protection’ of the body – be it social or individual. The system’s overcapacity to protect, normalise and integrate is evidenced everywhere: natural immunity is replaced by systems of artificial immunity – ‘hygienic, chemical, medical, social and psychological pros- thetics’ (SC, 98) – in the name of science and progress.

### Vampiricism

#### Calls to take action and alleviate suffering from within debate vampirically drain the life out of the so-called “victims,” commodifying their pain for the ballot

Baudrillard 96 (Jean Baudrillard The Perfect Crime, 1996, pg 133 – 137, CP)

Our reality: that is the problem. We have only one, and it has to be saved. `We have to do something. We can't do nothing.' But doing something solely because you can't not do something has never constituted a principle of action or freedom. Just a form of absolution from one's own impotence and compassion for one's own fate. The people of Sarajevo do not have to face this question. Where they are, there is an absolute need to do what they do, to do what has to be done. Without illusion as to ends and without compassion towards themselves. That is what being real means, being in the real. And this is not at all the `objective' reality of their misfortune, that reality which `ought not to exist' and for which we feel pity, but the reality which exists as it is -- the reality of an action and a destiny. This is why they are alive, and we are the ones who are dead. This is why, in our own eyes, we have first and foremost to save the reality of the war and impose that -- compassionate -- reality on those who are suffering from it but who, at the very heart of war and distress, do not really believe in it. To judge by their own statements, the Bosnians do not really believe in the distress which surrounds them. In -- 134 -the end, they find the whole unreal situation senseless, unintelligible. It is a hell, but an almost hyperreal hell, made the more hyperreal by media and humanitarian harassment, since that makes the attitude of the whole world towards them all the more incomprehensible. Thus, they live in a kind of spectrality of war -- and it is a good thing they do, or they could never bear it. But we know better than they do what reality is, because we have chosen them to embody it. Or simply because it is what we -- and the whole of the West -- most lack. We have to go and retrieve a reality for ourselves where the bleeding is. All these ‘corridors’ we open up to send them our supplies and our `culture' are, in reality, corridors of distress through which we import their force and the energy of their misfortune. Unequal exchange once again. Whereas they find a kind of additional strength in the thorough stripping-away of the illusions of reality and of our political principles -- the strength to survive what has no meaning -- we go to convince them of the `reality' of their suffering -- by culturalizing it, of course, by theatricalizing it so that it can serve as a point of reference in the theatre of Western values, one of which is solidarity. This all exemplifies a situation which has now become general, in which inoffensive and impotent intellectuals exchange their woes for those of the wretched, each supporting the other in a kind of perverse contract -- exactly as the political class and civil society exchange their respective woes today, the one serving up its corruption and scandals, the other its artificial convulsions and inertia. Thus we saw Bourdieu and the Abbé Pierre offering themselves up in televisual sacrifice, exchanging between them the pathos-laden language and sociological metalanguage of wretchedness. And so, also, our whole society is embarking on the path of commiseration in the literal sense, under cover of ecumenical pathos. It is almost as though, in a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and politicians, related to the panic-stricken state of history and the twilight of values, we had to replenish the stocks of values, the referential reserves, by appealing to that lowest -- 135 -common denominator that is human misery, as though we had to restock the hunting grounds with artificial game. A victim society. I suppose all it is doing is expressing its own disappointment and remorse at the impossibility of perpetrating violence upon itself. The New Intellectual Order everywhere follows the paths opened up by the New World Order. The misfortune, wretchedness and suffering of others have everywhere become the raw material and the primal scene. Victimhood, accompanied by Human Rights as its sole funerary ideology. Those who do not exploit it directly and in their own name do so by proxy. There is no lack of middlemen, who take their financial or symbolic cut in the process. Deficit and misfortune, like the international debt, are traded and sold on in the speculative market -- in this case the politico-intellectual market, which is quite the equal of the late, unlamented military-industrial complex. Now, all commiseration is part of the logic of misfortune [malheur]. To refer to misfortune, if only to combat it, is to give it a base for its objective reproduction in perpetuity. When fighting anything whatever, we have to start out -- fully aware of what we are doing -- from evil, never from misfortune.

### A2 Aff = Survival

#### The aff promotes a vision of life that is mere survival – this produces a form of life that is a living death – it’s try or die for the alternative to restore value to life

Fluri 11 [(Jennifer, Geography Department and Women’s and Gender Studies Program, Dartmouth College) “Capitalizing on Bare Life: Sovereignty, Exception, and Gender Politics” Antipode Vol. 00 No. 0 2011] AT

In the introduction to Homo Sacer, Agamben defines ancient Greek terms for life: “zoe ̈ which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben 1995:1). He sets up these distinctions to critique the condition of modern “western” politics. “Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoe ̈ and bios, between voice and language, that would have healed the fracture. Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception” (Agamben 1995:11). Agamben also identifies sacred life, homo sacer, which is made into “the object of aid and protection” (1995:133). He continues to link humanitarian organizations “in perfect symmetry with state power, need. A humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to reproduce the isolation of scared life at the basis of sovereignty, and the camp” (1995:134). Humanitarian organizations and development projects are integrated into the folds of sovereign power based on donor dictates and the ideologies of individuals on the “front lines” of humanitarian action. Also the assumption that life targeted for humanitarianism is by definition homo sacer and bare life assumes a hierarchal arrangement between zoe ̈ (bare life) and the subjective claims and politicized perspective for defining bios or proper life worth living. Placing (or displacing) life onto the margins of bios (proper life) by firmly binding it into a framework of human rights at the site of zoe ̈ (as common or bare life) subjectively defines and demarcates bare life as the site of living death, as well as potentiality or transference. Minca’s calls on geographers to think of places (rather than spaces) in order to avoid translating lived bodies into “the corpus of the nation” and the isolation of bare life (Minca 2007:90). Bare life (as defined in conflict or emergency aid/development zones) is life on the precipice of potentiality—as a living corpse “in need” of rebirth to bios through outside intervention. Layers of politics (and economically structured assumptions) substantiate the reduction from “proper” to bare life, and the creation of victims into sites of “humanitarian” biopolitics. As argued by Redfield: “the bios that understands itself as a civilizing force has difficulty imagining a zoe ̈ that it could not civilize or one whose alteration might change the very conditions of dignity” (2005:345). Bare life can then be discursively articulated as a site of potentiality through transcendental or metaphysical re-birth (such as attempted by religious groups) or by way of economic transference from bare life (zoe ̈—essential life) to bios (life with meaning—a “proper” life). The transference from zoe ̈ to bios re-evaluates life by way of its devaluation through an outsider’s lens. Life defined as on the edge of survival—essential and basic—resides in this zone of indistinction, where “universal” conceptualizations of rights are called upon to carry out a rescue by means of economic development as the mode of this transference.

## Alternative

### Radical Alterity Alt

#### The alternative is to recognize radical alterity – refusing to ascribe a fixed identity to the Other means the system cannot assimilate the Other

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

Baudrillard’s position was not one of despair; it is not without hope. The Code is not total; it merely aims at totality. Though we may act as though we believe in the system, ultimately we do not. Baudrillard wrote “I am not a pessimist … singularity (or radical otherness) is indestructible” (2005). There is always a “principle of secret disaffection” (1996: 142) against the system, disaffection is felt by all, despite their relative position in the hierarchy of the Code. The absorption, integration and channelling of all negative elements by the Code inevitably gives rise to “violent, virulent, destabilising abreactions” (ibid.). In this, as in much else, Baudrillard’s position did not change, remaining consistent from the writing of The Consumer Society in the late 1960s right through to The Intelligence of Evil (2005a) and late essays such as The Pyres of Autumn (2005). We hate the other as sign, as signifying regime which allows us, momentarily, to act-out our frustrations through them. As we hate the other as sign, we must, as Baudrillard demanded, “burn signs” (1981: 163). If we acknowledge that the Code humiliates us all, some far more than others, and that humiliated people will, occasionally and not in any predictable way, act-out to communicate disaffection and defiance we must not play the game of signs, we must not play with the humiliation of the other through signs. Because of the violence of the Code as system of assimilation and absorption, violent ‘acting-out’ is always, for Baudrillard, a counter-offensive or counter-gift. This process does not take place at the conscious, rational, goal-directed level of the Liberal subject: it is an “abreaction”, a rising to the surface of a ‘repressed’, ingrained violence – our positioning by the Code. We are all humiliated by the Code; we are all rubbished and “ripped apart” by it. How do we defy the Code? We might begin with counter-violence: a counter-gift or “subtraction” directed against our-‘self’ as constituted by the Code. Not self-hatred or ressentiment but defiance of the Code’s violent construction of our ‘identity’ as signified and defined through the “ludique” game of signs. We allow the other to become Other, singular, non-identical. We do not place or define ourselves or others. We do not reduce the other to a ‘reality’ – neither what we imagine to be a positive, endorsing, empowering ‘reality’ or to a negative, stereotyped ‘reality’. To reduce the other to a ‘reality’ in order to confer them rights and representation is, for the conferrer, a form of control and limitation over the conferee. Yet this form of control is never stable or complete, the recipient of rights or entitlements may not believe in them as the system does. To be in the Code is to be able to defy the Code, and, according to Baudrillard, behind our superficial acceptance of the system we do, in any case, practice a poetics of “distance”. A “distance” not from the Other, but from ourselves: a distance that recovers proximity to the Other (Baudrillard 2001: 45-50, 70-73). We might look for the singularity of the Other, and for oneself as Other, as radical alterity, as ambivalence and “secret” that cannot be incorporated by the system because it cannot be read, understood or positioned. To experience self and other as CODE is the vital precondition to individualise, commodify and hate. Without a self the other cannot be the same and without self or other there is little scope for hate. Do not fight over signs: fight the sign system.

### A2 Activism Good/Suicide Bad

#### The alternative requires exhaustion – choosing activist modes of resistance privileges the neoliberal ethos of productivity, which makes the system more powerful – a deliberate refusal to produce reorients suicide towards social creativity and builds a new form of civilization

Bifo 11 – Whit Whitmore’s pen name (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, After the Future pg 106-108)

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

### Symbolic Exchange Solvency

#### The alternative is metaphorical suicide. Refusing our identities as laborers, refusing to produce and accumulate returns the “gifts” of life and consumption the system has given us back to the system. The system can only respond to the returning of the gift with its own collapse, and by re-institute symbolic exchange, the alt makes power impossible

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

The 'ultimate aim of the system', of seizing 'control of death' (1993a: 48 n. 24), makes it highly vulnerable to any defiance of its control over death, since for Baudrillard the entire edifice of power is built on this foundation. Death, then, is the ultimate weapon against the system because it is capable of re-engaging the symbolic exchange of life and death. As we are condemned to a 'slow death' of labour and survival by the system according to Baudrillard, . We must therefore displace everything onto the sphere of the symbolic where the challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force . . . only the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. (1993a: 36) Baudrillard clearly feels that 'real' acts of violence are pointless and counterproductive because they feed into the system, justifying its methods of control, and ultimately serve as commodity-sign or entertainment value for its media networks. To defy the system, Baudrillard argues, we must be prepared to 'die', in the sense of surrendering the 'life' (or living-death) that the system has given us. We must, he asserts, throw the gift of living death back in the face of the system and demand either an 'immediate death' or a new 'life' freed of the barring of symbolic exchange (1993a: 36-7). The self as given by the system cannot liberate itself from the system because it is of the system. This self must be annulled or sacrificed and the system is then put in the position of having to respond to this symbolic exchange: To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of catastrophe for the capital remains. (1993a: 37) In modernity, suicide has such a subversive force: 'through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society ... by inverting the author- ities and reinstating reversibility' (1993a: 175, emphasis added). So, for example, the high rate of suicide in prisons is understood as a symbolic exchange, 'an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach' in the system of control. Suicide is a 'challenge that society cannot reply to' (1993a: 180), it seizes back control of (the individual's) death and, further, it subtracts 'capital' or value from a system based on the accumulation and real- isation of value. In the act of suicide we remove ourselves as a quantity of capital. Moreover, Baudrillard insists, 'if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to the system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal' (1993a: 176). Baudrillard does not only mean suicide in the literal sense, but any behaviour that challenges or opposes the maximizing of performance, growth, accumulation, success. He includes neurotic behaviours by which 'sufferers' can prevent their full integration into the code and also street demonstrations that have no other goal than to provoke the authorities to 'real' violence, to shame and humiliate them. Baudrillard does not develop examples at this stage, but he cites briefly the student demonstrations of May 1968 where students 'sacrificed' their gift of a higher education, throwing it back at the system such that the system 'loses its footing'. The anti-Poll Tax riots of July 1990 in London seemed to undermine the Thatcher government as people rejected the secure life of (signs of) prosperity and instead risked life and limb in pitched battles with the police. But in both cases any fractures in the system were soon repaired, or at least papered over; particular politicians are removed but the system continues. Yet this does not necessarily undermine Baudrillard's argument as he asserts that the system has the power 'to displace the time of exchange, substitut- ing continuity and mortal linearity for the immediate retaliation of death' (1993a: 40). In other words the system has time on its side, or rather linear time is the time of the system. Baudrillard's point becomes painfully obvious in cases where corporations are found by the courts, or increasingly by the media, to have risked the health of consumers by negligence. This occurred when Coca-Cola marketed 'Dasani' purified water as a health drink when it was in fact ordinary tap water with various pollutants added by the company, and when Cadbury-Trebor- Bassett UK sold chocolate laced with salmonella. On both occasions the companies' PR spokespersons announced that since the unfavourable findings were made their company had already introduced the most stringent safety improvements: in other words your critique is already long out of date, time is on our side. To summarise, the system (political economy) has 'possession' of death such that it 'gives' us our natural, biological death, just as it gives us the gifts of a self and identity in consumer society. It gives us the gift of welfare, security and finally a painless 'natural' death in hospital. We may well try to resist these gifts, by driving fast without a seatbelt, heavy smoking, over-eating or starving ourselves. We may deliberately refuse to maximise ourselves, to realise our potential, or our refusal may be beyond conscious volition as in Baudrillard's examples of impotence and anorexia (1990a: 119-28). In each of these cases failure is equal to symbolic death in our competitive, performance-obsessed societies. However, an effective 'counter-gift' of potlatch-style destruction can only occur through suicide. The system gives and dominates by giving unilaterally, its power is based in the cessation of the cycle of symbolic exchanges. According to Baudrillard 'the worst repression , . . consists in dispossessing you of your own death' (1993a: 177). Suicide gives back, returns or counters the gift of life/death given by the system: symbolic exchange is once more put into play, the cycle continues and unilateral power and authority crumble by lacking a symbolic response. Domination is never total. The system cannot hunt down or neutralise every aspect, every fragment of our lives and thoughts; we remain 'free', at least free to challenge the system. We cannot and will not be made to identify fully with our individual interests, needs, desires and 'potential' that the system promotes as coded options within an integrated system. Baudrillard's conviction is that people will never acquiesce to the system and resign themselves to being merely 'the capitalist of their own lives' (1993a: 179-80).

#### Symbolic exchange resists the logic of power

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together.

#### Only an affirmation of reversibility and encounter with death through symbolic exchange can combat the way the system operates through chains of dead simulation. The alternative is a celebration of the haunting of the wage system – an exchange with the gift of death that breaks down the regime of accumulation

Baudrillard 93 (Jean, the holographic 2pac of philosophy, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 1993, Sage, Originally Published 1976, p. 1-5, endnotes included inline)

Symbolic exchange is no longer the organising principle of modern society. Of course, the symbolic haunts modern social institutions in the form of their own death. Indeed, since the symbolic no longer rules these social forms, they experience it only as this haunting, and as a demand forever blocked by the law of value. Even though a certain idea of revolution has, since Marx, attempted to find a way past the law of value, it long since became a revolution in accordance with the Law. Even psychoanalysis gravitates around this haunting, which it fends off while at the same time circumscribing it within an individualised unconscious, thus reducing it, under the Law of the Father, to the obsessional fear of castration and the Signifier. Always the Law. However, beyond the topologies and economics, both libidinal and political, gravitating around a materialist or desiring-production on the stage of value, an outline of social relations emerges, based on the extermination of value. For us, the model of this relation harks back to primitive formations, but this radical utopia is slowly beginning to intrude at every level of contemporary society; this intoxicating revolt no longer has anything to do with the laws of history, nor even - but we will have to wait for a later stage for this to appear, since it is a recent phantasy - with the 'liberation' of a 'desire'.¶ In this light, other theoretical events, such as Saussure's anagrams and Mauss's gift-exchange, assume cardinal importance. In the long run, these hypotheses are more radical than Marx's or Freud's, whose interpretations are censored by precisely their imperialism. The anagrams or gift­ exchanges are not merely transitory phases within the disciplines of linguistics and anthropology, nor are they inferior forms compared to the vast machinations of the unconscious and the revolution. Here one predominant form emerges, from which Marxism and psychoanalysis, though they may not be aware of it, derive. This form is equally dismissive of political and libidinal economy, outlining instead a beyond of value, a beyond of the law, a beyond of repression and a beyond of the unconscious. This is taking place here and now. ¶ When Freud proposes the theory of the death drive, this is the one theoretical event of the same order as the anagram and the gift, provided we radicalise it against Freud himself Indeed we must switch the targets of each of these three theories and turn Mauss against Mauss, Saussure against Saussure and Freud against Freud. The principle of reversibility (the counter-gift) must be imposed against all the economistic, psychologistic and structuralist interpretations for which Mauss paved the way. The Saussure of the Anagrams must be set against Saussurian linguistics, against even his own restricted hypotheses concerning the anagram. The Freud of the death drive must be pitched against every previous psycho­ analytic edifice, and even against Freud's version of the death drive.¶ At the price of paradox and theoretical violence, we witness that the three hypotheses describe, in their own respective fields (but this propriety is precisely what the general form of the symbolic annihilates), a functional principle sovereignly outside and antagonistic to our economic 'reality principle'. Everywhere, in every domain, a single form predominates: reversibility, cyclical reversal and annulment put an end to the linearity of time, language, economic exchange, accumulation and power. Hence the reversibility of the gift in the counter-gift, the reversibility of exchange in the sacrifice, the reversibility of time in the cycle, the reversibility of production in destruction, the reversibility of life in death, and the reversibility of every term and value of the langue in the anagram. In every domain it assumes the form of extermination and death, for it is the form of the symbolic itself. Neither mystical nor structural, the symbolic is inevitable. The reality principle corresponded to a certain stage of the law of value.¶ Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather than the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second­ order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious.¶ Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy· it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, thus becoming part of the third order of simulacra (see below). Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. It was exactly the same for the previous apparatus - the natural law of value - which the system of political economy and the market law of value also appropriated as their imaginary system of reference ('Nature'): 'nature' leads a ghostly existence as use-value at the core of exchange-value. But on the next twist of the spiral, use-value is seized as an alibi within the dominant order of the code. Each configuration of value is seized by the next in a higher order of simulacra. And each phase of value integrates the prior apparatus into its own as a phantom reference, a puppet reference, a simulated reference.¶ A revolution separates each order from its successor: these are the only genuine revolutions. We are in the third order, which is the order no longer of the real, but of the hyperreal. It is only here that theories and practices, themselves floating and indeterminate, can reach the real and beat it to death.¶ Contemporary revolutions are indexed on the immediately prior state of the system. They are all buttressed by a nostalgia for the resurrection of the real in all its forms, that is as second-order simulacra: dialectics, use­value, the transparency and finality of production the 'liberation' of the unconscious, of repressed meaning (the signifier, or the signified named 'desire'), and so on. All these liberations provide the ideal content for the system to devour in its successive revolutions, and which it brings subtly back to life as mere phantasmas of revolution. These revolutions are only transitions towards generalised manipulation. At the stage of the aleatory processes of control, even revolution becomes meaningless.¶ The rational, referential, historical and functional machines of consciousness correspond to industrial machines. The aleatory, non­referential, transferential, indeterminate and floating machines of the unconscious respond to the aleatory machines of the code. But even the unconscious is reabsorbed by this operation, and it has long since lost its own reality principle to become an operational simulacrum. At the precise point that its psychical reality principle merges into its psychoanalytic reality principle, the unconscious, like political economy, also becomes a model of simulation.¶ The systemic strategy is merely to invoke a number of floating values in this hyperreality. This is as true of the unconscious as it is of money and theories. Value rules according to the indiscernible order of generation by means of models, according to the infinite chains of simulation.¶ Cybernetic operativity, the genetic code, the aleatory order of mutation, the uncertainty principle, etc., succeed determinate, objectivist science, and the dialectical view of history and consciousness. Even critical theory, along with the revolution, turns into a second-order simulacrum, as do all determinate processes. The deployment of third-order simulacra sweeps all this away, and to attempt to reinstate dialectics, 'objective' contradictions, and so on, against them would be a futile political regression. You can't fight the aleatory by imposing finalities, you can't fight against programmed and molecular dispersion with prises de conscience and dialectical sublation, you can't fight the code with political economy, nor with 'revolution'. All these outdated weapons (including those we find in first­order simulacra, in the ethics and metaphysics of man and nature, use­value, and other liberatory systems of reference) are gradually neutralised by a higher-order general system. Everything that filters into the non­finality of the space-time of the code or that attempts to intervene in it, is disconnected from its own ends, disintegrated and absorbed. This is the well known effect of recuperation, manipulation, of circulating and recycling at every level. 'All dissent must be of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed' (Anthony Wilden, System and Structure [London: Tavistock, 1977], p. xxvii). Is it at least possible to find an even match to oppose third-order simulacra? Is there a theory or a practice which is subversive because it is more aleatory than the system itself, an indeterminate subversion which would be to the order of the code what the revolution was to the order of political economy? Can we fight DNA? Certainly not by means of the class struggle. Perhapse simulacra of a higher logical (or illogical) order could be invented. beyond the current third order, beyond determinacy and indeterminacy But would they still be simulacra? Perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code.¶ Every system that approaches perfect operativity simultaneously approaches its downfall. When the system says 'A is A', or 'two times two equals four', it approaches absolute power and total absurdity; that is, immediate and probable subversion. A gentle push in the right place is enough to bring it crashing down. We know the potential of tautology when it reinforces the system's claim to perfect sphericity (Ubu Roi's belly) .¶ Identity is untenable: it is death, since it fails to inscribe its own death. Every closed or metastable, functional or cybernetic system is shadowed by mockery and instantaneous subversion (which no longer takes the detour through long dialectical labour), because all the system's inertia acts against it. Ambivalence awaits the most advanced systems, that, like Leibniz's binary God, have deified their functional principle. The fascination they exert, because it derives from a profound denial such as we find in fetishism, can be instantaneously reversed. Hence their fragility increases in proportion to their ideal coherence. These systems, even when they are based on radical indeterminacy (the loss of meaning), fall prey, once more, to meaning. They collapse under the weight of their own monstrosity, like fossilised dinosaurs, and immediately decompose. This is the fatality of every system committed by its own logic to total perfection and therefore to a total defectiveness, to absolute infallibility and therefore irrevocable breakdown. the aim of all bound energies is their own death. This is why the only strategy is catastrophic, and not dialectical at all. Things must be pushed to the limit, where quite naturally they collapse and are inverted. At the peak of value we are closest to ambivalence, at the pinnacle of coherence we are closest to the abyss of corruption which haunts the reduplicated signs of the code. Simulation must go further than the system . Death must be played against death. a radical tautology that makes the system's own logic the ultimate weapon. The only strategy against the hyperrealist system is some form of pataphysics, 'a science of imaginary solutions', that is, a science-fiction of the system's reversal against itself at the extreme limit of simulation, a reversible simulation in a hyperlogic of death and destruction. 1 [Endnote inserted: Death is always equally what waits at the term of the system, and the symbolic extermination that stalks the system itself. It is not that there are two words to designate the finality of death internal to the system, the one in-scribed everywhere in its operational logic, and the other a radical counter-finality ex-scribed on the system as such, but which haunts it everywhere: only the term of death, and it alone, figures on both sides. This ambiguity can already be discerned in the Freudian death-drive. Rather than an ambiguity, however it simply translates the proximity of complete perfection and immediate defectiveness.]¶ The symbolic demands meticulous reversibility. Ex-terminate every term, abolish value in the term's revolution against itself: that is the only symbolic violence equivalent to and triumphant over the structural violence of the code.¶ A revolutionary dialectic corresponded to the commodity law of value and its equivalents; only the scrupulous reversion of death corresponds to the code's indeterminacy and the structural law of value.2 [Endnote inserted: Death ought never to be understood as the real event that affects a subject or a body, but as a form in which the determinacy of the subject and of value is lost. The demand of reversibility puts an end to determinacy and indeterminacy at the same time. It puts an end to bound energies in stable oppositions, and is therefore in substantial agreement with theories of flows and intensities, whether libidinal or schizo. The unbinding of energies is, however the very form of the current system, which consists in a strategic drift of value. The system can be connected and disconnected, but all the freed energies will one day return to it: this is how the concepts of energy and intensity come about. Capital is an energetic and intense system. Hence the impossibility of distinguishing the libidinal economy from the political economy (see Jean-Fran,>ois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy \tr I.H. Grant, London: Athlone, 1992]) of the system of value; and the impossibility of distinguishing capitalist schizzes from revolutionary schizzes (see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia I [tr R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane, London: Athlone, 1984]). For the system is master— like God it can bind or unbind energies; what it is incapable of (and what it can no longer avoid) is reversibility. Reversibility alone therefore, rather than unbinding or drifting, is fatal to it. This is exactly what the term symbolic 'exchange' means.]¶ Strictly speaking, nothing remains for us to base anything on. All that remains for us is theoretical violence – speculation to the death, whose only method is the radicalisation of hypotheses. Even the code and the symbolic remain terms of simulation. it must be possible to extract them, one by one, from discourse.

### XT Metaphorical suicide

#### The alternative is metaphorical suicide. This is a refusal of the gifts the system has given us, including the gift of work and our identity as laborer which is a “living death”. The system gives us these gifts we are obligated to reciprocate by complying with it; giving the gift back to the system reverses this by forcing the system to respond by collapsing. Rather than producing value, metaphorical suicide removes value from the system, challenging the logic of accumulation and productivity that upholds capitalism. Finally, by affirming an exchange of gifts, the alt re-institutes symbolic exchange, which challenges power relations.

### A2 Perm---Generic

See Long OV above – includes perm answers for exhaustion alt

#### Perm is impossible – 1. all the links above are disads – including the aff wrecks perm solvency. The alt requires rejecting the aff, so the perm either severs out of the aff, which is a voting issue because it destroys stable ground to generate neg offense; or it can’t solve the kritik.

#### 2. the perm has no net benefit – all the reasons the aff can’t solve were also above and prove including the aff does nothing

#### 3. the alt is sufficient to solve the entire case – it tears down the system of capitalism that’s the root cause of aff impacts, so there’s no reason to include the aff – no net benefit to a permutation and any risk of a link is sufficient to vote neg

### A2 Perm---More answers

#### 6. The perm is literally impossible – radical thought and belief in the illusion of the real cannot be combined with an objective interpretation of the world.

Baudrillard in 95 [Jean, April 19, "Radical Thought"]

In any case, the two orders of thought are irreconcilable. They each follow their own path without blending into one another. At best, they slide on one another, like tectonic plates, and from time to time their collision or their subduction creates fault lines inside which reality is engulfed. Fatality is always at the crossing point of these two lines. Similarly, radical thought is at the violent crossing point of sense and non-sense, of truth and non-truth, of the continuation of the world and the continuation of nothingness. In contrast to the discourse of reality and rationality, which bets on the fact that there is something (some meaning) rather than nothing, and which, in the last analysis, wants to be built on the preservative notion of an objective and decipherable world, radical thought bets on the illusion of the world. This thought wants to be illusion, restituting non-veracity to the facts, non- signification to the world, and formulating the reverse hypothesis that there may be nothing rather than something, tracking down this nothingness which runs under the apparent continuation of meaning. The radical prediction is always that of a non-reality of the facts, of an illusion of the factual. It merely starts with the foreboding of this illusion, but never fuses with the objective state of things. Any fusion of this type would be similar to mistaking a messenger for his message, which still today consists in killing the messenger who always brings the bad news (for example, the news that all our values are null, that the real is uncertain, that certain events do not "take place"). Any fusion of the thought (of writing, of language) with the real - a so-called "faithfulness of the real" with a thought that has made the real emerge in all of its configurations - is hallucinatory. It is moreover the result of a total misinterpretation of language, of the fact that language is an illusion in its very movement, that it carries this continuation of emptiness or nothingness at the very core of what it says, and that it is in all its materiality a deconstruction of what it signifies. Just as the photograph (the image) connotes an erasure, the death of what it represents, that which gives the photograph its intensity, what gives intensity to writing, be it the writing of a fiction or the writing of a theoretical fiction, is emptiness, an underlying nothingness, an illusion of meaning, an ironic dimension of language, which is corollary to an ironic dimension of the facts themselves, which are never what they are - in all meanings: they are never more than what they are, and they are always only what they are - a perfect amphiboly. The irony of the facts, in their miserable reality, is precisely that they are only what they are. At least, that is what they are supposed to mean: "the real is the real." But, by this very fact (so to speak), they are necessarily beyond [truth] because factual existence is impossible: nothing is totally evidentiary without becoming an enigma. Reality, in general, is too evident to be true. It is this ironic transfiguration through language which constitutes the event of language. And it is on a restitution of this fundamental illusion of the world and language that thought must work, without however taking language in its literality, where the messenger is mistaken for the message, and thus already sacrificed.

#### 7. Radical thought cannot be combined with pragmatic solutions to affect the “real” world. Critical thought must remain distanced from the real, or else it becomes powerless.

Baudrillard in 95 [Jean, April 19, "Radical Thought"]

All this defines the insoluble relationship between thought and the real. A certain type of thought is an accomplice of the real. It starts with the hypothesis that there is a real reference to an idea and that there is a possible "ideation" of reality. This is no doubt a comforting perspective, one which is based on meaning and deciphering. This is also a polarity, similar to that used by ready-made dialectical and philosophical solutions. The other thought, on the contrary, is ex-centric from the real. It is an "ex-centering" of the real world and, consequently, it is alien to a dialectic which always plays on adversarial poles. It is even alien to critical thought which always refers to an ideal of the real. To some extent, this thought is not even a denial of the concept of reality. It is an illusion, that is to say a "game" played with desire (which this thought puts "into play"), just like metaphor is a "game" played with truth. This radical thought comes neither from a philosophical doubt nor from a utopian transference (which always supposes an ideal transformation of the real). Nor does it stem from an ideal transcendence. It is the "putting into play" of this world, the material and immanent illusion of this so-called "real" world - it is a non-critical, non-dialectical thought. So, this thought appears to be coming from somewhere else. In any case, there is an incompatibility between thought and the real. Between thought and the real, there is no necessary or natural transition. Not an "alternation," not an alternative either: only an "alterity" keeps them under pressure. Only fracture, distance and alienation safeguard the singularity of this thought, the singularity of being a singular event, similar in a sense to the singularity of the world through which it is made into an event. Things probably did not always happen this way. One may dream of a happy conjunction of idea and reality, in the shadow of the Enlightenment and of modernity, in the heroic ages of critical thought. But that thought, which operated against a form of illusion - superstitious, religious, or ideological - is substantially over. And even if that thought had survived its catastrophic secularization in all the political systems of the 20th century, the ideal and almost necessary relationship between concept and reality would in any case have been destroyed today. That thought disappeared under the pressure of a gigantic simulation, a technical and mental one, under the pressure of a precession of models to the benefit of an autonomy of the virtual, from now on liberated from the real, and of a simultaneous autonomy of the real that today functions for and by itself - motu propio - in a delirious perspective, infinitely self-referential. Expelled, so to speak, from its own frame, from its own principle, pushed toward its extraneity, the real has become an extreme phenomenon. So, we no longer can think of it as real. But we can think of it as "ex-orbitated," as if it was seen from another world - as an illusion then. Let's ponder over what could be a stupefying experience: the discovery of another real world, different from ours. Ours, one day, was discovered. The objectivity of this world was discovered, just like America was discovered, more or less at the same period. But what was discovered can never be created again. That's how reality was discovered, and is still created (or the alternate version: this is how reality was created, which is still being discovered). Why wouldn't there be as many real worlds as there are imaginary ones? Why would there be only one real world? Why such a mode of exception? In reality, the notion of a real world existing among all other possible worlds is unimaginable. It is unthinkable, except perhaps as a dangerous superstition. We must stay away from that, just as critical thought once stayed away (in the name of the real!) from religious superstition. Thinkers, give it another try!

#### This robs critical theory of its critical potential – events morph to support any theory that might challenge them, which destroys the effectiveness of the theory. To be effective, the criticism must remain distanced, which the perm destroys.

Baudrillard in 95 [Jean, April 19, "Radical Thought"]

More subtly, reality also gets its revenge from those who challenge it by, paradoxically, proving that they are right. Whenever any risky idea, any cynical or critical hypothesis proves to be right, it in fact turns out to be a dirty trick. You are fooled and disarmed. Your arguments are lamentably confirmed by a reality without scruples. So, you may posit the idea of a simulacrum, and yet, secretly, not believe in it, hoping that the real will avenge itself. The theory is then not necessarily convinced of its own validity. Unfortunately, only those who are reality fanatics react negatively. Reality does not seem to be willing to deny itself, far from it: all simulacra wander freely. Reality today is nothing more than the apocalypse of simulation. Consequently, the reality supporters (who defend reality as if it was a moral value or a virtue) play, so to speak, the part of those who once were called the fanatics of the Apocalypse. The idea of simulacrum was a conceptual weapon against reality, but it has been stolen. Not that it has been pillaged, vulgarized, or has become common-place(which is true but has no consequence), but because simulacra have been absorbed by reality which has swallowed them and which, from now on, is clad with all the rhetoric of simulation. And to cap it all, simulacra have become reality! Today, simulacra guarantee the continuation of the real. The simulacrum now hides, not the truth, but the fact that there is none, that is to say, the continuation of Nothingness. This is the very paradox of any thought that reveals the falsehood of the real: when reality steals your concept and realizes (fulfills) it, and by the same token flies away from any criticism. Events, deprived of any direction, steal any possible meaning. They adapt to the most fantastic hypotheses like natural species and viruses adapt to the most hostile environments. They show an extraordinary mimetic capacity. There has been a reversal here too: it is no longer theories that have to adapt to events, but events that adapt to theories. In any case, they mystify us because a theory that realizes itself is no longer a theory. A realized hypothesis is no longer a hypothesis. It is terrifying to see a hypothesis be realized like this. It is terrifying to suddenly see the idea coincide with reality. This is the agony of the concept. The epiphany of the real is the twilight of the concept. We have lost the advance that ideas had on the world, that distance that makes an idea stay an idea. Thought must anticipate, be exceptional, and in the margin - the projected shadow of the future events. Yet, today, we are lagging behind the events. They may sometimes give the impression that they regress, that they are not what they should be. In fact, they have passed over us for a long time. The simulated disorder of things has gone faster than us. The effect of reality has disappeared behind the acceleration of things - an anamorphosis of speed. What happens to the heterogeneity of thought in a world that has been converted to the craziest hypotheses and to an artificial delirium? In their accelerated occurrence, the events have in a sense swallowed their own interpretation. Things have been cleansed of their own meaning. And consequently, they are like black holes and can no longer reflect. They are what they are, never too late for their occurrence, but always beyond their meaning. What is late rather is the interpretation of things. Interpretation is then merely a retro figure for an unpredictable event.

### A2 Cede the Political

#### No uniqueness – the political is already ceded – it’s try or die for the alt and means the aff can’t solve anything, so zero net benefit to the perm

Bifo 11 [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”. Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

#### The code means political positions can’t solve – the political is impossible – that’s Pawlette

#### *Consumer capitalism simulates liberation to enforce social control – politics by itself can’t solve*

*Pawlett 10 [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT*

*The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more complete form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and assimilation which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’ politics is defused by the code; they are designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feeding consumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system. The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption. The code simulates choice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer society by allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition. The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation. The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.*

#### The aff uses politics in the wrong way – all the links prove even if they use the political, they result in bad uses of the political

### A2 Code = Domination Inevitable

#### This just means try or die for the alt… if the code is truly dominating then the aff has zero solvency and the only possible option is the alternative – any link means you vote neg

#### Even the code can’t totally dominate us – the system is always vulnerable to challenge at the level of symbolic exchange

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

The 'ultimate aim of the system', of seizing 'control of death' (1993a: 48 n. 24), makes it highly vulnerable to any defiance of its control over death, since for Baudrillard the entire edifice of power is built on this foundation. Death, then, is the ultimate weapon against the system because it is capable of re-engaging the symbolic exchange of life and death. As we are condemned to a 'slow death' of labour and survival by the system according to Baudrillard, . We must therefore displace everything onto the sphere of the symbolic where the challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force . . . only the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. (1993a: 36) Baudrillard clearly feels that 'real' acts of violence are pointless and counterproductive because they feed into the system, justifying its methods of control, and ultimately serve as commodity-sign or entertainment value for its media networks. To defy the system, Baudrillard argues, we must be prepared to 'die', in the sense of surrendering the 'life' (or living-death) that the system has given us. We must, he asserts, throw the gift of living death back in the face of the system and demand either an 'immediate death' or a new 'life' freed of the barring of symbolic exchange (1993a: 36-7). The self as given by the system cannot liberate itself from the system because it is of the system. This self must be annulled or sacrificed and the system is then put in the position of having to respond to this symbolic exchange: To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of catastrophe for the capital remains. (1993a: 37) In modernity, suicide has such a subversive force: 'through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society ... by inverting the author- ities and reinstating reversibility' (1993a: 175, emphasis added). So, for example, the high rate of suicide in prisons is understood as a symbolic exchange, 'an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach' in the system of control. Suicide is a 'challenge that society cannot reply to' (1993a: 180), it seizes back control of (the individual's) death and, further, it subtracts 'capital' or value from a system based on the accumulation and real- isation of value. In the act of suicide we remove ourselves as a quantity of capital. Moreover, Baudrillard insists, 'if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to the system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal' (1993a: 176). Baudrillard does not only mean suicide in the literal sense, but any behaviour that challenges or opposes the maximizing of performance, growth, accumulation, success. He includes neurotic behaviours by which 'sufferers' can prevent their full integration into the code and also street demonstrations that have no other goal than to provoke the authorities to 'real' violence, to shame and humiliate them. Baudrillard does not develop examples at this stage, but he cites briefly the student demonstrations of May 1968 where students 'sacrificed' their gift of a higher education, throwing it back at the system such that the system 'loses its footing'. The anti-Poll Tax riots of July 1990 in London seemed to undermine the Thatcher government as people rejected the secure life of (signs of) prosperity and instead risked life and limb in pitched battles with the police. But in both cases any fractures in the system were soon repaired, or at least papered over; particular politicians are removed but the system continues. Yet this does not necessarily undermine Baudrillard's argument as he asserts that the system has the power 'to displace the time of exchange, substitut- ing continuity and mortal linearity for the immediate retaliation of death' (1993a: 40). In other words the system has time on its side, or rather linear time is the time of the system. Baudrillard's point becomes painfully obvious in cases where corporations are found by the courts, or increasingly by the media, to have risked the health of consumers by negligence. This occurred when Coca-Cola marketed 'Dasani' purified water as a health drink when it was in fact ordinary tap water with various pollutants added by the company, and when Cadbury-Trebor- Bassett UK sold chocolate laced with salmonella. On both occasions the companies' PR spokespersons announced that since the unfavourable findings were made their company had already introduced the most stringent safety improvements: in other words your critique is already long out of date, time is on our side. To summarise, the system (political economy) has 'possession' of death such that it 'gives' us our natural, biological death, just as it gives us the gifts of a self and identity in consumer society. It gives us the gift of welfare, security and finally a painless 'natural' death in hospital. We may well try to resist these gifts, by driving fast without a seatbelt, heavy smoking, over-eating or starving ourselves. We may deliberately refuse to maximise ourselves, to realise our potential, or our refusal may be beyond conscious volition as in Baudrillard's examples of impotence and anorexia (1990a: 119-28). In each of these cases failure is equal to symbolic death in our competitive, performance-obsessed societies. However, an effective 'counter-gift' of potlatch-style destruction can only occur through suicide. The system gives and dominates by giving unilaterally, its power is based in the cessation of the cycle of symbolic exchanges. According to Baudrillard 'the worst repression , . . consists in dispossessing you of your own death' (1993a: 177). Suicide gives back, returns or counters the gift of life/death given by the system: symbolic exchange is once more put into play, the cycle continues and unilateral power and authority crumble by lacking a symbolic response. Domination is never total. The system cannot hunt down or neutralise every aspect, every fragment of our lives and thoughts; we remain 'free', at least free to challenge the system. We cannot and will not be made to identify fully with our individual interests, needs, desires and 'potential' that the system promotes as coded options within an integrated system. Baudrillard's conviction is that people will never acquiesce to the system and resign themselves to being merely 'the capitalist of their own lives' (1993a: 179-80).

#### People will never be dominated by the system

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

As a term the Code largely disappeared from Baudrillard’s writings after Simulacra and Simulation (1981/1994). Are we to take it that the Code is still operational in the “fourth order” or is it defunct? We can answer this question by recalling two important points. Firstly, Baudrillard did not contend that the pacification and control effected by the Code would be total (quite the reverse, see Baudrillard 1996:142-9; 1998: 174-185), only that the Code aimed at total constraint. Baudrillard’s most developed example, the masses, let us recall, are not so passive and docile that they are manipulated by the system; rather, they withdraw into silence or practice a hyper-conformity without belief in, or commitment to, the integrated system of values (1978/1983). In other words they refuse to be the active, discriminating, reflective consumers that the system requires. Moreover Baudrillard writes “We form a mass, living most of the time in panic or haphazardly (aleatoire) above and beyond any meaning” (1978: 16/1983: 15). The masses, for Baudrillard, are clearly not only the poor and marginal, they are “us, you and everyone” (nous, vous, tout le monde) (1978: 51/1983: 46). That is everyone, as posited by the Code, is mass. We are all both inside and, at the same time, outside or beyond the Code: we are all mass, and yet we are all singularities.

## Framework

### TL Framework

#### I meet their interp---

#### 1. The kritik implies the aff’s assumptions are wrong – if I win the kritik, the aff has no offense.

#### 2. The kritik proves the plan is a bad idea – policy measures like a living wage only feed the system of consumption – even without an alternative, you should evaluate it as a linear disad to the aff.

#### Counter-interp---The neg should be able to challenge the aff’s representations and the plan’s complicity with the hyperreal system of capitalism.

#### One, best for fit – we’re also unlikely to actually become policymakers, but all of us must learn how to operate within oppressive systems – kritik is best to teach students to become critical intellectuals capable of challenging systems of power even if they don’t control positions of power.

#### Two, fiat is illusory – the plan doesn’t actually happen at the end of the debate – the only impacts that actually exist are the aff’s representations, so it’s more logical to evaluate these

#### Three, assumptions are a vital part of policymaking – abstracting away from vital questions of how the world operates makes us less effective advocates for change and guts critical thinking – turns all their offense.

#### Four, hyperreality means the aff can’t do anything to teach us about politics – challenging the gratuitous production of images is a prerequisite to critical awareness and education

Crews 98 [(john, author) “Baudrillard and the Scandal Effect” Cyberspace and Critical Theory, Spring 1998] AT

Having restated what I personally believe many people are aware of, that one cannot believe everything one sees, what is frightening as we look toward the future is the potential for mass manipulation through the use, abuse, production, and reproduction of images. Especially when these images are positioned by agencies of the media, such as the television, radio, print (newspapers, periodicals), electronic hypertext and so on... Baudrillard's project in his book Simulacra and Simulation is to invest a great deal of cynicism, and concern in thinking about the hegemonic effects of what may as well be called a 'logic of simulation'. The scandal effect is one idea of Baudrillard's that I find relevant in thinking about the political situation in the United States. The scandal effect could be articulated as follows : Accepting that the difference between what is real and non-real becomes fuzzy... then how is one to believe in the power or utility of government. For the most part, one's knowledge of what government is, and how it works is carried through some media. It is mediated, and in effect what the American public understands as the reality of government is suspect to manipulation. The pattern that has developed with the executive branch of government, specifically the President, seems dangerously along the lines of what Baudrillard is talking about. Same operation, tending to regenerate through scandal a moral and political principle, through the imaginary, a sinking reality principle. p. 14 The reality principle is articulated by Baudrillard in a rather vague way. How does this work? What is reality here? What could be obscured by President Clinton's troubles with allegations of either sexual impropriety or abuse of his office? Our ability to know what is happening in the world, to take some active role in what happens slowly disappears as the reality principle -- I understand it as participating in a sort of naturalism -- is confused in an endless exchange of images that don't inform us, but instead allow us to feel informed. Matters of the President's conduct are important concerns, and they touch upon the legitimacy of our system of government, but the gratuitous production of images deadens any sort of critical awareness into what is actually going on. There are other priorities we must have. The economic situation in Asia is sparcely reported on. Our negotiations with Iraq, Israel... . Brushed under the rug. As citizens we do have other concerns. Funny how like in the movie Wag the Dog a Presidential scandal is averted, subverted... public attention toward scandal is quickly fed into a war machine. We can see this now, in the present day situation.

#### Five, the whole kritik proves policy approaches can do nothing to challenge consumer capitalism – it’s useless to discuss competing policy alternatives since they have zero critical potential; the debate should be about competing intellectual stances which is more educational

#### Challenging the dominance of economics in our collective imagination is a prerequisite – decisions are controlled by conventional economic assumptions and policymaking can’t do anything about this, which also means zero aff solvency

Bifo 11 [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”. Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

### XT Bifo

#### Extend Bifo – No risk of aff solvency – economic decisions are not made consciously in the political sphere, but automatically since economic values are embedded in our imagination – politics does nothing, only challenging capitalist ideology can solve the case

### Fairness Stuff

#### Fairness is a ruse – the attempt to be perfectly reciprocal destroys the process of symbolic exchange the kritik says is good – the impact is loss of value to life

#### K’s key to fairness – they’re a key check against new affs designed to escape and turn all other neg offense – no kritiks means the neg has zero strategy against new affs.

#### K’s don’t moot the aff – putting pre-empts in the aff solves any time skew; also the aff has to defend their assumptions to win their offense regardless of whether I read a K or not, so mooting the aff is inevitable

#### Education o/w fairness – it’s the only terminal goal of debate since fairness has no external impact. Also, education guides the rules of debate – debate and basketball are both fair, but their rules are different because they have different goals – the goal of debate is education.

### Role-Playing Bad

#### Roleplaying is bad—it overlooks our own role in manufacturing violence

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control.

### Fiat Bad

#### Fiat encourages a spectator mentality where real events become tools in our game of academic debate – turns their offense and breeds detachment

Mitchell in 98 [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, “PEDAGOGICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE” Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60]

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow **taller** and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely **simulated** plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998). The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8).

### A2 Coverstone

#### Politics is a farce – that was above and the thesis of the kritik disproves the assumption of Coverstone that the “levers of power” can do anything in America

#### The kritik doesn’t breed disillusionment or nihilism – it promotes critical engagement that can challenge power instead of wielding it in harmful ways

### A2 Infiltrate State

#### The kritik isn’t “state bad” – infiltrating the state doesn’t teach us anything and is unproductive – they have no warrant why teaching us the tactics of state oppression is useful

### A2 Switch-Side

#### No link – I can’t read the kritik on the aff, so it does force switching sides

#### Switch-side debate is a simulation and is worse for cognitive development of students

Cauvin 89 [(Nicole, Prof of Sociology at Sacred Heart University) “Role-Playing for Different Viewpoints (Review)” Sociology Faculty Publications 1989] AT

Being able to stimulate students in the classroom is a problem most college professors experience during their teaching careers, especially today; the bulk of the students in college have barely developed their thinking skills while in high school. In their article, Duncombe and Heikkinen present the "two-hat debate" as a means which not only keeps students awake during a lecture, but also increases the level of knowledge they acquire about the subject matter. This technique consists of the use of appropriate hats which the instructor puts on and off whenever differing points of view are presented. Each hat identifies the opinion of a group or a person in a debate over a given issue, as presented by the instructor who keeps switching hats to express the ideas presented, or to offer a rebuttal. Duncome has used this technique in courses such as Introduction to Political Science, State Government, History of Political Theory, and Comparative Government. According to the authors, this technique allows students to join the debate at any point, to agree or disagree, without inhibitions, since they are not expressing their ideas to the instructor but to the character portrayed by the hat that he/she wears at the time. This puts the discussion between faculty and students on "a more equal footing" and the instructor can destroy the point of view of a student "without putting the student down" since he is not the instructor, but a character portrayed by a hat. Referring to the work of David Ausubel, Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View, the authors feel that the technique provides a framework for the entire lecture and as such, serves as an 'advanced organizer.' The imagery provided by this technique helps convey abstract ideas as concretely as possible, but the authors warn that it should not be overused because it would "lose its effectiveness." It is obvious to me that the "two-hat" technique may be successful in keeping the students awake and in stimulating class discussion, but anyone concerned with the cognitive development of the college student will find that such a technique tends to perpetuate the inability of today's students to deal with abstractions and increases their fascination with images. The French sociologist, Jean Baudrillard, in his essays on "Precession Simulacra" and "Simulations" explains that because of our excessive use of images we have social relations between people which take the form of relations between images. In his now famous successive phases of the image, he thinks that contemporary society has already left the phase at which the image marks the absence of a basic reality and has reached the phase where the image has no relation to any reality whatsoever. Thus it becomes its 'own pure simulacrum.' The "two-hat" technique seems to exacerbate this problem by feeding right into the already exaggerated fascination of today's students with images which do not reflect any basic reality. Moreover, Duncombe and Heikkinen's technique raises the question as to whether or not the end justifies the means. In this context, the answer is no, since the end of a college education is to liberalize the individual. Education in the United States has been under very strong attacks because the system has consistently been producing a weak product, especially in terms of basic critical and analytical skills. Although the students exposed to the "two-hat" technique demonstrate a higher level of knowledge of the subject matter in their exams, the essential question remains whether or not the student's thought processes have reached a higher level of development. If this development has not taken place, the liberalizing process is handicapped in that it is tied to the imagery presented by the "two-hat" technique; therefore, without the image to identify it, the thought is lost.

### Power = Simulation

#### Power is a simulation

Lui 12 [“BAUDRILLARD’S HYPERREAL — A CASE STUDY OF SECOND LIFE” Simulacrum 2012-10-21] AT

Baudrillard defined this blurring of the lines between the original and its replication as the ‘hyperreal’, and one of his most quoted examples was Disneyland. Not a simulation of the world outside, rather, that world is a simulation of Disneyland, which itself exists to hide the fact that it is reality. In Disneyland being presented as imaginary, the surrounding Los Angeles environment seems real. Similarly, prisons are presented as carceral to hide the carceral nature of society.[3] This should not be mistaken for delusion, a binary that continues to exist in hiding. It is rather a collapse of meaning, a binary that collapses on itself leaving no passive or active, no positive or negative. The dialectical polarity is lost as the two poles collapse into each other. To salvage meaning from the wreckage simulated binaries must be constructed, but these are indefinite and indistinct, in a word – hyperreal. The idea that difference constructs meaning is central to semiotic thought and Baudrillard uses it to explain how the illusion survives. The real is simulated against the imaginary; the law against transgression; and truth against scandal, just as ethnology was simulated against its opposite – an ethnology with no subject. Not only does the simulacrum simulate the original, it brings it to its fatal extreme, the simulacrum of truth is truer than true, the hyperreal is realer than real.[4] In Baudrillard’s critique, power has been replaced by the simulation of power, and the ultimate simulacrum of power is democracy. The authorities lead “the people”, but these same people lead the authorities. Again we see the paradox of involuted poles, and to reassert the existence of power its binary partner must be presented, something we could call antipower or unpower. Baudrillard uses the example of Watergate[5], but in fact any collapse of democratic government would suit the model just as aptly, the ritual murder of simulated power, to maintain the illusion that power is still real.

### Power = Aimless

#### Political power has become aimless – its only goal becomes the preventative repression of populations, which culminates in extinction

Baudrillard 5 [(Jean, philosopher) "Virtuality and Events: The Hell of Power." The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact (Talking Images). Berg Publishers. November 15, 2005.] AT

It is going to be necessary, then, to invent a security system that prevents any event whatever from occurring. A whole strategy of deterrence that does service today for a global strategy. Steven Spielberg's recent film, Minority Report, provides an illustration of such a system. On the basis of brains endowed with a gift of pre-cognition (the “precogs”), who identify imminent crimes before they occur, squads of police (the “precrimes”) intercept and neutralize the criminal before he has committed his crime. There is a variant in the film Dead Zone (directed by David Cronenberg): the hero, who, following a serious accident, is also endowed with powers of divination, ends up killing a politician whose future destiny as a war criminal he foresees. This is the scenario of the Iraq war too: the crime is nipped in the bud on the strength of an act that has not taken place (Saddam's use of weapons of mass destruction). The question is clearly whether the crime would really have taken place. But we shall never know. What we have here, then, is the real repression of a virtual crime. Extrapolating from this, we can see looming beyond the war a systematic de-programming not only of all crime, but of anything that might disturb the order of things, the policed order of the planet. This is what “political” power comes down to today. It is no longer driven by any positive will; it is merely a negative power of deterrence, of public health, of security policing, immunity policing, prophylaxis. This strategy is directed not only at the future, but also at past events – for example, at that of 11 September, where it attempts, by war in Afghanistan and Iraq, to erase the humiliation. This is why this war is at bottom a delusion, a virtual event, a “non-event”. Bereft of any objective or finality of its own, it merely takes the form of an incantation, an exorcism. This is also why it is interminable, for there will never be any end to conjuring away such an event. It is said to be preventive, but it is in fact retrospective, its aim being to defuse the terrorist event of 11 September, the shadow of which hovers over the whole strategy of planetary control. Erasure of the event, erasure of the enemy, erasure of death: in the insistence on “zero casualties” we see the very same imperative as applies in this obsession with security.3 The aim of this world order is the definitive non-occurrence of events. It is, in a sense, the end of history, not on the basis of a democratic fulfillment, as Fukuyama has it, but on the basis of preventive terror, of a counter-terror that puts an end to any possible events. A terror which the power exerting it ends up exerting on itself under the banner of security. There is a fierce irony here: the irony of an anti-terrorist world system that ends up internalizing terror, inflicting it on itself and emptying itself of any political substance – and going so far as to turn on its own population. Is this a remnant of the Cold War and the balance of terror? But this time it's a deterrence without cold war, a terror with­out balance. Or rather it is a universal cold war, ground into the tiniest interstices of social and political life. This headlong rush by power into its own trap reached dramatic extremes in the Moscow theatre episode, when the hostages and the terrorists were jumbled together in the same massacre. Exactly as in Mad Cow Disease: you kill the whole herd as a precautionary measure – God will recognize his own. Or as in Stockholm Syndrome: being jumbled together in death makes them virtually partners in crime (it is the same in Minority Report: the fact that the police seize the presumptive criminal before he has done anything proves a posteriori that he cannot be innocent). And this is, in fact, the truth of the situation: the fact is that, one way or another, populations themselves are a terrorist threat to the authorities. And it is the authorities themselves who, by repression, unwittingly set the seal on this complicity. The equivalence in repression shows that we are all potentially the hostages of the authorities. By extension, we can hypothesize a coalition of all governments against all populations – we have had a foretaste of this with the war in Iraq, since it was able to take place in defiance of world opinion, with the more or less disguised assent of all governments. And if the world-wide demonstrations against war may have produced the illusion of a possible counter-­power, they demonstrated above all the political insignificance of this “international community” by comparison with American Realpolitik. We are dealing henceforth with the exercise of power in the pure state with no concern for sovereignty or representation; with the Integral Reality of a negative power. So long as it derives its sovereignty from representation, so long as a form of political reason exists, power can find its equilibrium – it can, at any rate, be combated and contested. But the eclipsing of that sovereignty leaves an unbridled power, with nothing standing against it, a savage power (with a savagery that is no longer natural, but technical). And which, in a strangely roundabout way, might be said to get back to something like primitive societies, which, not knowing power, were, according to Claude Levi-Strauss, societies without history. What if we, the present global society, were once again, in the shadow of this integral power, to become a society without history? But this Integral Reality of power is also its end. A power that is no longer based on anything other than the prevention and policing of events, which no longer has any political will but the will to dispel ghosts, itself becomes ghostly and vulnerable. Its virtual power – its programming power in terms of software and the like – is total, but as a result it can no longer bring itself into play, except against itself, by all kinds of internal failures. At the height of its mastery, it can now only lose face. This is, literally, the “Hell of Power”. The policing of events is essentially carried out by information itself.4 Information represents the most effective machinery for de-realizing history. Just as political economy is a gigantic machinery for producing value, for producing signs of wealth, but not wealth itself, so the whole system of information is an immense machine for producing the event as sign, as an exchangeable value on the universal market of ideology, of spectacle, of catastrophe, etc. – in short, for producing a non-event. The abstraction of information is the same as the abstraction of the economy. And, as all commodities, thanks to this abstraction of value, are exchangeable one with another, so all events become substitutable one for another in the cultural information market. The singularity of the event, irreducible to its coded transcription and its staging, which is what quite simply constitutes an event, is lost.

## A2 Cap Link/Alt Answers

### OV – The code

#### Their cap answers assume Marxist theories of capitalism, where cap can be challenged by workers’ struggles or progressive political action – Baudrillard directly denies this assumption; political change cannot challenge anything because it all operates within the code, which structures social relations. The extension of the kritik takes out all their answers

### A2 Devinatz – Progressive Agendas

#### 1. Progressive agendas are exactly what the kritik criticizes – this evidence is just a new link; these progressive movements are merely simulations that operate within the code – they can’t solve anything

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

The Code as form is preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology “precessional”; that is, as grid or network it precedes individual experience, perception, choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract, arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified, the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself. The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Baudrillard calls this the “logic of equivalence”. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or grid whereby all points can be compared, contrasted and exchanged. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be converted into sign form, it rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’, essences, identities and differences.[2] Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot process ambivalence (or becoming) as these are not ‘things’ with identity but relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis. The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental. At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together. Baudrillard was particularly interested in the moment of the “counter-gift” (contre don), that is the refusal of the gift or its return with interest to the giver in a kind of status war (the latter often referred to, rather imprecisely, as “potlatch” (1993: 125-194). Baudrillard defines the Code as the “structural law of value”; a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production, social identities. His early emphasis was the Code’s “ obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68). The Code produces a “hierarchy of differential signs” and, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned by the Code, and are positioned through it by others. We all know the value of a professional career, an elite education or a cute butt whether we like it or not. Further each of these ‘sign-values’ are classifiable and comparable through the sign’s logic of equivalence: traditionally wealthy businessmen trade on their financial wealth to offset their ailing physique and secure the affections of a younger and more physically attractive partner, that businesswomen now do the same only demonstrates the universalisation of the Code’s sign system. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence and in the barring produces equivalence – the regulated play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false, good/evil, self/other, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. Binary oppositions are central features of Baudrillard’s first and second orders of the sign (or “orders of simulacra”). The third order, of the Code proper, simulates choice, difference, freedom and diversity by allowing the privileged term to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’, ‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion and cosmetics advertising or pop music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign form, that is as “simulation”. In his early studies, The Object System and The Consumer Society Baudrillard depicts the Code as performing a pacifying effect on society; it soothes away once clear-cut, binary divisions of class and status by registering all people as individual consumers on a single universal scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations: but an illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard did not contend that other forms of violence and dissent would be deterred by the Code. Indeed he wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, not binary but post-dialectical (Baudrillard 1998: 174-185). He later proposed the term “disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996: 142-147). The later sections of the paper explore “the hate” in some detail.

#### 2. This cites only a few cities as an example, but these cities happen to ALREADY be progressive, so a living wage wasn’t the cause – Boston and Los Angeles were leftist hubs before a living wage; a living wage elsewhere won’t have the same effect

#### 3. The alt already solves this – no net benefit to a perm since the alt is sufficient to tear down capitalism

### A2 Shalom – Reformism 1st

#### 1. The overview proves the aff is an illusory reform – intended to improve living conditions but in fact making the lives of workers worse – to access this argument they need to actually answer the thesis of the kritik, which they haven’t done

#### 2. This is just an impact weighing argument, comparing short-term benefits of reform against the benefits of long-term overthrow of the system – the “turns case” arguments in the overview combined with all the impact weighing are sufficient to disprove this argument

#### My impact also outweighs—the aff is a stopgap measure to improve workers’ lives, whereas the alt is the only real way to challenge the reason workers suffer in the first place – the impact is far greater, even if it’s more long-term

#### 3. Mass movements against capitalism don’t solve – the code merely subsumes these challenges

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

The Code as form is preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology “precessional”; that is, as grid or network it precedes individual experience, perception, choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract, arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified, the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself. The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Baudrillard calls this the “logic of equivalence”. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or grid whereby all points can be compared, contrasted and exchanged. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be converted into sign form, it rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’, essences, identities and differences.[2] Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot process ambivalence (or becoming) as these are not ‘things’ with identity but relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis. The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental. At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together. Baudrillard was particularly interested in the moment of the “counter-gift” (contre don), that is the refusal of the gift or its return with interest to the giver in a kind of status war (the latter often referred to, rather imprecisely, as “potlatch” (1993: 125-194). Baudrillard defines the Code as the “structural law of value”; a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production, social identities. His early emphasis was the Code’s “ obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68). The Code produces a “hierarchy of differential signs” and, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned by the Code, and are positioned through it by others. We all know the value of a professional career, an elite education or a cute butt whether we like it or not. Further each of these ‘sign-values’ are classifiable and comparable through the sign’s logic of equivalence: traditionally wealthy businessmen trade on their financial wealth to offset their ailing physique and secure the affections of a younger and more physically attractive partner, that businesswomen now do the same only demonstrates the universalisation of the Code’s sign system. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence and in the barring produces equivalence – the regulated play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false, good/evil, self/other, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. Binary oppositions are central features of Baudrillard’s first and second orders of the sign (or “orders of simulacra”). The third order, of the Code proper, simulates choice, difference, freedom and diversity by allowing the privileged term to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’, ‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion and cosmetics advertising or pop music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign form, that is as “simulation”. In his early studies, The Object System and The Consumer Society Baudrillard depicts the Code as performing a pacifying effect on society; it soothes away once clear-cut, binary divisions of class and status by registering all people as individual consumers on a single universal scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations: but an illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard did not contend that other forms of violence and dissent would be deterred by the Code. Indeed he wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, not binary but post-dialectical (Baudrillard 1998: 174-185). He later proposed the term “disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996: 142-147). The later sections of the paper explore “the hate” in some detail.

### A2 No Alt to Cap

#### 1. The alternatives they say have failed are not true alternatives – they still operate within the same frame of productivity and accumulation – the only true alternative is to re-institute symbolic exchange, which my alternative does - it provides a genuine alternative to consumer capitalism and the code

#### 2. The argument there is no alternative is a new link – it’s an ideology constituted by capitalism itself, designed to indoctrinate us into blind acceptance of capitalism

#### 3. It asserts alternatives to capitalism have failed – by what measure? Capitalism has produced environmental crises, exploitation, dehumanization, and deadly competition for scarce resources that makes extinction inevitable – it is CAPITALISM that has failed, not alternatives to it

#### 4. The alternative is perfectly situated to create alternatives to cap – the mere intellectual act of exploring possible alternatives makes those alternatives possible – there are economic possibilities beyond capitalism

Wilson 12 [Amanda DiVito Wilson (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada). “Beyond Alternative: Exploring the Potential for Autonomous Food Spaces.” Antipode Vol. 45 No. 3 2013 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 719–737] AJ

Through a poststructuralist political economy perspective, we can begin to see the possibilities for autonomous food spaces where food is both the site and the means for building worlds beyond capitalism. A poststructuralist political economy approach moves the discussion beyond a flawed binary of alternative vs convention to explore diverse possibilities beyond capitalism. Autonomous food spaces is one such possibility but there are undoubtedly others that could be explored as well. By utilizing a set of conceptual tools that do not presume who the actors are and what activities are being performed, the possibilities for the future are left open. It is a reminder that how we think about and how we understand food-provisioning activities is of significance. As Gibson-Graham, Resnick and Wolff write, knowledge “actively shapes ‘reality’ rather than passively reflecting it. The production of new knowledges is a world-changing activity, one that repositions other knowledges and empowers new subjects, practices, politics, and institutions” (2001:21). Recognizing the existence of diverse economic practices is a first step to rejecting the hegemony of capitalism and signals the beginning of a process to relearn, rethink and re-create new economic and social realities. These two cases illustrate opportunities to build new social and economic relationships, but they also show the limits and challenges to sustaining and strengthening these new forms of social and economic interaction. We must acknowledge that envisioning and enacting possibilities beyond capitalism is a process, it involves experimentation and exploration. Like all forms of experimentation and exploration, they take time and their outcomes will be incomplete. While the goal may not be to create a universal space inclusive of everyone, these two cases are a reminder that more work is needed to break down barriers and undo social and economic relationships built on power and privilege. The success of autonomous food spaces relies in part on the trust and commitment of those involved, to believe that such a possibility is, in fact, possible and to commit to making it happen. As Gibson-Graham reminds us, in order to create economic possibilities beyond capitalism we must be willing to become ethical subjects capable of desiring and enacting these diverse economies (2006a:xxiii).

### A2 Survival 1st

#### The aff promotes a vision of life that is mere survival – this produces a form of life that is a living death – it’s try or die for the alternative to restore value to life

Fluri 11 [(Jennifer, Geography Department and Women’s and Gender Studies Program, Dartmouth College) “Capitalizing on Bare Life: Sovereignty, Exception, and Gender Politics” Antipode Vol. 00 No. 0 2011] AT

In the introduction to Homo Sacer, Agamben defines ancient Greek terms for life: “zoe ̈ which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben 1995:1). He sets up these distinctions to critique the condition of modern “western” politics. “Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoe ̈ and bios, between voice and language, that would have healed the fracture. Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception” (Agamben 1995:11). Agamben also identifies sacred life, homo sacer, which is made into “the object of aid and protection” (1995:133). He continues to link humanitarian organizations “in perfect symmetry with state power, need. A humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to reproduce the isolation of scared life at the basis of sovereignty, and the camp” (1995:134). Humanitarian organizations and development projects are integrated into the folds of sovereign power based on donor dictates and the ideologies of individuals on the “front lines” of humanitarian action. Also the assumption that life targeted for humanitarianism is by definition homo sacer and bare life assumes a hierarchal arrangement between zoe ̈ (bare life) and the subjective claims and politicized perspective for defining bios or proper life worth living. Placing (or displacing) life onto the margins of bios (proper life) by firmly binding it into a framework of human rights at the site of zoe ̈ (as common or bare life) subjectively defines and demarcates bare life as the site of living death, as well as potentiality or transference. Minca’s calls on geographers to think of places (rather than spaces) in order to avoid translating lived bodies into “the corpus of the nation” and the isolation of bare life (Minca 2007:90). Bare life (as defined in conflict or emergency aid/development zones) is life on the precipice of potentiality—as a living corpse “in need” of rebirth to bios through outside intervention. Layers of politics (and economically structured assumptions) substantiate the reduction from “proper” to bare life, and the creation of victims into sites of “humanitarian” biopolitics. As argued by Redfield: “the bios that understands itself as a civilizing force has difficulty imagining a zoe ̈ that it could not civilize or one whose alteration might change the very conditions of dignity” (2005:345). Bare life can then be discursively articulated as a site of potentiality through transcendental or metaphysical re-birth (such as attempted by religious groups) or by way of economic transference from bare life (zoe ̈—essential life) to bios (life with meaning—a “proper” life). The transference from zoe ̈ to bios re-evaluates life by way of its devaluation through an outsider’s lens. Life defined as on the edge of survival—essential and basic—resides in this zone of indistinction, where “universal” conceptualizations of rights are called upon to carry out a rescue by means of economic development as the mode of this transference.

#### All the arguments extended in the overview prove the aff does not guarantee survival – the system makes survival impossible and extinction inevitable

### A2 Luce – LW As a kritik

#### This says a living wage is consistent with socialism – Baudrillard criticizes socialism, it still uses the same values of production, consumption, and accumulation that causes all my impacts

Steinberg 7 [(Stefan, author for World Socialist Website) “French philosopher Jean Baudrillard dies in Paris” World Socialist Website March 17] AT

In his books The Consumer Society (1970) and, in particular, The Mirror of Production (1975), Baudrillard argued that the Marxist emphasis on the primary role of economic factors and production in social development was incapable of adequately explaining both pre-capitalist societies and modern capitalism. According to Baudrillard, both socialism and capitalism remained tied to the concept of commodity production and the Marxist concepts of use and exchange value, which were no longer sufficient to account for modern society. Baudrillard promised a much more radical alternative. In place of the production process and the analysis of the commodity that stood at the centre of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, Baudrillard elevates the role of consumption and the consumer in modern society. He first articulates this theme in his early work of the 1970s, and it then runs like a red thread throughout his entire work. In his book The Consumer Society, for example, Baudrillard makes his case for the primacy of consumption. He writes: “The fundamental problem of contemporary capitalism is no longer” production, but is rather “the contradiction between a virtually unlimited productivity and the need to dispose of the product. It becomes vital for the system at this stage to control not only the mechanism of production, but also consumer demand.”

#### This is also a new link, it satisfies us with the appearance of a radical alternative while only reinscribing failures

#### Finally, all the links prove the way the aff advocates a living wage reinscribes capitalism, not socialism – this cites other living wage movements, but I have specific links to prove the aff isn’t analogous to these movements

### A2 Mass Movements

#### The code ensures mass movements cannot solve

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

The Code as form is preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology “precessional”; that is, as grid or network it precedes individual experience, perception, choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract, arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified, the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself. The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Baudrillard calls this the “logic of equivalence”. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or grid whereby all points can be compared, contrasted and exchanged. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be converted into sign form, it rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’, essences, identities and differences.[2] Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot process ambivalence (or becoming) as these are not ‘things’ with identity but relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis. The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental. At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together. Baudrillard was particularly interested in the moment of the “counter-gift” (contre don), that is the refusal of the gift or its return with interest to the giver in a kind of status war (the latter often referred to, rather imprecisely, as “potlatch” (1993: 125-194). Baudrillard defines the Code as the “structural law of value”; a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production, social identities. His early emphasis was the Code’s “ obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68). The Code produces a “hierarchy of differential signs” and, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned by the Code, and are positioned through it by others. We all know the value of a professional career, an elite education or a cute butt whether we like it or not. Further each of these ‘sign-values’ are classifiable and comparable through the sign’s logic of equivalence: traditionally wealthy businessmen trade on their financial wealth to offset their ailing physique and secure the affections of a younger and more physically attractive partner, that businesswomen now do the same only demonstrates the universalisation of the Code’s sign system. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence and in the barring produces equivalence – the regulated play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false, good/evil, self/other, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. Binary oppositions are central features of Baudrillard’s first and second orders of the sign (or “orders of simulacra”). The third order, of the Code proper, simulates choice, difference, freedom and diversity by allowing the privileged term to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’, ‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion and cosmetics advertising or pop music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign form, that is as “simulation”. In his early studies, The Object System and The Consumer Society Baudrillard depicts the Code as performing a pacifying effect on society; it soothes away once clear-cut, binary divisions of class and status by registering all people as individual consumers on a single universal scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations: but an illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard did not contend that other forms of violence and dissent would be deterred by the Code. Indeed he wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, not binary but post-dialectical (Baudrillard 1998: 174-185). He later proposed the term “disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996: 142-147). The later sections of the paper explore “the hate” in some detail.

#### This is proven by every past attempt to use a living wage struggle to galvanize workers – hundreds of US cities already have a living wage, but capitalism continues to destroy their lives nonetheless – proves no social movements and their other link turns are wrong

#### Mass consciousness is high now but the aff causes it to be co-opted in favor of small reforms, which solve nothing – only the alt’s radicalism can solve the case

Moore 15 [(Ty Moore, 15 Now Organizing Director) “UNITING FIGHT FOR $15 WITH FERGUSON FURY” Jan 3, 2015] AT

Unfortunately, the union leaders’ ties to the Democratic Party at the national and local level – where Democratic mayors oversee racist police policies in most major cities – undermine their ability to win the trust of youthful protesters. These same Democratic Party leaders have played a generally conservative role in the fight for $15. They sometimes offer solidarity in words to fast food workers protesting McDonalds, but fail to champion $15 where they have the power to act at the city, state, and federal level. During the Ferguson protests especially, the Governor and other Democratic Party politicians who intervened did so mainly to quell the protests, either through supporting police repression or demanding protesters clear the streets to restore “peace.” So it is understandable that many youthful #BlackLivesMatter protesters are afraid that partnering with politicians and union leaders risks co-optation. Some will remember that during the Occupy movement in 2011, SEIU’s president Mary Kay Henry orchestrated a joint national day of action with Occupy Wall Street leaders, only to use the event to offer SEIU’s high profile early endorsement of Obama, calling him the “President of the 99%” to the outrage of most Occupy activists. There is mass popular anger at income inequality, racism, sexism, environmental destruction, and the corporate corruption of both major political parties. Polls show half of all young people have a negative view of capitalism, and anti-capitalist consciousness is highest in Black communities. The same youthful, combative, and radical mood expressed in the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 are present today in the #BlackLivesMatter movement, with the crucial difference that today’s movement is bringing a more oppressed, working class section of youth to the forefront. However, like Occupy before, the new movement against police racism will quickly face tough decisions. Endless protests and highway takeovers, if not connected to a clearly understood strategy to win tangible victories, will eventually exhaust the movement. A section of activists will be co-opted into the well funded non-profits and Democratic Party aligned efforts pushing for small-scale reforms. Limiting our demands to band-aid reforms like police cameras or slowing the flow of military weaponry to local police, while positive, won’t be enough to inspire the kind of mass movement needed. There is a burning desire to see fundamental changes. Yet many liberal leaders make the mistake of limiting demands to what they believe the current system, the current government, can “realistically” deliver. This so-called “realistic” approach fails in two ways. It fails because, as Malcolm X famously explained, “you can’t have capitalism without racism,” which means there is no way to meet the expectations of the movement for fundamental change without challenging the whole rotten system. The liberal approach of limiting our demands to small-scale reforms also fails because it undermines our strength to even win those small reforms! Mass movements are the only power that can win meaningful reforms for working people, but to inspire the level of energy and self-sacrifice needed to sustain mass struggle, activists need confidence that fundamental changes are within reach. How can this confidence be built when our fighting demands remain limited to what this rotten capitalist system and deeply corrupted two-party political system is prepared to deliver? Historically, all the most significant reforms within capitalism have been won when the ruling class is threatened with widening revolutionary consciousness. In contrast to liberal leaders, socialists urge movements to link up demands around immediate small-scale reforms with bigger transformative demands that offer a vision of fundamental change. The young people demanding justice for Mike Brown and Eric Garner have made clear they want to live in a society free from racist police policies, free from poverty, from unequal jobs, unequal housing, unequal education, etc.

#### Their social movements fail – litany of reasons.

McKernan 13 – Jen, an organizer with AFT Michigan, Local 6075. She has worked on candidate campaigns, state and local ballot initiatives, neighborhood improvement organizations, union drives, and a bunch of other stuff, some of which is embarrassingly uncoordinated (“When Bad Structures Happen to Good Movements”, 12/2/13, <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/when-bad-structures-happen-to-good-movements/>) jwang

Failure in social movements is an overwhelming topic. When I started thinking about things under our control that we could do differently to minimize the chances of self-imposed failure, I kept coming back to the organizational structures we create. We know that more money, more time, better lists, and more volunteers would all help. But how can we also work smarter with the resources we have, while we continue to work harder to improve our resources? I spoke with terrific organizers and activists who contributed incredible insights and revisions. They have all been a part of many different movements, brainstorms, meetings, plans, rallies, accountability sessions, campaigns, debriefs, press conferences, and work groups to make the world better for more people. They gained their hard-won experience in the trial by fire that is organizing. The result is short list of bad structures that happen to good movements. For the purposes of this essay: A leader is someone with followers. A volunteer is someone unpaid by the movement. An organizer is someone who is paid to mobilize people and money. 1. Consistently Using Convenient People to Do Inconvenient Work: This takes many forms. It might be that the social movement is underfunded or understaffed and so whoever is available gets assigned the task. This can lead to big delays, poorly designed programs, and ineffective strategies. Movements are such hard work that we cannot give someone tasks and expect successful outcomes if her or his ambition is driving them to do something else. In a self-driven environment like social movements, a person’s ambition and self-interest must intersect with that person’s tasks. It might be that for any number of reasons, the people who implement the plan are not a part of the planning process. Planning is difficult for many reasons, but having no member of the implementation team there at the planning sessions all but guarantees friction and a bad plan: scheduling conflicts, resource allocation issues, and impractical designs. It is impossible to have a perfect plan, but we will do nothing with a bad one. It might be that the movement is not truly important enough to an organization to send the important person, thereby ensuring that nothing happens. If an organization cannot realign its priorities to get the right people there, then the movement will never be important enough to win. Similarly, volunteers or partially donated staff should not be expected to do campaign work as their primary responsibility. They are often fully capable of doing it, but volunteers or staff who are partially donated already have a primary responsibility and it is not this job. People in social movements often believe that we can do everything for everyone. But a person cannot have two primary jobs. I have come to appreciate that the people are the movement. I think the “What will we do?” question is far less important than the “Who will do it?” question. If you look around the room and see that the wrong people are there, walk out and go find where the right people hang out. They are going to be busy doing something valuable. 2. Local and National Staff Conflicts: Many movements would fail without help from national organizations. Often, national organizations have the resources to move a campaign from an idea to a reality. National staffers have often been all over the country, putting out fires, filling in where needed, and contributing fresh ideas to stale, local brainstorms. National staff can be an incredible resource for a local campaign. It is a problem when national staff do not have strong relationships with either local staff or local leaders. Without help from the local leaders or staff, national staff may inadvertently step on toes, accidentally insult critical allies, treat volunteers like they are disposable, or make some serious, unintended, logistical mistakes. Due to the nature of their work, national staff will often be pulled from the campaign before they are able to repair the damages. We set national staff up for failure when we are not able to integrate their skills and knowledge into a successful local context. And national staff may leave big messes for local staff who don’t have the time or the resources to spend their days repairing relationships, rebuilding their demolished volunteer base, and apologizing to leaders whose feelings were hurt. In the case of a local campaign utilizing the skills and resources of national staff, it is critical that we integrate national staff into the local context. National staff need to know who the strong leaders, experienced volunteers, and reliable organizers are before making critical decisions. National staff need to be able to rely on local staff and leaders for event planning and logistical issues. And national staff need to be able to work with local leaders in order to produce effective campaign materials and strategic plans. 3. The Aftermath of Unreconciled Conflict: Certainly, an ounce of prevention would be worth more than a pound of cure, but we cannot completely prevent hurt feelings, misaligned agendas, zero sum competitions, or personal injustices. Race, gender, class, sexuality, ability, age, and size privileges will always exist in our movements. Good people will be fired. The wrong people will get credit. Lots of people will feel hurt. People will cheat, steal, and lie. Since movements are made of people these things will happen. And let’s not forget that those of us in the Save the World Business do not always agree on the agenda, even when we are able to avoid hurting each other personally. In the Save the World Business, an organizer on one campaign is often a leader on another. A volunteer often has experience with many different campaign staffs over the years. Many of us are recycled through the years, working in many different contexts, sharing our time between several passions. In so doing, we often recycle our conflicts, making it more difficult to create the strategic alliances we need to win bigger victories.

### A2 Social Democracy

#### Baudrillard criticizes socialism, it still uses the same values of production, consumption, and accumulation that causes all my impacts – this is a new link, it satisfies us with the appearance of a radical alternative while only reinscribing failures

Steinberg 7 [(Stefan, author for World Socialist Website) “French philosopher Jean Baudrillard dies in Paris” World Socialist Website March 17] AT

In his books The Consumer Society (1970) and, in particular, The Mirror of Production (1975), Baudrillard argued that the Marxist emphasis on the primary role of economic factors and production in social development was incapable of adequately explaining both pre-capitalist societies and modern capitalism. According to Baudrillard, both socialism and capitalism remained tied to the concept of commodity production and the Marxist concepts of use and exchange value, which were no longer sufficient to account for modern society. Baudrillard promised a much more radical alternative. In place of the production process and the analysis of the commodity that stood at the centre of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, Baudrillard elevates the role of consumption and the consumer in modern society. He first articulates this theme in his early work of the 1970s, and it then runs like a red thread throughout his entire work. In his book The Consumer Society, for example, Baudrillard makes his case for the primacy of consumption. He writes: “The fundamental problem of contemporary capitalism is no longer” production, but is rather “the contradiction between a virtually unlimited productivity and the need to dispose of the product. It becomes vital for the system at this stage to control not only the mechanism of production, but also consumer demand.”

### A2 Workers’ Dignity [Jones]

#### All the value-to-life arguments in the overview prove the aff does NOTHING to ensure workers’ dignity

[read the Death deferred satellite under Impacts]

### A2 Bryant – Concrete Action Good

#### This has zero uniqueness – the argument that critique fuels reactionary responses assumes the status quo academia is sustainable, but the whole kritik proves it’s controlled by the code – it’s try or die for the alternative to break out of the code, radicalism is the only option since anything else gets co-opted

Lechte 10 [(John, Professor of Sociology at MacQuarie University) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

Another domain in which the imaginary is in play is in what Baudrillard called, following the radical French playwright Alfred Jarry, ‘pataphysics’, the science of imaginary solutions. Pataphysics is a response to the dominance of the code in society. The code makes everything equivalent and tautologous. It gives rise to what Baudrillard calls a ‘banal strategy’, even as it pretends to be the ultimate real, and even though it has no finality, so that every concrete effort made to oppose the existing state of affairs is recuperated by the code – that is, is turned into a quasi-legitimate part of the capitalist system. Left-wing thought in particular has been appropriated by the code and turned into an entity that, far from being a threat to the system, becomes an integral part of it (the opposition needed to affirm the power of capital). Politically, therefore, it is necessary, Baudrillard estimated, to challenge the putative real, to move things to the extremes in order to avoid recuperation. These extremes, however, are precisely prod- ucts of the imaginary. Whether or not he was successful in this enterprise remains a constant source of debate with regard to Baudrillard’s intellectual legacy.

#### The alternative isn’t vague – it’s not just declaring “revolution” but is a real concept that poses a challenge to the symbolic order of capitalism

#### Bryant assumes the alternative needs to be concrete – the whole kritik proves concrete changes are merely tinkering with the apparatus of capitalism, but do nothing fundamental to alter the system – the only true challenge to the system operates at the level of the symbolic, which can’t be a material challenge

## Baudrillard Frontlines/Method

### TL – Method

#### 1. My kritik draws on Baudrillard’s idea of a consumer society, which is clear and intellectually sound – their indicts don’t apply

Ritzer 98 [(George, American sociologist, professor, and author who studies globalization, metatheory, patterns of consumption, and modern and postmodern social theory) “Société de Consommation: Ses Mythes, Ses Structures” by Jean Baudrillard. Introduction – written by George Ritzer] AT

There are many ways in which The Consumer Society can be seen as a piece of modem social theory. The book offers a generally sustained and coherent argument. While this was also true of the previously published The System of Objects (1968/1996), and remained the case for a number of Baudrillard's works that followed in the 1970s and into the early 1980s, it is certainly not true of the more recent works which often read like pastiches of aphorisms with little or nothing to connect them. The modern reader who is put off by Baudrillard's more recent postmodern style will be more comfortable with the structure and development of The Consumer Society. The scholarly format of the book will be familiar to most modern readers. Intellectual predecessors and antagonists are clear (something not always the case in postmodern works) and, as a result, so are the roots of many of Baudrillard's ideas. A powerful intellectual presence is John Kenneth Galbraith, especially his book The Affluent Society (1958/1964). Baudrillard uses many of Galbraith's ideas, and his critical analysis of them, to develop his own perspective on the affluent, that is consumer, society. For example, Baudrillard argues that there is no such thing as an affluent society; all societies combine 'structural excess' and 'structural penury'.

#### 2. His analysis of the consumer society explains sociological phenomena very well

Bjerg 14 [(Ole, Associate Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School; and Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen is a PhD fellow at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School) “The falling rate of enjoyment: Consumer capitalism and compulsive buying disorder” Epherema Journal May 12, 2014] AT

The object of analysis in this article is the phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder. If we project the tendency of the ‘falling rate of enjoyment’ proposed by Baudrillard, we arrive at Compulsive Buying Disorder as its logical end point. While the phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder is indeed interesting in itself, it also provides an opportunity to study more general relations between enjoyment, consumption, identity and desire. The article thus revolves around the following two questions: What is the role of enjoyment in Compulsive Buying Disorder? How may the specific phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder serve as an extreme case of the general relation between enjoyment and consumption in contemporary capitalism? Our theoretical approach to the study of consumption is developed through Lacan and Žižek, since the hegemony of consumerism today, arguably, cannot be grasped without reference to the axes of enjoyment and desire (Stavrakakis, 2007: 228; Fontenelle, 2013). The application of certain Lacanian insights – particularly into the logic of desire and enjoyment – is, as pointed out by Stavrakakis, a promising perspective in the analysis and critique of consumption (2007: 22). In our engagement with contemporary capitalism, we also draw on Baudrillard’s reworking of Marx’ analysis of capitalism (Baudrillard, 1970/1999, 1981), since it is argued that an analysis of the contradictions of capitalism can still be utilized to understand the contemporary phenomena such as Compulsive Buying Disorder. Perhaps today, in our age of extreme individualization, even the contradictions of capitalism have become individualized. And perhaps we may understand the flourishing of different kinds of addictive disorders as subjectively manifested local collapses of capitalism. In a time of economic crisis, rising levels of debt and harsh measures of austerity politics, excessive consumption may not seem to be the most pressing problem. Still, we believe, that in order for us to confront the fundamental causes of our current predicament, we must be able to imagine forms of economic organization and personal self-realization that point beyond the existing form of consumer capitalism. It seems that most solutions to the current challenges merely aim to restore society to a state of affairs immediately prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Even in a situation where the economic system has obviously failed, the public imagination is still mesmerized by the fantasies of consumerism. Rather than seeing the crisis as an opportunity to fundamentally reform society, the aim of mainstream politics is merely to restore the economy so that we can get back to previous levels of spending and consumption again. The following analysis of Compulsive Buying Disorder offers a glimpse into the dark side of consumerism. The purpose of this article is not to refute or replace existing theories of Compulsive Buying Disorder but rather to supplement these theories with a social theoretical understanding of the relation between compulsive buying and contemporary consumer capitalism. There is an essential insight to be obtained from the existing and massively growing psychological research into compulsive buying disorder, namely that the compulsive buyer does not differ qualitatively but only quantitatively from the normal consumer (Dittmar, 2000, 2005). The pathological trait of the compulsive buyer is merely one of exaggeration, not one of transformation. The feature that makes the literature on compulsive buying disorder worth addressing is thus that what is found in the compulsive buyer is merely an exaggerated form of what is already present in the normal consumer to a lesser degree. Consequently, the examination of compulsive buying is also promising in shedding further light upon the nature of consumption more generally. The aim of the analysis is not to provide a sense of comfort for non-compulsive consumers by showing that there are people out there, who are much worse off. Instead, we want to demonstrate the general dynamics of consumerism and thereby point to the forms of desire and enjoyment that perhaps we need to overcome, if we are to exit the current crisis through a door that does not just lead to even more spending and more consumption. Commodities, sign-value and the structuring of desire A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, bounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. (Marx, 1867/1973: 85) The use-value of a commodity represents the potential for satisfying human needs, while exchange-value represents the price for which the commodity is traded on the market (Marx, 1867/1973: 49-55). This is the well-known argument of Marx’s classic analysis of the commodity. What is characteristic about capitalism, compared to other ways of organizing production, is the emergence of a market where the exchange-value of the commodity is determined independently of its use-value. The ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ generated by the commodity are for Marx essentially connected to this paradoxical mismatch; how can a commodity take on a value, which is not justified by its use-value? In Marx’s original study of capital, the commodity is analyzed primarily in its relation to the capitalist mode of production. However, a number of subsequent authors have argued that capitalism’s centre of gravity has moved away from the process of production and towards to the process of consumption (Baudrillard, 1970/1999; Bauman, 1998; Campbell, 1987). The essence of contemporary capitalism no longer lies in the ability to continuously maximize productivity and profit, as Marx argued, but in the ability to reproduce and expand the capacity for consumption (Kjellberg, 2008). In short, we will argue that this shift in the gravity of capitalism produces a new set of ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ connected to the commodity and that this new set of complexities can be analysed by means of the concept of sign-value. In its original version, Marx’ analysis is insufficient for an understanding of contemporary capitalism, since it does not adequately include an analysis of consumption. On the basis of this critique, Baudrillard has developed the classical Marxist analysis of Capital to also include the sphere of consumption (Baudrillard, 1970/1999, 1981). Homologous to the way in which the exchange-value of the commodity in the sphere of production is determined independently from its use-value, Baudrillard shows how the commodity in the sphere of consumption generates a sign-value independent from its use-value (Baudrillard, 1981: 64-87). Aside from its capacity to satisfy needs in the customer, the commodity also constitutes value by functioning as a sign that gains meaning and value in its relation to other signs. In Marx, exchange-value is conceived as an ideological distortion of the commodity’s true essence as use-value. As we know, this distortion is what makes commodity fetishism and alienation possible. But while use-value in Marx functions as an external point of reference, outside the ideological circulation of capital, Baudrillard radicalizes the analysis by also seeing use-value as a matter of ideology. Not only is the exchange-value of the commodity a product of symbolic processes working internally in the capitalist system, but even the use-value of the commodity and the subjective needs to which it refers are socially generated. The consuming subject does not, as in Marx, stand outside of capitalism and therefore cannot serve as an absolute and material point of reference for the determination of the commodity’s true value. [M]an is not simply there first, equipped with his needs, and designated by nature to fulfil and finalize himself qua Man. This proposition, which smacks of spiritualist teleology, in fact defines the individual function in our society – the functional myth of productivist society ... Far from the individual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the economic system that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of objects and needs. (Baudrillard, 1981: 86, 133) Baudrillard’s point is not that needs such as hunger and thirst exist only by virtue of capitalism. The point is rather that capitalism functions in such a way that every need is appropriated and structured in a form that is useful to the system. Our basic thirst cannot be distinguished from our desire to quench this thirst with Coca-Cola or some other capitalist commodity-object.

Continues

The high prevalence of compulsive buying disorder attests to the increasing shift of gravity from production to consumption within capitalism. The mediating link between the two is the ability of modern capitalism to directly shape and appropriate desires and needs towards an increased capacity for consumption. Capitalism is thus not merely a market beneficiary that satisfies our needs; rather modern consumer capitalism also implies a symbolic structuring of our needs and our capacity for enjoyment. In order to explain his apparent indifference to clothes, Žižek once told a magazine reporter that ‘for me shopping is like masturbating in public’ (in Boynton, 1998). A main contention in this article may be phrased as saying that this joke also inadvertently expresses a more general truth, namely, that shopping is intimately connected with enjoyment and desire. Within modern consumer capitalism, shopping is the public form of enjoyment. There are indeed biographical, psychological, genetic, or otherwise individual explanations as to why some people manage to function properly in contemporary consumer capitalism whereas others develop a detrimental Compulsive Buying Disorder. Yet, in this article we have argued that there is also a specific relation between compulsive buying and consumer capitalism and that the functioning of commodities in contemporary capitalism constitutes a societal disposition for the development of Compulsive Buying Disorder. As capitalism’s center of gravity shifts from production to consumption, the importance of consumption of commodities as medium for the creation of identity also increases. In this sense, compulsive buying exhibits the structure of modern commodities more clearly than ordinary consumption in that the identity-creating trait of many commodities is more plainly exhibited in the compulsive buyer’s excessive relation to this trait. In order to create identity through consumption by redeeming the sign-value of the commodity, the consumer must mobilize a certain element of enjoyment in the engagement with use-value of the commodity. The compulsive buyer is characterized by failing to make this process of consumption work. This failure does not quench desire, but rather sends it into vicious cycle where each commodity only yields satisfaction for a moment. At this point compulsive buying is however merely an excessive illustration of consumption as such. The incessant deferral of satisfaction is not unique to compulsive buying; it is rather a quite formal trait of consumption. If we venture to read the phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder as a symptom of the current state of consumer capitalism, we may see the failure of the compulsive buyer in the attempt to make ends meet in the intricate interplay between desire, enjoyment and the constitution of identity, as the subjective expression of the societal tendency, which Baudrillard refers to as the falling rate of enjoyment. The incessant pressure on individual consumers to consume more and more in order to provide an outlet for the never ending stream of consumer goods flowing from a globalized production apparatus may be approaching inherent limits of human subjectivity (cf. Soper, 2013). In debates about climate change and ecological devastation it is often suggested that economic growth has reached the natural limits of the global ecosystem. In similar fashion, we may risk the hypothesis that there are also natural limits to the capacity of the subjective ‘egosystem’ for producing enough enjoyment to facilitate the conversion of the sign-value of commodities into personal meaning and identity. If this hypothesis is true, Compulsive Buying Disorder constitutes the necessary breakdown of subjective egosystems under the pressure of consumer capitalism.

#### 3. Baudrillard’s method is sound – he draws on Foucault’s genealogical method

Ilipoulos 13 [(John, Hellenic Air Force Hospital, Athens, Greece) “Foucault, Baudrillard and the History of Madness” Volume 10, Number 2 (July 2013)] AT

Michel Foucault’s groundbreaking work altered our perception of psychiatry. Although generally labeled anti-psychiatric for its supposed narrative of exclusion of madness by the oppressive power of Enlightenment reason, its scope reaches far beyond the simple refutation of mental illness (Foucault, 1989: 418). It is a more radical cultural approach to the conditions of possibility of current psychiatric practice in the west. It is at once a historical, philosophical and anthropological endeavor which explores the foundations of psychiatric rationality and displays its epistemological, ethical and political limitations. Foucault’s historical analyses of madness havecreated a new type of critique which, instead of attacking the relations of domination inside the psychiatric institution or the objectivity of psychiatric discourse, they question the very conditions which shape our stable images of power relations and the universality of the medical model governing psychiatric practice. In this paper I show how Baudrillard follows closely Foucault’s line of reasoning. He too carries out a cultural and anthropological study which repeats, revives and extends Foucault’s analyses of madness. Like Foucault, he performs a genealogy of western reason to illustrate the evolution of the prevalent rational schemas which have determined a specific relationship of western culture with its limits. Baudrillard’s sociological reflections are permeated by the social and cultural division between reason and madness, and, while less focused on the analysis of the psychiatric institution itself, they take up and deepen Foucault’s observations, exploring the fate of madness in contemporary societies of the west, contributing to critical psychiatry, which is not part of anti-psychiatry but a more radical type of critique of the psychiatric institution and its operation inside the wider context of today’s global rationality. The affinity between the two thinkers needs to be accentuated, as it is not immediately obvious, especially after their apparent break since the publication of Forget Foucault. In that book, Baudrillard had attacked Foucault’s preoccupation with power, putting forward his own theory of simulation and seduction in order to punctuate his distance from Foucault’s methodology (1987). Foucault’s brief response to Baudrillard’s polemical thesis did not help to clarify the underlying kinship between the two thinkers (1989: 360-361). The similarities, as I show, however, are greater than they appear, as both thinkers not only theorize power, but also carry out an almost identical genealogy of its transformations. Moreover, both thinkers explore simulation in depth and in remarkably similar terms, as both the symptom of current power relations and their underside. Finally, they reach strikingly similar conclusions regarding madness and its problematization since the Enlightenment. Taking their analyses beyond the narrow field of the psychiatric institution, they tackle madness not simply as a medical issue, but also as the most general problem of society. They examine the political factors which have contributed to formation of madness as an object of medical perception, but also the way in which madness challenges politically and ethically the exercise of reason in western societies.

#### This genealogical method is sound

Crowley 5 [(Una, Department of Geography and NIRSA, National University of Ireland) “International Encyclopaedia of Human Geography Genealogy, method (MS number: 443)”] AT

Genealogy is a historical perspective and investigative method, which offers an intrinsic critique of the present. It provides people with the critical skills for analysing and uncovering the relationship between knowledge, power and the human subject in modern society and the conceptual tools to understand how their being has been shaped by historical forces. Genealogy works on the limits of what people think is possible, not only exposing those limits and confines but also revealing the spaces of freedom people can yet experience and the changes that can still be made (Foucault 1988). Genealogy as method derives from German philosophy, particularly the works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), but is most closely associated with French academic Michel Foucault (1926-24). Michel Foucault’s genealogical analyses challenge traditional practices of history, philosophical assumptions and established conceptions of knowledge, truth and power. Genealogy displaces the primacy of the subject found in conventional history and targets discourse, reason, rationality and certainty. Foucault’s analyses are against the idea of universal necessities, the search for underlying laws and universal explanatory systems, the inevitability of lines of development in human progress and the logic that we learn more about things and become better at dealing with them as time goes on. Instead, genealogy seeks to illuminate the contingency of what we take for granted, to denaturalise what seems immutable, to destabilise seemingly natural categories as constructs and confines articulated by words and discourse and to open up new possibilities for the future. Through an examination of the histories and geographies of institutions - from asylums to clinics, schools, hospitals and prisons - Foucault’s genealogies encourage a re-assessment and re-evaluation of the discourses and knowledges of the ‘human sciences’ (Foucault examined historic discourses on madness, disease and normality, crime and punishment, sexuality, and much else as well), to question official accounts, their effects, and how they work to limit and subject individuals in modern society.

### Science Bad

#### Science is constitute by the system and isn’t objective

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Let us examine these claims in some detail. In Mirror and in Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard does substantiate these claims in theor- etical discussions that are not repeated in later works. Mirror provides important arguments on the emergence of 'reality'. First, Baudrillard argues, during the eighteenth century 'Nature' comes to be under- stood in a new way: 'Under the stamp of Science, Technology and Production, Nature becomes the great Signified, the great Referent. It is ideally charged with "reality", it becomes the Reality' (1975: 54). Nature as object constituted by science and technology is understood as a 'potentiality of forces' submitted to 'operational finality': the 'forces' of nature are put to use in order to achieve a particular goal or end, such as the fuelling of industry. The previous understanding of nature as totality, great law or principle did not lend itself to such operational ends. A scientific understanding of Nature that was suited to industrial society was required and was generated by scientists because they theorised from within the code or matrix of industrial society; that is, their thinking was dominated, at an unconscious level, by the metaphysical principle of production. Science, then, does not deal in 'objective', timeless truths but, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is always 'timely', always restricted by the socio-historic context and ideas about what constitutes the truth (epistemology) current at the time. This line of argument is directed at Marxism itself, with Baudrillard's mock incredulity that 'the reality of production enters the scene at precisely the moment when someone is discovered who invents the theory of it' (1975: 113). However it is also directed at other targets - particularly Western notions of Nature, Civilisation, Science and Progress.

### A2 Science---Extra

#### This is equally as falsifiable as the aff – say that our theories are wrong using deductive logic, same as we’d say your solvency mechanism can’t solve – neither has empirical studies or data sets to support because they haven’t been done before

#### No scholarly view can ever be neutral

Smith 4 - Smith, Vice-Chancellor Univ of Exeter, Sept 2004[Steve, Singing Our World Into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11th]

This raises the question of what kind of social science dominates academic disciplines of Political Science and International Relations? As the perestroika movement in the American Political Science Association has shown, the US academic community is becoming increasingly centred on a specific approach, namely rational choice theory. This approach is a very powerful one. It is the dominant tool in ‘successful’ social sciences such as economics, and its core assumption is simple to express: rational choice theory treats actors as rational, self-interested maximisers of utility (however that is defined). The rational choice theorist is not interested in the internal workings of actors, that is to say, for states, in their internal political debates, or, for individuals, their psychology. Instead the rational choice theorist models behaviour, on the basis of fixed, and pre-given identities, and interests. Such a method is incredibly productive, since it is parsimonious. It is uninterested in history or culture or difference, and instead is only concerned with what kind of game the actors are caught up in. In economics, it can predict with considerable accuracy how an interest rate rise will affect unemployment, or growth. It does this without having a second’s concern with the internal workings of the actors involved. It is a black-box model, focussed on the correlation between inputs and outputs.   Now, in International Relations this approach is also increasingly dominant. It lies behind the major research programmes in the US community, either in hard form (mathematical modelling) or in its softer form (accounts based on assumptions of egotistic rational value-maximising actors). Whilst I may disagree about its range and assumptions, I consider it to be an entirely legitimate way of analysing international relations, but, and here is the rub, it is only one such legitimate approach; there are many others, and they commonly involve methodologies and epistemological warrants that are incompatible with rational choice theory. From this two conclusions follow: first rational choice theory is only one way of studying the world, and it should not be seen as the social science enterprise. Second, it has strengths, but it also has weaknesses. The most obvious of these is that it treats interests and identities as given. Thus as soon as you accept the first move in the story you must accept the outcome. Take for example the prisoners’ dilemma game. This yields enormously interesting conclusions about the social world. The point however is the ability of the analysts to define a given problem as a prisoners’ dilemma game. Once that is said then there is no way of coming to anything other than the finding that both actors end up in a worse situation than they need be. But reflect for a second on what is omitted from the game: the actors cannot communicate; there is no shadow of the future; we know nothing of their prior relationship; we do not know if they are guilty; we do not know if they know they are in a prisoners’ dilemma. Note also that the academic is claiming to sit outside the world he or she is reporting on. The game is a real one, and there is a clear gap between the observer and what is being observed. The game theorist is reporting on a world ‘out there’. This last point should cause us to think, since surely it is the game theorist who pronounces that this is indeed such and such a game, and surely it matters precisely if it is that game and not some other game.  My point is that the game is at best a framework placed on the social world. So, the logic is not one of ‘this is a prisoners’ dilemma therefore we can predict the outcome’ but rather ‘because we are able to make the prior intellectually justified but nonetheless political move of saying that this situation is a prisoners’ dilemma game, then we predetermine that the result will be the one we expect’. In short, the important move is the framing of the question, and in International Relations that translates into being able to make such reifying statements such as ‘the international political system is anarchical’, or ‘actors are self-interested’, or ‘the real world is so and so’. Rational choice theory is silent on this matter of the prior conditions for ascribing to a situation that it fits rational choice theory.  What I am saying is that rational choice theory is technologically very efficient. It gets results. It predicts behaviour. It works. But why does it work? Is it because it is right, or because it presents itself, and becomes accepted, as the truth. Does it work because it has indeed captured the way the world is, because it corresponds with the way the world is, or does it dominate scholarly activity because it serves some interests; remember, it is an approach located within a particularly powerful academic community itself based in the dominant power in the world? In essence I am asking if the discipline of International Relations is marked by any less hegemonic behaviour than the international political system itself.   My point is that the dominant method in the dominant IR academic community is producing a discipline that is marked by political assumptions masquerading as technical ones. Note that rational choice theory treats identities and interests as given, and never enquires into how these come about. As such it buys into a political economy of the possessive individual, itself a creation of 17th Century social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. It takes the relationship between economics and politics as given, whereas in fact they were always taught as political economy until the 19th Century. Crucially it treats these features of the social world, especially as they have unfolded in the US, as if they apply throughout the world and apply for all time, even projecting them backwards into history. But I want to insist that this is a misleading account of the relationship between knowledge and the world. The act of any social theorist can never be to report neutrally on a world pre-formed and separate to him or her. There is no view from nowhere; all views make assumptions about actors, identities and interests, and all of them mix together statements about what is and what should be. So-called normative theory, a real no-no for the US academic community because it is ‘not scientific’, does this explicitly, but I want to insist that rational choice theory does it by stealth, by a sleight of hand, by pretending that the world is ‘out there’ whereas in fact it is a particular reading of that world, a reading influenced by the social location of the scholar concerned.   This takes me back to Max Weber, and to one of his other most fascinating essays, ‘Politics as a Vocation’(Weber, 1948b), which was written as a public lecture at Munich University in 1918. Speaking about the nature of political activity, he makes a famous distinction between two ethical positions that might guide us in these political actions. The first of these is the ethic of ultimate ends, the second the ethic of responsibility. The ethic of ultimate ends refers to the notion that the ethical person acts rightly and leaves the results to work out; it is not the person’s fault if good intentions lead to bad results. On the other hand, someone acting according to the ethic of responsibility has to take account of the foreseeable results of one’s actions. Yet neither position can escape the logical problem that sometimes you have to use morally dubious means to achieve ‘good ends’. And, given that the decisive means for politics is violence, then the ethical dilemma for the political activist is obvious. Politics, for Weber, is ‘a strong and slow boring of hard boards’, and the ethical person cannot rely simply on a notion of an ethic of ultimate ends. Politics involves judgement and choice, which Martin Hollis called the ‘dirty hands’ problem, namely that there is no neutral place to decide technically on the ‘right’ way forward. Thus, echoing Luther, Weber voices his admiration for the person who says ‘here I stand I can do no other’. That is the ethic of responsibility in action. And it carries with it the danger that ‘[w]hoever wants to engage in politics at all…must know that he is responsible for what may become of himself under the impact of these paradoxes…he lets himself in for the diabolic forces lurking in all violence…He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own an of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence’ (Weber 1948b: 125-126). So, I feel it is in the discipline of International Relations. There can be no equivalent to the ethic of ultimate ends, that is to say there is no possibility of a neutral observation of the world of international relations; all engagement is partial, all engagement carries with it a set of ethical consequences that rest, in the final analysis, on violence.   Weber, then, seems to have one view of scholarly activity (as shown by the statements from ‘Science as a Vocation’, quoted above), and a very different one of political activity. Academic scholarship should not engage with normative questions, or introduce political perspectives into enquiry. Political activity rests upon the possibilities of violence, and as such can never avoid the ethic of responsibility. Yet, I believe that this draws too sharp a distinction between scholarship and the world of political activity. Specifically, I do not think that academics can avoid the moral and political ramifications of their scholarship, since that scholarship is based in a set of social forces towards which it is either supportive (either explicitly or implicitly) or opposed. In essence, then, scholarship cannot be neutral; it is unavoidably partial, is unavoidably political, and unavoidably has ethical consequences. Crucially, this is the case whether or not the scholar is explicit about these ramifications. Indeed, the pretence of -neutrality, of using ‘objective’ data, is particularly problematic. As Weber commented in several essays, there is no more effective way of taking a political position than ‘letting the speak for themselves’. In my view, no scholar can avoid the dirty hands problem in his or her teaching of, or research into, international relations.

### OV – Not my Baudrillard

#### Their generic answers are indicts to different parts of Baudrillard’s theory – my kritik only defends his theory of consumer capitalism – if they haven’t explained how their answers specifically answer my Baudrillard then you should disregard them; new 2AR explanations of how they apply is unpredictable and kills neg strategy

#### Criticize the way Baudrillard arrives at some of his conclusions, doesn’t answer Baudrillard’s theory at large – disproving his thesis on television and media says nothing about hyperreality

### A2 Kellner – Specificity/Content Good/Essentialist

Card is “Yet doubts remain as to whether … replace careful analysis and critique.” And “Consequently, there is no real theory … which I shall soon return.”

#### This is a critique of Baudrillard’s theory about the media – the warrant is that Baudrillard reduces complex media messages to formalistic content, an argument that applies to his analysis of television but not to capitalism and labor

#### The paragraph before their card proves it’s in the context of television – doesn’t apply to Baudrillard

Kellner 02 [Douglas, Prof at UCLA, “Baudrillard: A New McLuhan?”]

Another problem is that Baudrillard's formalism vitates the project of ideology critique, and against his claims that media content are irrelevant and unimportant, I would propose grasping the dialectic of form and content in media communication, seeing how media forms constitute content and how content is always formed or structured, while forms themselves can be ideological, as when the situation comedy form of conflict/resolution projects an ideological vision which shows all problems easily capable of being resolved within the existing society, or when action-adventure series formats of violent conflict as the essence of reality project a conservative view of human life as a battleground where only the fittest survive and prosper.[12] For a dialectical theory of the media, television would have multiple functions (and potential decodings) where sometimes the ideological effects may be predominant while at other times time functions a medium like television functions as mere noise or through the merely formal effects which Baudrillard puts at the center of his analysis.

### A2 King – Evidence Good/Baud’s Writing Sucks

#### My kritik isn’t the “fragmented” and “terroristic” style this evidence criticizes, which applies to his later writings but not the kritik. Every card in the kritik has a warrant, so this response doesn’t apply

#### This is in the context of Baudrillard’s thesis on television and the media – even if this part of Baudrillard doesn’t use strong evidence, his other arguments do – the small text of the evidence proves

King 98 [Anthony, Professor at Essex University, Telos Journal, “Baudrillard’s Nihilism and the End of Theory”] AT

Thus, he does not provide a clearer insight into the true nature of televisual culture but rather obscures the role of television with an assertive and arrogant hypostatization of an immediate concept. His terrorism halts the dialectical process at its first and most inadequate initial point, before the critical process has begun. Instead of developing his concepts through a thorough immersion in “hyperreal” culture, refining his interpretation to make it more adequate to that object, Baudrillard reifies his first impressions into absolute truths. In breaking off the dialectical engagement with the actual social practices of postmodern culture, he hypostatizes his crude standpoint into “the truth.” Ironically, in trying to present hyperreality immediately, Baudrillard falls into exactly the same error for which he so effectively criticized Marx. Just as Marx failed to provide a truly radical alternative to capitalism by employing the concepts of capitalist political economy, Baudrillard’s fragmented aphorisms are unable to provide a critical alternative to hyperreality, because they are so thoroughly embedded in and dependent on the very cultural forms they are intended to oppose. The fragmentation of Baudrillard’s later writing does not serve the critical purpose for which it was intended, but rather, if it has any effect, it sensitizes the reader to the global media culture Baudrillard wanted to resist. His attempt to portray a culture in which allegedly there is no longer any reality beyond its representations, is the academic extension of that culture. Contrary to his own intentions, it is the very intellectual path he has insisted on taking, which turns its back on careful research and close critical analysis, which makes the desert of hyperreality grow. It robs the reader of any critical understanding of contemporary culture. Moreover, it denies the importance of developing alternative knowledge and understandings, which would undermine media representations of the world because it asserts that these alternative visions would always already be incorporated into hyperreality. It is not enough simply to say that television is a false reality; one must try and reconstruct a reality in which political freedom and critique are possible, even though any constructed reality must itself always be subjected to critique.

### A2 Dawkins – Unintelligible

#### This is just a literary criticism of Baudrillard’s writing style – I’ve explained the kritik and drawn on multiple other authors whose writing is more lucid which avoids this criticism

#### Obviously, saying Baudrillard is hard to understand and that he uses confusing terminology doesn’t actually answer the thesis of the kritik – it doesn’t prove me wrong

### A2 Robinson – System not Totalizing

#### The only warrant is that capitalism has changed to no longer assimilate challenge – they have no explanation of why this is true – the defense of Baudrillard’s theory proves the system is totalizing

#### This is also just alt solvency for me – even if the system can’t totally dominate, it still uses assimilation to SOME degree – in this specific instance the system assimilates the challenge a living wage makes to it, the case-specific evidence all proves that

### A2 Rorty – Ubiquity of Power Bad

#### It’s not a question of whether the ubiquity of power is bad or good, but whether it’s an *accurate* depiction of power – viewing power differently from how it actually operates means our political strategies will be doomed to failure

### A2 Rorty - State Good/Kellner

#### See “a2 cede the political”

### A2 Dhamee – Prejudiced/No Alt

#### They have no explanation for why Baudrillard is “prejudiced” – the explanation of our warrants answers this claim

#### Dhamee is more prejudiced – he starts with the agenda of disproving what he perceives as postmodern philosophers

#### Baudrillard doesn’t “liquidate truth” – this is an accusation about some of Baudrillard’s other writings that doesn’t apply to this kritik – truth exists, it’s just hidden by the operation of the code

#### Moreover, there is an alternative that challenges the operation of the code – the accusation that Baudrillard makes resistance futile is just wrong

### A2 Donahue

Card is “According to Žižek, theorists of postmodern … experiences himself as an outlaw . (102)”

#### This is consistent with Baudrillard – this evidence is an impact to hyperreality

Donahue 1 (Department of English, Gonzaga University), (Brian, “Marxism, Postmodernism, Žižek,” Postmodern Culture,12.2, Project Muse).

The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their "hyperrealist" character by means of which they saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction. A society of proliferating, promiscuous images is thus not overly fictionalized but is, on the contrary, not "fictionalized" enough in the sense that the basis for making valid statements, the structure guaranteeing intersubjective communication, the order permitting shared narratives and, to use Jameson's term, "cognitive mapping"[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/pmc/v012/12.2donahue.html#foot11)--in short, the realm of the Symbolic--is short-circuited by an incessant flow of images, which solicit not analysis and the powers of thought but rather nothing more than blank, unreflective enjoyment. The kind of subjectivity that corresponds to this hyperreal, spectacularized society without a stable Symbolic order is what Žižek calls in Looking Awry the "pathological narcissist" (102). That is, following the predominance of the "'autonomous' individual of the Protestant ethic" and the "heteronomous 'organization man'" who finds satisfaction through "the feeling of loyalty to the group"--the two models of subjectivity corresponding to previous stages of capitalist society--today's media-spectacle-consumer society is marked by the rise of the "pathological narcissist," a subjective structure that breaks with the "underlying frame of the ego-ideal common to the first two forms" (102). The first two forms involved inverted versions of each other: one either strove to remain true to oneself (that is, to a "paternal ego-ideal") or looked at oneself "through the eyes of the group," which functioned as an "externalized" ego-ideal, and sought "to merit its love and esteem" (102). With the stage of the "pathological narcissist," however, the ego-ideal itself is dissolved: Instead of the integration of a symbolic law, we have a multitude of rules to follow--rules of accommodation telling us "how to succeed." The narcissistic subject knows only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social relations constitute for him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper symbolic mandates; he stays clear of any kind of binding commitment that would imply a proper symbolic identification. He is a radical conformist who paradoxically experiences himself as an outlaw . (102)

#### And this description of hyperreality as an over-saturation of images is totally consistent with Baudrillard

Gane 10 [(Mike, Professor Emeritus, Loughborough University, UK) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The second is the way in which modern cultures implode, in which they wipe out age-old boundaries or transgress boundaries (towards the ‘transpolitical’). Here the hyper-real is that which moves towards the ‘more real than real’. Indeed, as reality decamps into the image the image ironically absorbs the space of the real – and that, Baudrillard concludes, the hyper-real can ‘no longer [be] the mirror of reality’ (AA, 12). It is from this perspective that Baudrillard examines the modern art world – not just the phase of the image that is more real than real, but the disappearance of illusion in abstractionism and simulationism. It is important to note here that Baudrillard does not simply chart this as a negative development but distinguishes between artists who can genuinely explore this development (for example, early Warhol) and those whose work simply adds to disillu- sion and banalisation. This evidently has consequences that go far beyond the question of transaesthetics (see TE).

#### The difference between appearance and simulacrum is a minor technical difference – the overall thesis still applies whether you call it appearance or simulation

### A2 Wolin – Doesn’t Analyze America/Nihilist

#### This just asserts Baudrillard didn’t visit America – that’s just false, since he did visit America – also, Baudrillard obviously analyzed American culture and ideology through secondary sources to come up with his conclusion.

#### Plus, his thesis applies to all societies – consumer capitalism and the code is a generalized system of domination that applies not just in France, but everywhere – they have ZERO explanation why America is so different from other countries that nothing Baudrillard says about it applies

#### Baudrillard isn’t pure skepticism – the alt has a real strategy to solve which avoids the criticism of him as nihilistic and skeptical

### A2 Know It’s Fake [Zizek – Horror Movie example]

Card is “If we are to surrender to the enticements of … that "this is not real life."”

#### Not my argument – this contests Baudrillard’s argument about CYBERSPACE in another book that we mistake virtual reality for reality itself, which is obviously not part of this kritik… here’s the paragraph before the one they’re reading

Zizek 2000 [(University of Ljubljana), 2000 (Slavoj, March/April “The Cyberspace Real”] AT

Are the pessimistic cultural criticists (from Jean Baudrillard to Paul Virilio) justified in their claim that cyberspace ultimately generates a kind of proto-psychotic immersion into an imaginary universe of hallucinations, unconstrained by any symbolic Law or by any impossibility of some Real? If not, how are we to detect in cyberspace the contours of the other two dimensions of the Lacanian triad ISR, the Symbolic and the Real? As to the symbolic dimension, the solution seems easy — it suffices to focus on the notion of authorship that fits the emerging domain of cyberspace narratives, that of the "procedural authorship": the author (say, of the interactive immersive environment in which we actively participate by role-playing) no longer writes detailed story-line, s/he merely provides the basic set of rules (the coordinates of the fictional universe in which we immerse ourselves, the limited set of actions we are allowed to accomplish within this virtual space, etc.), which serves as the basis for the interactor's active engagement (intervention, improvisation). This notion of "procedural authorship" demonstrates the need for a kind of equivalent to the Lacanian "big Other": in order for the interactor to become engaged in cyberspace, s/he has to operate within a minimal set of externally imposed accepted symbolic rules/coordinates. Without these rules, the subject/interactor would effectively become immersed in a psychotic experience of an universe in which "we do whatever we want" and are, paradoxically, for that very reason deprived of our freedom, caught in a demoniac compulsion. It is thus crucial to establish the rules that engage us, that led us in our immersion into the cyberspace, while allowing us to maintain the distance towards the enacted universe. The point is not simply to maintain "the right measure" between the two extremes (total psychotic immersion versus non-engaged external distance towards the artificial universe of the cyber-fiction): distance is rather a positive condition of immersion.

#### The article title is also “The Cyberspace Real” – the application of this argument to my kritik is a clear misrepresentation of what this evidence actually says.

#### The warrant also can’t be applied to Baudrillard’s argument about the code – the argument here isn’t that we start thinking simulation/virtual reality is actually real, but that signs become total abstractions, unconnected to what they originally represented

### A2 Marsh – Pomo Bad

Card is “In such a postmodernist account is a reduction … Southern California and the United States”

#### Not my Baudrillard – this criticizes the reduction of everything to images or the denial of reality, which is obviously not the kritik – it doesn’t deny the existence of a reality, it merely challenges the aff’s ability to influence that reality

### A2 BALSAS – Angry Rant about Baudrillard

#### This isn’t an answer… making fun of Baudrillard doesn’t answer his argument

#### Also this is a misreading – Baudrillard doesn’t actually deny the existence of the Gulf War

Smith 10 [(Richard, Associate Professor of Geography at Swansea university) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

In 1981 Baudrillard argued that Francis Ford Coppola’s film Apocalypse Now amounted to the extension and prolongation of the Vietnam War by means of media images, and that its success lay in the fact that it com- pleted an incomplete war: ‘the war in Vietnam “in itself ” perhaps in fact never happened . . . [T]he war in Vietnam and this film are cut from the same cloth . . . [N]othing separates them . . . [T]his film is part of the war . . . Apocalypse Now is a global victory’ (SS, 59 and 60). According to Baudrillard, Apocalypse Now demonstrated the fatal interdependence of war and cinema (SS), as the former has ‘become cinematographic and televisual’ (ED, 16), an argument that was to form the essence of the Gulf War thesis he advanced a decade later (GW). This thesis developed his long-standing theorisation of the mass media, hyper-reality and, more specifically, the precession of simulacra, to argue that the Gulf War was one where war itself had been exchanged for the signs of war, overexposed in an ‘orgy of simulation’ (IE, 62). The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995 [1991]) was originally published as a series of three articles in the newspaper Libération: ‘The Gulf War will not take place’ (4 January 1991); ‘The Gulf War: is it really taking place?’ (6 February 1991); and ‘The Gulf War did not take place’ (29 March 1991). The title of the book was an allusion to Jean Giradoux’s play The Trojan War Will Not Take Place (1983) – indeed Baudrillard noted ‘many analogies between the Trojan and Gulf wars’ (IE, 64) – and perhaps a reference to the Dadaist Johannes Baader’s comments in 1920 on the media coverage of the Great War: ‘The World War is a newspaper war. In reality it never existed’ (cited in Green, 1993: 101; Merrin, 2005). However, despite such an obvious reference to Giradoux’s play, Baudrillard’s book (GW) became a succès de scandale, with many commentators (for example, Norris, 1992) rushing to accuse Baudrillard (caricatured as the postmodernist par excel- lence) of denying the ‘reality’ of war. Indeed, critics at the time failed to grasp that Baudrillard’s critique of the Gulf War was based on the premise that it had no specific simulacrum – unlike the Trojan War which had the beauty of Helen as its simulacrum – but was rather the simulacrum of war itself. In other words, his critique of the Gulf War could not have been more grounded in ‘reality’ precisely because for him it was a ‘pure war’, a ‘non-war’, a slaughter of many thousands to further American power and a western desire for a New World Order. The core argument of The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995 [1991]) is that the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf was a part of the logic of a New World Order based around the principle of self-deterrence: that the Gulf conflict dramatised a new kind of deterrence that emerged to replace the one that was lost after the end of the Cold War. In other words, with the Gulf War a new geopolitical logic of self-deterrence was confirmed, a deterrence whose function was to replace the balance of terror and calcu- lated threat afforded by the orbital bomb and the always deferred nuclear shoot-out of the Cold War. Thus, for Baudrillard, the West is impotent, constrained by its own strength; it is incapable of waging war. This is why he hoped (his first newspaper article was published just eleven days before the deadline for Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait expired) that fight- ing in the Gulf would not break out: ‘paralysed by its own strength and incapable of assuming it in the form of relations of force. This is why the Gulf War will not take place’ (GW, 24). Against an Aristotelian logic where the actual follows the virtual (virtual catastrophe leads to real catastrophe), Baudrillard’s perverse logic and ‘stupid gamble’ (GW, 28) was that arms proliferation and the overwhelming military superiority of the West had decreased the possibility of armed con- flict: ‘We are no longer in a logic of the passage from the virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual’ (GW, 27). In other words, Baudrillard was beholden to Hölderlin’s reasoning that ‘where danger threatens, that which saves us from it also grows’ (GW, 86–7). Undeterred by the outbreak of fighting, Baudrillard continued to press his argument that a geopolitical model of ‘self-deterrence’ was not only operating but was also being confirmed daily – before our very eyes – through the war’s media coverage. As a ‘rotten simulation’ (GW, 59), the Gulf War, he contends, is a ‘non-war’ (a reversal of Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means) because: ‘It no longer proceeds from a political will to dominate or from a vital impulsion or an antagonistic violence, but from the will to impose a general consensus by deterrence’ (GW, 83). In other words, the protagonists are fighting in the Gulf over nothing more than the ‘corpse of war’ (GW, 23). They are engaged in ‘liquidating any confrontation likely to threaten the hence-forward unified system of control’ (GW, 83–4). The end of war is necessary, contends Baudrillard, to ‘impose a general consensus by deterrence’ (GW, 83) on a global level, to ossify the New World Order as ‘an immense democracy governed by a homogenous order which has as its emblem the UN and the Rights of Man’ (GW, 83). The target of Baudrillard’s critique of the Gulf War is the West’s wider geopolitical agenda, namely to establish a global consensus – a Hell of the Same or New World Order – through a violent eradication of the Other and the imposition of a logic of ‘self-deterrence’. In other words, what the Gulf War was really about, says Baudrillard, is ‘the consensual reduction of Islam to the global order’ (GW, 85), a war to domesticate the ‘symbolic challenge that Islam represents for the entire West’ (GW, 85). In short, the Gulf War was ‘a simulacre of a war’ (BL, 207): a con- flict between a western model of ‘self-deterrence’ and the singular and irreducible symbolic exchange of Islam. And it is a war that continues today – across western cities and the battlegrounds of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – as the West seeks to domesticate (not destroy) all radical alterity in the name of liberty, freedom, democracy, modernity and human rights.

### A2 Nihilist/Apolitical [Butterfield/Kellner]

#### Doesn’t apply to my specific type of Baudrillard – I defend an alternative and explain how it solves – that breaks out of nihilism and solves

#### Yes, the kritik proves conventional political solutions can’t solve – this isn’t nihilistic, especially since there IS solution that is non-political – the aff is just naïve to believe politics can solve

#### No link - this criticizes Baudrillard’s later theory, where he grew more apathetic – that’s not the Baudrillard I defend

### A2 Pomo Bad

#### Baudrillard isn’t postmodernist – accusing him of this isn’t a real answer

Smith 10 [(Richard G. Smith, Associate Professor of Geography at Swansea university) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007) was a visionary French philosopher, soci- ologist, cultural critic and ‘intellectual celebrity’ who made a major con- tribution to theoretical analysis in the social sciences and humanities. In the 1980s, Baudrillard became famous far beyond the narrow confines of academe, especially in North America and the rest of the English-speaking world. The translation of his ideas into English – especially by the pub- lisher Semiotext(e) – meant that he came to be thought of, particularly in the popular press, as the ‘guru of postmodernism’, closely associated with terms such as simulation and hyper-reality. However, while Baudrillard became well known as the world’s leading theorist of simulation – fêted not just in academic circles, but also in the worlds of art, architecture and film-making – the widespread caricaturisation of him as a postmodernist who believed that images had now replaced reality is completely wrong: ‘People took “simulation” for postmodernism, and I became a guru of postmodernism . . . [I have] enjoyed undeserved success based on a total misunderstanding’ (UD, 21). Unfortunately, this misconception was rein- forced by the release in 1999 of the movie, The Matrix, which, through a visual reference to one of Baudrillard’s books (SS), sought to align itself to his philosophy when in fact the twist of the film – that the Matrix masks the ‘real’ – is one that owes its debt to Plato (just like so many other movies: The Truman Show, eXistenZ, Total Recall, Surrogates and so on), rather than poststructuralism and the disappearance of illusion (Smith, 2005). Rather than a ‘postmodernist’, Baudrillard was, in fact, a trenchant critic of many of the taken-for-granted features of advanced capitalism and western culture – consumerism, the postmodern celebration of pluralism and ‘diversity’, globalisation, capitalism, modernity, mass communication and the information economy – as destroyers of the act and social relation of symbolic exchange. Throughout his long career, Baudrillard became globally famous for his challenges to received wisdom and the status quo. Most well known in this regard are his works that questioned traditional sociological and philosophical paradigms from Marxism (MP), feminism (S) and dialectical thought (FS), to anthropology, communication studies and structuralism. However, he was also known for his critiques of US foreign policy in connection with the Gulf War (GW), Abu Ghraib (ST) and the destruction of the Twin Towers (ST). He was also a well-known commentator on, and critic of, current affairs, from the HIV-AIDS epi- demic to cloning, drugs, reality television and the Rushdie affair, not only in his books and academic articles, but also in such popular publications as the centre-left newspaper Libération.

#### Postmodernism is a response to the current era, not the other way around. It’s impossible to reject postmodernism, they have to engage our critique.

Feldman 94 [Stephen M. SPRING, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa DIAGNOSING POWER: POSTMODERNISM IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND JUDICIAL PRACTICE Northwestern University Law Review]

Postmodernists, in response to this attack, might insist that they neither colonize nor depoliticize different voice scholarship; rather (as already discussed) postmodern theory both builds upon and supports such scholarship. Indeed (possibly speaking for Schlag), one reason we now question the ability of subjects to choose and pursue normative goals is that different voice scholars have helped reveal that the very concept of the "choosing subject" represents a manifestation of a dominant majority's exercise of power. Of course, some critics of postmodernism, discounting such postmodern responses, might reply that the postmodern emphasis on the antifoundationalist and anti-essentialist play of signifiers inevitably leads to a "slippery slope of "totalizing critique,' " n268 which leaves no standard for criticizing oppression and domination. To be sure, the problem of justifying critique looms as a crucial difficulty for postmodernists, n269 but postmodernism is not merely some grand theory that we can choose to reject because of some serious weakness. Postmodernism, at a minimum, is a cultural era or tradition that includes or manifests itself in certain types of theory. n270 With this recognition, the problem of critique becomes a challenge that must be confronted, not a defect that somehow justifies the impossible (rejecting the postmodern). n271  [\*1105]

### A2 Kritik is Also Hyperreal

#### This is a misreading of the hyperreality thesis – it’s not that anything that operates within hyperreality is wrong or false, but that hyperreality applies to some specific objects such as liberation, labor, and wages – this application is overly broad and generic, prefer my case-specific links

#### Even if that’s true – it’s still possible to produce critique from within the system, since the system’s control is always incomplete

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

The 'ultimate aim of the system', of seizing 'control of death' (1993a: 48 n. 24), makes it highly vulnerable to any defiance of its control over death, since for Baudrillard the entire edifice of power is built on this foundation. Death, then, is the ultimate weapon against the system because it is capable of re-engaging the symbolic exchange of life and death. As we are condemned to a 'slow death' of labour and survival by the system according to Baudrillard, . We must therefore displace everything onto the sphere of the symbolic where the challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force . . . only the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. (1993a: 36) Baudrillard clearly feels that 'real' acts of violence are pointless and counterproductive because they feed into the system, justifying its methods of control, and ultimately serve as commodity-sign or entertainment value for its media networks. To defy the system, Baudrillard argues, we must be prepared to 'die', in the sense of surrendering the 'life' (or living-death) that the system has given us. We must, he asserts, throw the gift of living death back in the face of the system and demand either an 'immediate death' or a new 'life' freed of the barring of symbolic exchange (1993a: 36-7). The self as given by the system cannot liberate itself from the system because it is of the system. This self must be annulled or sacrificed and the system is then put in the position of having to respond to this symbolic exchange: To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of catastrophe for the capital remains. (1993a: 37) In modernity, suicide has such a subversive force: 'through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society ... by inverting the author- ities and reinstating reversibility' (1993a: 175, emphasis added). So, for example, the high rate of suicide in prisons is understood as a symbolic exchange, 'an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach' in the system of control. Suicide is a 'challenge that society cannot reply to' (1993a: 180), it seizes back control of (the individual's) death and, further, it subtracts 'capital' or value from a system based on the accumulation and real- isation of value. In the act of suicide we remove ourselves as a quantity of capital. Moreover, Baudrillard insists, 'if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to the system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal' (1993a: 176). Baudrillard does not only mean suicide in the literal sense, but any behaviour that challenges or opposes the maximizing of performance, growth, accumulation, success. He includes neurotic behaviours by which 'sufferers' can prevent their full integration into the code and also street demonstrations that have no other goal than to provoke the authorities to 'real' violence, to shame and humiliate them. Baudrillard does not develop examples at this stage, but he cites briefly the student demonstrations of May 1968 where students 'sacrificed' their gift of a higher education, throwing it back at the system such that the system 'loses its footing'. The anti-Poll Tax riots of July 1990 in London seemed to undermine the Thatcher government as people rejected the secure life of (signs of) prosperity and instead risked life and limb in pitched battles with the police. But in both cases any fractures in the system were soon repaired, or at least papered over; particular politicians are removed but the system continues. Yet this does not necessarily undermine Baudrillard's argument as he asserts that the system has the power 'to displace the time of exchange, substitut- ing continuity and mortal linearity for the immediate retaliation of death' (1993a: 40). In other words the system has time on its side, or rather linear time is the time of the system. Baudrillard's point becomes painfully obvious in cases where corporations are found by the courts, or increasingly by the media, to have risked the health of consumers by negligence. This occurred when Coca-Cola marketed 'Dasani' purified water as a health drink when it was in fact ordinary tap water with various pollutants added by the company, and when Cadbury-Trebor- Bassett UK sold chocolate laced with salmonella. On both occasions the companies' PR spokespersons announced that since the unfavourable findings were made their company had already introduced the most stringent safety improvements: in other words your critique is already long out of date, time is on our side. To summarise, the system (political economy) has 'possession' of death such that it 'gives' us our natural, biological death, just as it gives us the gifts of a self and identity in consumer society. It gives us the gift of welfare, security and finally a painless 'natural' death in hospital. We may well try to resist these gifts, by driving fast without a seatbelt, heavy smoking, over-eating or starving ourselves. We may deliberately refuse to maximise ourselves, to realise our potential, or our refusal may be beyond conscious volition as in Baudrillard's examples of impotence and anorexia (1990a: 119-28). In each of these cases failure is equal to symbolic death in our competitive, performance-obsessed societies. However, an effective 'counter-gift' of potlatch-style destruction can only occur through suicide. The system gives and dominates by giving unilaterally, its power is based in the cessation of the cycle of symbolic exchanges. According to Baudrillard 'the worst repression , . . consists in dispossessing you of your own death' (1993a: 177). Suicide gives back, returns or counters the gift of life/death given by the system: symbolic exchange is once more put into play, the cycle continues and unilateral power and authority crumble by lacking a symbolic response. Domination is never total. The system cannot hunt down or neutralise every aspect, every fragment of our lives and thoughts; we remain 'free', at least free to challenge the system. We cannot and will not be made to identify fully with our individual interests, needs, desires and 'potential' that the system promotes as coded options within an integrated system. Baudrillard's conviction is that people will never acquiesce to the system and resign themselves to being merely 'the capitalist of their own lives' (1993a: 179-80).

### A2 Reps Meaningless [Baudrillard]

#### If representations are meaningless, the aff plan is even more meaningless because it doesn’t actually happen, and they have no offense – the conclusion of this argument is that the alternative is the only meaningful strategy, so any risk of a link is the only offense left in the debate

#### Representations aren’t meaningless – what the aff says obviously has implications in shaping and influencing other people – the ideas they argue for obviously matter. Also, denying this assumption makes the whole debate meaningless, neutralizing offense for both sides

#### Look, just because they also read Baudrillard doesn’t mean it’s congruous with my argument or has any special relevance – this is just a random musing that happens to be from the same author but they haven’t explained how it actually answers my kritik

### A2 Schoonmaker – No Empirics/Determinist

#### Baudrillard’s method is sound – [see “TL – Method]

#### The scientific method is determined by the system and fails

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Let us examine these claims in some detail. In Mirror and in Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard does substantiate these claims in theor- etical discussions that are not repeated in later works. Mirror provides important arguments on the emergence of 'reality'. First, Baudrillard argues, during the eighteenth century 'Nature' comes to be under- stood in a new way: 'Under the stamp of Science, Technology and Production, Nature becomes the great Signified, the great Referent. It is ideally charged with "reality", it becomes the Reality' (1975: 54). Nature as object constituted by science and technology is understood as a 'potentiality of forces' submitted to 'operational finality': the 'forces' of nature are put to use in order to achieve a particular goal or end, such as the fuelling of industry. The previous understanding of nature as totality, great law or principle did not lend itself to such operational ends. A scientific understanding of Nature that was suited to industrial society was required and was generated by scientists because they theorised from within the code or matrix of industrial society; that is, their thinking was dominated, at an unconscious level, by the metaphysical principle of production. Science, then, does not deal in 'objective', timeless truths but, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is always 'timely', always restricted by the socio-historic context and ideas about what constitutes the truth (epistemology) current at the time. This line of argument is directed at Marxism itself, with Baudrillard's mock incredulity that 'the reality of production enters the scene at precisely the moment when someone is discovered who invents the theory of it' (1975: 113). However it is also directed at other targets - particularly Western notions of Nature, Civilisation, Science and Progress.

#### Accusing Baudrillard of determinism isn’t an answer if I win the system does in fact determine people’s behavior. They need to win why determinism is *wrong*; even if it’s inconvenient, it’s correct – and it’s worse to act as if the system doesn’t determine behavior because that means we’ll use the wrong political strategy

#### Baudrillard isn’t nihilistic – alternative solvency means I do provide a way to break down the operation of the system

### A2 Katz – Anti-Revolutionary

#### No uniqueness – there’s no revolution now – there’s no revolution existing now for the alt to suppress

#### Look, this doesn’t explain why proletarian revolutions solve – it accuses Baudrillard of being anti-revolutionary, but the whole kritik proves revolution does in fact fail – the kritik is an impact-turn to this argument

#### Revolution fails – only challenge to the symbolic order solves

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Nature as object constituted by science and technology is understood as a 'potentiality of forces' submitted to 'operational finality': the 'forces' of nature are put to use in order to achieve a particular goal or end, such as the fuelling of industry. The previous understanding of nature as totality, great law or principle did not lend itself to such operational ends. A scientific understanding of Nature that was suited to industrial society was required and was generated by scientists because they theorised from within the code or matrix of industrial society; that is, their thinking was dominated, at an unconscious level, by the metaphysical principle of production. Science, then, does not deal in 'objective', timeless truths but, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is always 'timely', always restricted by the socio-historic context and ideas about what constitutes the truth (epistemology) current at the time. This line of argument is directed at Marxism itself, with Baudrillard's mock incredulity that 'the reality of production enters the scene at precisely the moment when someone is discovered who invents the theory of it' (1975: 113). However it is also directed at other targets - particularly Western notions of Nature, Civilisation, Science and Progress. For Baudrillard this new understanding of Nature realises a definitive split between the subject or person and the 'Nature-object'.6 In this splitting Nature and Man become separate or autonomous, both are 'liberated' yet 'dominated' in the same movement. As separated elements both Nature and Man can be coded; that is, they are understood as subject to 'abstract, linear, irreversible' (1975: 56) processes of development or 'progress'. Once split, both are then split again as the unquestioned criteria of rationality erects a 'bar' or barrier separating rational and irrational, good and bad into binary oppositions. Good Nature (food, abundance and beauty) is separated from bad Nature (disease, catastrophe), just as good Humans (white, hard-working) are separated from bad Humans (black, lazy). Marxism, according to Baudrillard, sought to overcome 'bad' Nature by the increased effort to conquer and master Nature as the fundamental signified.7 Baudrillard also attacks science and history as they are constituted by Western reason. His theoretical manoeuvres here lead us to the first formulations of the concepts of simulation and the notion of the revenge of the object: It is only in the mirror of production and history, under the double principle of indefinite accumulation (production) and dialectical continuity (history), only by the arbitrariness of the code, that our Western culture can reflect itself in the universal as the privileged moment of truth (science) or of revolution (historical materialism). Without this simulation...our era loses all privileges. It would not be any closer to any term of knowledge or any social truth than any other. (1975: 114-15) The recurrent and important theme of the revenge of the object is first developed in relation to Marxism. Because Marxist epistemology cannot question the primacy of needs, use-value and production, Marxist theory is ultimately, for Baudrillard, a 'simulation model' - a coding system that reduces all human activities to the model of production. Marxist theory tries to produce a general account of the course of human civilisation. It attempts this by sketching the respective modes of the production of goods that are said to characterise various historical epochs. However, in attempting to understand pre-industrial societies Marxist theory encounters, according to Baudrillard, cultures without the pretence of universality, without history, without relations of production, without a distinction between infrastructure and superstructure. In the attempt to analyse such cultures, by projecting its categories on to the Other, Marxism fails and is actually analysed by its object. This is the revenge of the object: Marxism's chosen object of analysis tells us far more about the state of Marxist theory than Marxist theory can tell us about 'its' object - 'primitive' society. The Marxist critique of political economy was, for Baudrillard, insufficiently radical because it was unable to perceive the operation of symbolic forces within the system\* of capitalist economy. Baudrillard pursues the hypothesis that there has been an important shift from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism. While Marxism had considerable critical purchase on the workings of competitive capitalism it has little grip on the new phase. The dialectic, which had functioned in the phase of competitive capitalism, is undermined by the operation of the code as a system of 'total abstraction' where the signified and the referent are now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers... of a generalised formalization in which the code no longer refers back to any subjective or object- ive 'reality', but to its own logic. The signifier becomes its own referent and the use-value of the sign disappears to the benefit of it commutation and exchange value alone. The sign no longer designates anything at a l l . . . all reality becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structural simulation. (1975: 128) According to Baudrillard there is no more dialectic of meaning, either in representation, the dialectic between sign and reference, or in economics, between supply and demand. The code absorbs these through 'predictive anticipation' and 'planned socialisation', which extends far beyond the production and consumption of goods and incorporates 'needs, knowledge, culture, information, sexuality' as terms of the code (1975: 126). All that once had an 'explosive force' (ibid.) is defused, deterred or contained; there may still be signs of the dialectic, but they are precisely that: only signs. Signs of revolt and 'liberation' abound: images of Che Guevara on T-shirts, spiky 'punk' hair on V05 adverts, gay couples in soaps. But these are signs generated by the capitalist system and any 'revolution' they generate is at the level of the sign and of fashion. Content (of T-shirts and hair products for the young, of soap opera characters) changes constantly, it is always being revolutionised. There are, of course, healthy profits in niche and 'diversity' marketing, yet more important than profit margins, according to Baudrillard, is the level of form, of the sign as form and as code. The production and consumption of signs is the form through which we understand ourselves. The code sets all the terms in advance, of conformity and resistance, playfulness and seriousness. It promotes signs of revolt and signs of conformity because it constructs 'conformists' and 'rebels' as types of consumer, as alternative poles that structure patterns of consumption. The implication is clear: even 'pushed to the limit' Marxism is unable to critique the sign-form, the general principle of the code. The passage from the commodity-form to the sign-form or the political economy of the sign is one of the passage of all values to sign-exchange value, under the hegemony of the code. That is, of a structure of control and of power much more subtle and more totalitarian than that of exploitation' (1975: 121). The code is 'illegible', it cannot be read, it is instead the form that allows 'reading\* to take place. 'Production' as metaphysical principle is the principle of the code: desire, sexuality, even knowledge is understood in terms of production. The code destroys social relations as live symbolic exchanges. It is far more destructive than ownership of the means of production, and, for Baudrillard, this represents a revolution as profound as the industrial revolution was two centuries earlier. According to Baudrillard we have now reached the 'end' of production. Production still takes place of course, but it leads an increasingly shadowy, obscure existence: banished to the third world, operating within closed and guarded compounds, non-unionised, off the radar (see, for example, Klein, 2001: 195-229). But Baudrillard's 'end' of production is not only geo-political but also epistemological. The sign-code or 'structural law of value' signals the end of production: the structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation. Strictly speaking, neither the 'classical' economy not the political economy of the sign ceases to exist: they lead a secondary existence becoming a sort of phantom principle of dissuasion. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 8) So, for Baudrillard the logic of economic production, analysed by Marx, and the logic of representation, analysed by Saussure, follow the same form: they establish principles of equivalence. Equivalence establishes regulated, ordered exchange, linear development and accumulation. In the economic sphere money is the abstract principle of equivalence: everything has a price and that price is directly comparable with the price for anything else. An academic, for example, is paid twice as much as a nurse, a doctor or lawyer three times as much as an aca- demic and so on. Similarly, in the sphere of language or representation a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified, and between sign and referent, enables 'meaning' to be produced, exchanged and accumulated. The signifier 'tree' invokes the same 'thing' whether it is used by a child, a horticulturist or a poet. This Baudrillard dubs the 'classical' representation or 'the second order of Simulacra' (1993a: 53-7). The spheres of economy and of representation are linked by the same underlying form, but at the level of content they are distinct, they can be distinguished, and Baudrillard terms this a relation of 'determinate' equivalence. The 'end' of production occurs with the shift from determinate to increasingly 'indeterminate' equivalence. Signs circulate in the code and are able to do so because they tend to become detached from determinate signifieds. As the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is weakened the 'referential dimension' of meaning is undermined because it was the signified that supposedly 'captured' meaning out there in the world (the referent). Of course we do not live in a world of free-floating signs or signifiers that mean nothing, or alternatively anything (Callinicos, 1989: 145). This is a ludicrous misreading of Baudrillard given his emphasis on the constraining power of the code and his deconstruction of individual 'needs' and 'wants'. Signifiers simulate the effect of meaning and reference: a 'reality-effect' is crucial to the operation of the capitalist system. It might be objected that signifiers have only ever simulated the effect of meaning and reference. In a sense, this is not far off the mark, since Baudrillard insists that the world is illusion, is simulacrum (1996c: 16-19, 2005d: 39-46). But there are, he asserts, meaningful, qualitative differences within simulacra, different and distinguishable orders of simulacra that have direct, meaningful and theorisable effects on lived relations and social experience. Baudrillard's approach is, then, more sociological than is acknowledged, 8 at least given a broad definition of the sociological! With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather than to a 'real', or referent. A 'hyperreality' of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real . . . they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real . . . . Neither Saussure nor Marx had any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real... the 'classical' period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7) The tensions, contradiction, oppositions and sheer unpredictability the dialectic tend to be neutralised by simulation, although Baudrillard is clear that the dialectic does not disappear, nor of course is it transcended or obliterated. It endures, as do aspects of the first order of simulacra, but in tattered, fragmented form in the firmament of ideas that have had their moment but do not die (see also Baudrillard, 1994b: 21-7). This, in itself, is a paradoxical, other-than-dialectical process because, according to dialectics, one state is supposed to be definitely raised, resolved and transcended by another state. The dialec- tic rolls on, but it no longer captures our imagination. In a characteristic reversal strategy, directed at Marxist theory, Baudrillard argues that capitalism, rather than being 'transcended' by socialism, has actually leapt over the dialectic as it 'substitutes the structural form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system's strategy' (1993a: 7). Given this metamorphosis, Baudrillard asks whether we are we still living within capitalism. 'Hyper-capitalism' may be a more accurate term, he suggests, but what is not in doubt is that 'the structural law of value is the purest, most illegible form of social domination ...... it no longer has any references within a dominant class or a relation of forces' (1993a: 10-11).

### A2 Not Applicable Today [Poster 90]

#### This evidence is 25 years old… if anything, this evidence is the one that’s no longer applicable. My authors are much more recent and apply Baudrillard’s theory to the contemporary form of capitalism.

#### The model of capitalism Baudrillard describes still applies today – it accurately predicts and describes a very recent phenomena of Compulsive Buying Disorder

Bjerg 14 [(Ole, Associate Professor at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School; and Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen is a PhD fellow at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School) “The falling rate of enjoyment: Consumer capitalism and compulsive buying disorder” Epherema Journal May 12, 2014] AT

The object of analysis in this article is the phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder. If we project the tendency of the ‘falling rate of enjoyment’ proposed by Baudrillard, we arrive at Compulsive Buying Disorder as its logical end point. While the phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder is indeed interesting in itself, it also provides an opportunity to study more general relations between enjoyment, consumption, identity and desire. The article thus revolves around the following two questions: What is the role of enjoyment in Compulsive Buying Disorder? How may the specific phenomenon of Compulsive Buying Disorder serve as an extreme case of the general relation between enjoyment and consumption in contemporary capitalism? Our theoretical approach to the study of consumption is developed through Lacan and Žižek, since the hegemony of consumerism today, arguably, cannot be grasped without reference to the axes of enjoyment and desire (Stavrakakis, 2007: 228; Fontenelle, 2013). The application of certain Lacanian insights – particularly into the logic of desire and enjoyment – is, as pointed out by Stavrakakis, a promising perspective in the analysis and critique of consumption (2007: 22). In our engagement with contemporary capitalism, we also draw on Baudrillard’s reworking of Marx’ analysis of capitalism (Baudrillard, 1970/1999, 1981), since it is argued that an analysis of the contradictions of capitalism can still be utilized to understand the contemporary phenomena such as Compulsive Buying Disorder. Perhaps today, in our age of extreme individualization, even the contradictions of capitalism have become individualized. And perhaps we may understand the flourishing of different kinds of addictive disorders as subjectively manifested local collapses of capitalism. In a time of economic crisis, rising levels of debt and harsh measures of austerity politics, excessive consumption may not seem to be the most pressing problem. Still, we believe, that in order for us to confront the fundamental causes of our current predicament, we must be able to imagine forms of economic organization and personal self-realization that point beyond the existing form of consumer capitalism. It seems that most solutions to the current challenges merely aim to restore society to a state of affairs immediately prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Even in a situation where the economic system has obviously failed, the public imagination is still mesmerized by the fantasies of consumerism. Rather than seeing the crisis as an opportunity to fundamentally reform society, the aim of mainstream politics is merely to restore the economy so that we can get back to previous levels of spending and consumption again. The following analysis of Compulsive Buying Disorder offers a glimpse into the dark side of consumerism. The purpose of this article is not to refute or replace existing theories of Compulsive Buying Disorder but rather to supplement these theories with a social theoretical understanding of the relation between compulsive buying and contemporary consumer capitalism. There is an essential insight to be obtained from the existing and massively growing psychological research into compulsive buying disorder, namely that the compulsive buyer does not differ qualitatively but only quantitatively from the normal consumer (Dittmar, 2000, 2005). The pathological trait of the compulsive buyer is merely one of exaggeration, not one of transformation. The feature that makes the literature on compulsive buying disorder worth addressing is thus that what is found in the compulsive buyer is merely an exaggerated form of what is already present in the normal consumer to a lesser degree. Consequently, the examination of compulsive buying is also promising in shedding further light upon the nature of consumption more generally. The aim of the analysis is not to provide a sense of comfort for non-compulsive consumers by showing that there are people out there, who are much worse off. Instead, we want to demonstrate the general dynamics of consumerism and thereby point to the forms of desire and enjoyment that perhaps we need to overcome, if we are to exit the current crisis through a door that does not just lead to even more spending and more consumption. Commodities, sign-value and the structuring of desire A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, bounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. (Marx, 1867/1973: 85) The use-value of a commodity represents the potential for satisfying human needs, while exchange-value represents the price for which the commodity is traded on the market (Marx, 1867/1973: 49-55). This is the well-known argument of Marx’s classic analysis of the commodity. What is characteristic about capitalism, compared to other ways of organizing production, is the emergence of a market where the exchange-value of the commodity is determined independently of its use-value. The ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ generated by the commodity are for Marx essentially connected to this paradoxical mismatch; how can a commodity take on a value, which is not justified by its use-value? In Marx’s original study of capital, the commodity is analyzed primarily in its relation to the capitalist mode of production. However, a number of subsequent authors have argued that capitalism’s centre of gravity has moved away from the process of production and towards to the process of consumption (Baudrillard, 1970/1999; Bauman, 1998; Campbell, 1987). The essence of contemporary capitalism no longer lies in the ability to continuously maximize productivity and profit, as Marx argued, but in the ability to reproduce and expand the capacity for consumption (Kjellberg, 2008). In short, we will argue that this shift in the gravity of capitalism produces a new set of ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ connected to the commodity and that this new set of complexities can be analysed by means of the concept of sign-value. In its original version, Marx’ analysis is insufficient for an understanding of contemporary capitalism, since it does not adequately include an analysis of consumption. On the basis of this critique, Baudrillard has developed the classical Marxist analysis of Capital to also include the sphere of consumption (Baudrillard, 1970/1999, 1981). Homologous to the way in which the exchange-value of the commodity in the sphere of production is determined independently from its use-value, Baudrillard shows how the commodity in the sphere of consumption generates a sign-value independent from its use-value (Baudrillard, 1981: 64-87). Aside from its capacity to satisfy needs in the customer, the commodity also constitutes value by functioning as a sign that gains meaning and value in its relation to other signs. In Marx, exchange-value is conceived as an ideological distortion of the commodity’s true essence as use-value. As we know, this distortion is what makes commodity fetishism and alienation possible. But while use-value in Marx functions as an external point of reference, outside the ideological circulation of capital, Baudrillard radicalizes the analysis by also seeing use-value as a matter of ideology. Not only is the exchange-value of the commodity a product of symbolic processes working internally in the capitalist system, but even the use-value of the commodity and the subjective needs to which it refers are socially generated. The consuming subject does not, as in Marx, stand outside of capitalism and therefore cannot serve as an absolute and material point of reference for the determination of the commodity’s true value. [M]an is not simply there first, equipped with his needs, and designated by nature to fulfil and finalize himself qua Man. This proposition, which smacks of spiritualist teleology, in fact defines the individual function in our society – the functional myth of productivist society ... Far from the individual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the economic system that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of objects and needs. (Baudrillard, 1981: 86, 133) Baudrillard’s point is not that needs such as hunger and thirst exist only by virtue of capitalism. The point is rather that capitalism functions in such a way that every need is appropriated and structured in a form that is useful to the system. Our basic thirst cannot be distinguished from our desire to quench this thirst with Coca-Cola or some other capitalist commodity-object.

### A2 Feminism Turn---Seduction/Feminine

#### Doesn’t apply to my argument – this criticizes Baudrillard’s book *Seduction* – I didn’t read this part of Baudrillard, which means this doesn’t actually apply

### A2 Destroys Personal Agency

#### Baudrillard’s theory isn’t what destroys personal agency – the system does. Saying this view is inconvient isn’t an answer to Baudrillard because that view is correct – viewing agency differently leads to failed political strategies, which is worse

#### This is offense for me – the alternative actualizes new forms of personal agency since it challenges the system and thus allows personal agency to be expressed in ways other than the dominant, homogenous form of consumerism

### A2 Accelerate Hyperreality [Baudrillard]

#### This is intrinsic – accelerationism is neither the aff nor the alt, so accelerationism is an intrinsic perm – that destroys neg offense by adding extra parts to their advocacy to artificially escape links

#### Accelerationism fails – it brought you Reagan, Thatcher, and modern neoliberal exploitation

Shaviro 13 [(steven, American cultural critic) “Accelerationist Aesthetics: Necessary Inefficiency in Times of Real Subsumption” e-flux online journal] AT

Accelerationism was a political strategy before it became an aesthetic one. Benjamin Noys, who coined the term, traces it back to a certain “ultraleftist” turn in French political and social thought in the 1970s. Noys especially cites Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972), Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (1974), and Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976). These works can all be read as desperate responses to the failures of political radicalism in the 1960s (and especially, in France, to the failure of the May 1968 uprising). In their different ways, these texts all argue that, since there is no Outside to the capitalist system, capitalism can only be overcome from within, by what Noys calls “an exotic variant of la politique du pire: if capitalism generates its own forces of dissolution then the necessity is to radicalise capitalism itself: the worse the better.”15 By pushing capitalism’s own internal tensions (or what Marx called its “contradictions”) to extremes, accelerationism hopes to reach a point where capitalism explodes and falls apart. Evidently, this strategy has not worn well in the decades following the 1970s. Indeed, it has become a classic example of how we must be careful what we wish for—because we just might get it. Starting in the 1980s, “accelerationist” policies were in fact put into effect by the likes of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping. The full savagery of capitalism was unleashed, no longer held back by the checks and balances of financial regulation and social welfare. At the same time, what Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call the “new spirit of capitalism” successfully took up the subjective demands of the 1960s and 1970s and made them its own.16 Neoliberalism now offers us things like personal autonomy, sexual freedom, and individual “self-realization”; though of course, these often take on the sinister form of precarity, insecurity, and continual pressure to perform. Neoliberal capitalism today lures us with the prospect of living “the most intense lives, lives of maximized (individual and social) investment and maximized return” (James), while at the same time it privatizes, expropriates, and extracts a surplus from everything in sight. In other words, the problem with accelerationism as a political strategy has to do with the fact that—like it or not—we are all accelerationists now. It has become increasingly clear that crises and contradictions do not lead to the demise of capitalism. Rather, they actually work to promote and advance capitalism, by providing it with its fuel. Crises do not endanger the capitalist order; rather, they are occasions for the dramas of “creative destruction” by means of which, phoenix-like, capitalism repeatedly renews itself. We are all caught within this loop. And accelerationism in philosophy or political economy offers us, at best, an exacerbated awareness of how we are trapped.

### A2 Simulate Government Destroys it [Baudrillard]

#### This assumes Baudrillard’s theory of the fourth order of simulacrum, which I have not defended in this round – just because they carded Baudrillard doesn’t mean it’s actually congruent with my kritik

#### Symbolic exchange solves better – there’s actually a coherent explanation of why and how it solves, which you should prefer over their vague argument about “simulating the government”

#### No link – simulating the government isn’t the same as talking about what the government should do – this is an obvious misapplication of what this evidence says

### A2 Radicalism Bad

#### “Radicalism bad” isn’t really an answer – if I win the thesis of my argument it proves radicalism is the only necessary solution – this argument assumes politics is what it’s conventionally thought to be, which the whole kritik challenges

#### Radicalism is necessary – anything else gets co-opted

Lechte 10 [(John, Professor of Sociology at MacQuarie University) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

Another domain in which the imaginary is in play is in what Baudrillard called, following the radical French playwright Alfred Jarry, ‘pataphysics’, the science of imaginary solutions. Pataphysics is a response to the dominance of the code in society. The code makes everything equivalent and tautologous. It gives rise to what Baudrillard calls a ‘banal strategy’, even as it pretends to be the ultimate real, and even though it has no finality, so that every concrete effort made to oppose the existing state of affairs is recuperated by the code – that is, is turned into a quasi-legitimate part of the capitalist system. Left-wing thought in particular has been appropriated by the code and turned into an entity that, far from being a threat to the system, becomes an integral part of it (the opposition needed to affirm the power of capital). Politically, therefore, it is necessary, Baudrillard estimated, to challenge the putative real, to move things to the extremes in order to avoid recuperation. These extremes, however, are precisely prod- ucts of the imaginary. Whether or not he was successful in this enterprise remains a constant source of debate with regard to Baudrillard’s intellec- tual legacy.

### A2 “Primitive” bad

#### The entire kritik proves Baudrillard’s goal is to dismantle the Western world order – turns their impact

#### This use is ironic – Baudrillard doesn’t actually consider non-Westerners as “primitive”; he uses the term to explain how the dominant Western view sees these ideologies as savage

#### His use of this term highlights colonialism, challenges Western privilege, and affirms non-Western viewpoints

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Baudrillard, clearly, is not a cultural relativist, let alone an 'absolute relativist', as his Marxist critics Kellner (1989), Callinicos (1989) and Norris (1992) suggest. Baudrillard does use the term 'primitive', even 'savage', to describe non-Western cultures and Lane (2000) is right to question just how 'deconstructive' Baudrillard's radical anthropo- 2 logy actually is. But the answers are in Baudrillard's work if we look for them. The terms 'savage' and 'primitive' are used by Baudrillard to achieve a number of objectives. First, they draw attention to the disreputable past of anthropology, to its roots in colonialism and economic exploitation. Second, he offends liberal and humanist sensibilities; for Baudrillard such people feel guilty about their own positions of power and wealth and seek to assuage this by insisting on politically correct or 'sensitive' terminology, while jealously guarding the power they have (2001b). Finally, by using such terms Baudrillard signals that the practices of non-Western cultures are not merely 'different' from the West in the pluralist sense of similar objectives or ends (survival, reproduction, expression) being satisfied in a different way. This is the 'culturalist platitude' he despises. Instead they are, he insists, radically and fundamentally different: 'the term "savage" conveys this foreignness better than all the later euphemisms' (1993b: 148). This is an otherness or foreignness more radical than can be understood within the 'mirror' of the self/other binary opposition, an otherness that is not merely the fantasy of the Western self but the annulment of its binary codes, thus challenging Western models of social organisation and knowledge.

## A2 Cap Good

### Science Bad

#### Science is constitute by the system and isn’t objective

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Let us examine these claims in some detail. In Mirror and in Symbolic Exchange Baudrillard does substantiate these claims in theor- etical discussions that are not repeated in later works. Mirror provides important arguments on the emergence of 'reality'. First, Baudrillard argues, during the eighteenth century 'Nature' comes to be under- stood in a new way: 'Under the stamp of Science, Technology and Production, Nature becomes the great Signified, the great Referent. It is ideally charged with "reality", it becomes the Reality' (1975: 54). Nature as object constituted by science and technology is understood as a 'potentiality of forces' submitted to 'operational finality': the 'forces' of nature are put to use in order to achieve a particular goal or end, such as the fuelling of industry. The previous understanding of nature as totality, great law or principle did not lend itself to such operational ends. A scientific understanding of Nature that was suited to industrial society was required and was generated by scientists because they theorised from within the code or matrix of industrial society; that is, their thinking was dominated, at an unconscious level, by the metaphysical principle of production. Science, then, does not deal in 'objective', timeless truths but, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is always 'timely', always restricted by the socio-historic context and ideas about what constitutes the truth (epistemology) current at the time. This line of argument is directed at Marxism itself, with Baudrillard's mock incredulity that 'the reality of production enters the scene at precisely the moment when someone is discovered who invents the theory of it' (1975: 113). However it is also directed at other targets - particularly Western notions of Nature, Civilisation, Science and Progress.

### XT Bifo

#### Bifo answers this argument – with the foundations of capitalism eroding, capitalism resorts to violence in order to preserve its functioning – their arguments assume an older version of capitalism, which no longer exists – collapse is inevitable, it’s just a question of whether we cling to capitalism using escalating violence or abandon ship and return to modes of symbolic exchange

### A2 Cap Good – OV

#### This isn’t the argument – even if cap is good, the alternative merely requires challenging the productionist assumption within capitalism – markets of free exchange of goods are still possible, which non-uniques their offense

#### Their offense is also simulated – the system produces signs that it is functioning in order to generate complicity from its subjects – view their arguments with heavy skepticism

### A2 Human Nature

#### There’s no innate human nature – this is just a capitalist construction – instead, symbolic exchange is more consistent with value to life

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Baudrillard's major contention in this work is that production is far more than a mode of creating goods for distribution and sale: production is, in Western culture, a metaphysical system. A 'metaphysics' is a system of thought that bases its arguments on an abstracted or 'meta' principle that cannot be shown to be valid and has to be taken on trust. The implication is that metaphysical principles are spurious and fanciful, and Baudrillard uses the term 'metaphysical' in the most derogatory sense to mean something like empty, abstract nonsense. To produce goods to satisfy basic survival needs is very widely understood as the fundamental law of the human species. According to Baudrillard productionism, as metaphysical principle, functions as an abstract principle that codes all human practices, desires, aspirations and forms of exchange as production. Yet, following Durkheim (1961) and Bataille (1986), Baudrillard insists that very little human action can actually be understood in terms of production. Instead, profound meaning, joy and intensity are experienced in taking risks, in wastefulness and even in destruction. The metaphysics of production locks us within a system of the production of value - whether as goods, services or signs. Further, we are expected to produce and reproduce ourselves as value, we must maximize ourselves, exploit our potential, and this, for Baudrillard, is the most fundamental, insidious and developed form of social control. According to Baudrillard, Marxism, though a powerful critical force in some respects, is confined within the metaphysics of productionism. Marxism departs sharply from liberal economic theory in that it emphasises the importance of the social relations of production, not merely the abstract forces or conditions of production (such as available technology, raw materials, markets for the sale of goods). Marx focuses on the social relations involved in any practice or process of production and asks awkward questions such as who benefits the most from such a system. Baudrillard still has a reputation as an anti-Marxist, forged largely by Marxist critics of his work, particularly Kellner (1989: 33-59) and Callinicos (1989:144-54). However, there is no question that Baudrillard was inspired and deeply influenced by Marx even in the formulation of his notion of symbolic exchange and of sign-value, which, ultimately, Baudrillard deploys as a critique of Marx. Symbolic exchange and the logic of sign-value are developed to critique the integrating power of capitalism. It is therefore simplistic and misleading to suggest that these are anti-Marxist concepts and that by developing them Baudrillard entirely rejects Marxism (Kellner, 1989: 58; Cdlinico^ 1989: 147). However, Baudrillard attacks Marxism explicitly on several related fronts. First, Baudrillard argues, Marx failed to see the interconnections between the system of political economy (of labour, the production of goods, the market) and the system of representation (language, the sign, meaning). For Baudrillard these two orders are parallel and 'inseparable' such that 'it becomes impossible to think outside the form production and the form representation' (1981: 43-63, 1975: 29). Other, more substantive criticisms flow from this principle. Because it does not question the abstract or metaphysical principle of production as a means of satisfying needs, Marxism tends to naturalise and universalise use-value. For the sake of clarity this point is explored in some detail. In a section of Critique entitled 'The Myth of Primary Needs' (1981: 80-2) Baudrillard contests what he terms the 'bio-anthropological postulate' of primary needs. The notion of need is ideological in the sense that it is based on an insupportable abstraction: the separation of '[hu]man as essence' from the social environment. One implication of this way of flunking is that the social system could be said to obscure the 'true essence of humanity', but Baudrillard denies that 'true', 'objective' survival needs can be identified, since 'it is always the production of the surplus that regulates the whole. The survival threshold is never determined from below, but from above' (1981: 81). That is, 'needs' and their satisfactions are always ideological, always implicated in power relations, never 'natural'. For Baudrillard needs are defined as: a function induced (in the individual) by the internal logic of the system: more precisely not as a consummative force liberated by the affluent society, but as a productive force required by the functioning of the system . . . there are only needs because the system needs them. (Baudrillard, 1981: 82-3, original emphasis) Baudrillard attacks the very principle of needs, uses and wants. To speak of needs, uses or wants is already an abstraction because it covertly assumes a great deal. It assumes an already existing, taken-for- granted individual separated from other individuals and separated from the world. It assumes that this 'individual', itself an abstraction, will naturally abstract or break down the world into useful things (and less useful things)and make use of the useful things to survive and reproduce. This assumes a natural state of scarcity and of competition for these scarce resources. It assumes that all of these components - 'objects', 'individuals', 'scarcity', 'usefulness' and 'competition' - exist in nature or reality, independently of social or cultural meanings and representational practices. It suggests that these facts of reality or nature are the cause of cultural meanings and practices, which are merely a 'reflection' of them. Baudrillard's contention, and it is by no means an original one, is that these components are effects, not causes, of cultural practices. It follows that each of these contentions can be contested and, for Baudrillard, must be if the capitalist system is to be challenged. Crucially, the idea that the individual pre-exists society, culture or community is patently absurd - although it is widely held. Every 'individual' is born into a community with values, norms and a language, or rather the notion of the 'individual' is only constituted through relations with the community's values, norms and language. That an individual can be recognised, and function, as 'an individual' is a mea- sure of the community's success in producing individuals. Moreover, what we refer to as an 'individual' is an idea generated by our cultural practices and meanings, which are capitalist, and which are built upon the 'barring' of symbolic exchange relations between people. These points relate to Baudrillard’s theories in two important ways. First, the notion of symbolic exchange invites us to think about social relations without the abstractions and separations we are accustomed to: symbolic exchange expresses a 'pact' that defies abstraction into separate poles, terms or individuals. Second, Baudrillard continues to explore the ways in which the individual - with his or her needs, wants and uses - are coded by the capitalist system. Capitalist exchange-value represents use-value as residing beneath or beyond it in a natural relationship of human beings to objects, but this is, for Baudrillard, a mirage on the horizon of exchange-value, 'a code effect' (1975: 25). The capitalist system of exchange-value claims to base exchange-values, or prices, on the solid reality of use-values. For example, a strong well made tin opener may cost twice as much as a flimsy poorly constructed one but it should last twice as long. But the relationship between use-value and exchange-value is not nearly this transparent. It obscures the fact that we live in a culture where people are unable to produce their own food and where they feel that they do not have time to prepare food. It obscures the appropriation of surplus-value or profit accrued by those who own the factories that produce tinned food. The Marxist critique enables us to theorise these relations, but it does not enable us to question the metaphysical principle of the individual with his or her needs and use-values because it accepts the reality of 'natural' needs and uses. Marxism allows capitalism this 'alibi' because it tries to locate and 'rediscover' a natural relation to use-value undistorted by capitalist exchange-value, but there is no 'natural' relation to use-value. Baudrillard focuses on the concept of labour, which is divided into two forms in Marx's Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (originally published in 1857). The labour used to produce use-value is 'concrete, immediate and special' but the labour used in producing exchange-value is 'abstract, universal and homogeneous' (1975: 26). Yet this distinction has the effect of 'autonomizing and generalising labour as the essence of human practice'. This amounts to 'an incredible simplification of social exchange' (1975: 29), which, according to Baudrillard, actually 'intensifies' the abstractions and separations made by liberal theorists of political economy: Marxism assists the cunning of Capital. It convinces men that they are alienated by the sale of their labour power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labour power, as the 'inalienable' power of creating value by their labour.

### A2 Squo Improving

#### Social progress is a simulation – even if the signs of social progress are improving, the code causes violent outburst of hate that outweigh

Pawlette 8 [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “HATE/CODE” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

Hatred is undoubtedly something which outlives any definable object, and feeds on the disappearance of that object (Baudrillard 1995/1996: 145). What then is the relationship between the Code and violence and hatred? The Code, it seems, both pacifies and produces hate: indeed it produces hatred through pacification. The Code integrates as it differentiates, it culturates and multi-culturates. Baudrillard acknowledged that consumer capitalism had, partially, achieved a pacifying or ameliorative effect on ‘structural’ hatred such as the racism of biology or skin colour. However, the system, through its compulsory registration of all within the Code, generates, according to Baudrillard, new hatreds and new violence that cannot be ‘treated’ by socialisation, education and information. On racism specifically Baudrillard argues: Logically it [racism] ought to have declined with progress and the spread of Enlightenment. But the more we learn how unfounded the genetic theory of race is, the more racism intensifies. This is because we are dealing with an artificial construction of the Other, on the basis of an erosion of the singularity of cultures (Baudrillard 2002a: 55). If the dialectical violence of difference (self v. other) is ameliorated, the post-dialectical violence of indifference seems to grow in intensity. The violence of in-difference or “the hate” is a viral form and like a hospital ‘superbug’ it cannot be treated by the standard measures and cures because the over-use of those very measures produced it (Baudrillard 1996: 142-147; 2005: 141-155). The Code’s vast edifice of signs diversifies and assimilates producing ‘positive’ representations at the same time as the divide, both economic and cultural, between rich and poor deepens and ramifies. The richer get richer and the poor get humiliated. For Baudrillard the edifice of signs actually “deters”, prevents or displaces the possibility of genuine social progress by delivering “simulated” social progress: signs of inclusion, signs of empowerment. Further the masses (everyone, “nous, vous, tout le monde”) reject, ultimately, the system of signs; we become increasingly indifferent to it, disengaged from its prescriptions. The hate cannot be treated by the use of signs because the over-use of signs produced it. The hate, as Baudrillard figures it, cannot be broken down and understood through the binary or dialectical categories of self and other, black and white, inside and outside, us and them. The hate does not emanate from a recognisable position: a self, ideology or culture, nor does it emerge from the self, ideology or culture of the other. The verb ‘to hate’, like the self or ego has become autonomous: uprooted it flows and seeps crossing any boundary, any limit (Baudrillard 2005c: 141). The hate flows, is networked, travels at the speed of information; it has not one object or target but all and any. Because it is not, primarily, hatred of something or someone, it is not reflective or critical nor does it propose alternatives. Having no definite object, goal or purpose, no programme or ideology, the Hate is a particularly intractable and corrosive form of hatred.

#### Their “squo improving” claims obviously don’t account for value to life – objective measures of poverty lines and statistics on violence don’t account for the degrading subjective value that people find in their own lives – they can’t access this impact

#### The claim that the squo is improving is neoliberal ideology with no evidence---the system’s getting more unequal and more environmentally destructive

Stephen Gill 12, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science, York University, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 13

The enormous business literature on global leadership is also concerned with the problems confronting the transnational capitalist class, but sees these principally not as political and ecological challenges (and implicitly questions of legitimacy) but as problems of efficient corporate management or administration, decision-making and processes, and cultural and political sensitivity to local conditions. The litmus test of leadership is the level of profit in global markets. Oddly enough, relatively neglected in the management literature – as well as in much of the literature just reviewed – are the many important global forums that help to shape the strategic perspectives of capital and the state. Examples include the World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the scenario planning used by corporations and government agencies (e.g. by Shell, whose methods have been used by the CIA) not only to influence policy but also to anticipate political challenges to economic and cultural globalization. Organizations such as the World Economic Forum, the Trilateral Commission and the new Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) bring together dominant globalizing elites from government, corporations, universities, political parties, media, entertainment, the sciences and the arts to forge a consensus and to initiate strategic concepts of global leadership. What seems to be missing from these initiatives is precisely what Sklair (2000) claims was being attempted over a decade ago: comprehensive *evidence* of well-resourced, broad-based and serious efforts to deal with ever-widening global inequality, the systematic undermining and dispossession of livelihoods and growing threats to the integrity of the biosphere. The fact that this evidence is not forthcoming is perhaps not surprising if one reflects on the realities of the existing state of relations between rulers and ruled on a world scale. Why should international capitalists worry about growing global inequality and class polarization, or, indeed, the future of the planet, if there are no powerful political forces that force them to do so? Perhaps a more convincing hypothesis is that, far from creating a coherent redistributive and ecologically sustainable structure of globalization presided over by a transnational capitalist class, the opposite is true. What is gradually emerging is a more and more unequal and increasingly hierarchical global political and civil society directed by dominant social forces associated with disciplinary neoliberalism that seek to extend market civilization on a world scale, in ways that will further class polarization and the ecological crisis alike.

#### Their ev is a snapshot that can’t account for the future trajectory of neolib---it’s unsustainable and causes environmental system collapse

Benny Goodman 11, Faculty of Health, Education and Society, Plymouth University, June 2011, “Transformation for Health and Sustainability: “Consumption is Killing Us,”” http://www.academia.edu/666114/Transformation\_for\_health\_and\_sustainability\_Dualism\_and\_Anthropocentrism

Ben Ami (2010) tells us however that growth is good, consumption is good and we could have "Ferraris for air. He argues that in advanced industrial societies we have seen decreases in infant and maternal mortality rates and increasing life expectancy coupled with control of infections. We live longer healthier lives. Hans Rosling in his online gapminder series also points out that these indicators are also rising in many developing countries, but he warns that success may literally cost the earth. So how can consumption be killing us? Well, it isn't. Goklany (2006) argues that economic growth, technological change and free trade has helped to power a "cycle of progress" that in the last two centuries enabled unprecedented improvements in every objective measurement of human well-being. Poverty, hunger, malnutrition, child labor, illiteracy and unsafe water have ceased to be global norms; infant mortality has never been lower; and we live longer and healthier lives. Further, Goklany’s research suggests that global agricultural productivity is up, food prices are down, hunger and malnutrition have dropped worldwide, public health has improved, mortality rates are down, and life expectancies are up. So that its then, we are fine. Except that since he wrote that in 2006 the world saw one food crisis in 2008 and this year 2011 the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation are giving the global food market 'critical' status, again. The Millennium Development Goals have still to be met and maternal and infant mortality is still at numbers too high in many countries to enable any level of complacency. However, if you view the world anthropocentrically within the frame of reference of consumer capitalism and you happen to live in advanced industrial nations in wealthy suburbs. You can even muster hard empirical evidence to show the beneficence of the global economic system. The problem with this viewpoint is time frame. Seen from the last 200 years enormous, unprecedented progress has without doubt been made. However the time frame for a proper assessment of the current global system is much longer than that. Even in human time frames the last 200 years is a very short period of history. Depending on definition, the Roman Empire lasted over 400 years, and from the steps of the senate, Julius Ceaser may have dreamed of a millennium of Roman domination. World history is littered with the ruins of human civilizations, hubris comes before a fall. We are not Rome or Byzantium. We have controlled the natural environment (up to a point) to produce food and shelter for billions. However there is a poverty of spirit, a neglect of the 'bottom billion', willful ignorance of the casualties of inequalities based capitalism, a disconnect from environmental destruction and a lack of vision of alternatives that may lead to more healthy, sustainable lives on a finite planet as we bump up against limits. Of course, assertions about limits needs some evidence. A key paper in this respect is that which addresses the issue of planetary boundaries - i.e. that there are limits to what we can achieve on this planet, that we need urgently to identify what these limits are and then to address what socioeconomic conditions would allow all of humanity to live within the planet boundaries. If we do not do this, the argument runs, then the ecosystem services upon which all of us (the biosphere) may well collapse leading to a cull of humanity in line with the extinctions we are already exacting on the living world right now. Rockstrom et al (2009) have tried to identify what the key boundaries are and what the limits are within each. They suggest that humanity has already transgressed three of nine boundaries: 1. CO2 emissions for climate change. 2. Biodiversity loss. 3. Biochemical boundaries - the nitrogen cycle (the phosphorous cycle has not yet been transgressed) The other boundaries discussed include: 4. Ocean acidification 5. Stratospheric ozone depletion 6. Global fresh water use 7. Change in land use 8. Atmospheric aerosol loading (not yet quantified). 9. Chemical pollution (not yet quantified). They also argue: "In the last 200 years, humanity has transitioned into a new geological era—termed the Anthropocene—which is defined by an accelerating departure from the stable environmental conditions of the past 12,000 years into a new, unknown state of Earth". "In order to maintain a global environment that is conducive for human development and well-being, we must define and respect planetary boundaries that delineate a 'safe operating space' for humanity. We must return to the long-term stable global environment that nurtured human development'.

### A2 Cap Solves Coercion

#### This assumes private property is the most important measure of freedom – obviously cap protects private property, but the whole kritik contests the assumption that property is the measure of all value

#### Coercion for whom?! The existence of massive poverty in which billions can’t even afford to eat and are subject to unlimited exploitation proves cap only solves coercion for those at the top

#### The Bifo evidence turns this – as the foundations of cap erode, it violently imposes market forces on the world – it’s a worse form of coercion

### A2 Cap Solves Poverty

#### The existence of literally HALF the world’s population disproves this argument – it’s written from the standpoint of wealthy Western intellectuals – Western society has obviously profited from capitalism, but at the expense of the poorest EVERYWHERE ELSE

#### The existence of a consumer society means cap can’t solve poverty – it’s part of the logic of the system

Ritzer 98 [(George, American sociologist, professor, and author who studies globalization, metatheory, patterns of consumption, and modern and postmodern social theory) “Société de Consommation: Ses Mythes, Ses Structures” by Jean Baudrillard. Introduction – written by George Ritzer] AT

Rather than an affluent society, Baudrillard argues that we live in a 'growth society'. However, this growth brings us no closer to being an affluent society. Growth produces both wealth and poverty. In fact, growth is a function of poverty; growth is needed to contain the poor and maintain the system. While he is not always consistent on this, Baudrillard argues that the growth society is, in fact, the opposite of the affluent society. Its inherent tensions lead to psychological pauperization as well as systematic penury (see later) since 'needs' will always outstrip the production of goods. Since both wealth and shortage are inherent in the system, efforts like those proposed by Galbraith to solve the problem of poverty are doomed to failure. Thus, in various ways, Baudrillard not only critiques, but also builds in very modern ways upon, Galbraith's work.

## Wip

### Security

#### catastrophe

Baudrillard 5 [(Jean, philosopher) "Virtuality and Events: The Hell of Power." The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact (Talking Images). Berg Publishers. November 15, 2005.] AT

We are passing into a realm where events no longer truly take place, by dint of their very production and dissemination in “real time” – where they become lost in the void of news and information.

The sphere of information is like a space where, after hav­ing emptied events of their substance, an artificial gravity is re­created and they are put back in orbit in “real time” – where, having shorn them of historical vitality, they are re-projected on to the transpolitical stage of information.

The non-event is not when nothing happens. It is, rather, the realm of perpetual change, of a ceaseless updating, of an incessant succession in real time, which pro­duces this general equivalence, this indifference, this banality that characterizes the zero degree of the event.

A perpetual escalation that is also the escalation of growth – or of fashion, which is pre-eminently the field of compulsive change and built-in obsolescence. The ascendancy of models gives rise to a culture of difference that puts an end to any historical continuity. Instead of unfolding as part of a history, things have begun to succeed each other in the void. A pro­fusion of language and images before which we are defenseless, reduced to the same powerlessness, to the same paralysis as we might show on the approach of war.

It isn't a question of disinformation or brainwashing. It was a naive error on the part of the FBI to attempt to create a Disin­formation Agency for purposes of managed manipulation – a wholly useless undertaking, since disinformation comes from the very profusion of information, from its incantation, its looped repetition, which creates an empty perceptual field, a space shattered as though by a neutron bomb or by one of those devices that sucks in all the oxygen from the area of impact. It's a space where everything is pre-neutralized, including war, by the precession of images and commentaries, but this is perhaps because there is at bottom nothing to say about something that unfolds, like this war, to a relentless scenario, without a glimmer of uncertainty regarding the final outcome.

It is in the sphere of the media that we most clearly see the event short-circuited by its immediate image-feedback. Information, news coverage, is always already there. When there are catastrophes, the reporters and photojournalists are there before the emergency services. If they could be, they would be there before the catastrophe, the best thing being to invent or cause the event so as to be first with the news.

This kind of speculation reached a high point with the Penta­gon's initiative of creating a “futures market in events”, a stock market of prices for terrorist attacks or catastrophes. You bet on the probable occurrence of such events against those who don't believe they'll happen.

This speculative market is intended to operate like the market in soya or sugar. You might speculate on the number of AIDS victims in Africa or on the probability that the San Andreas Fault will give way (the Pentagon's initiative is said to derive from the fact that they credit the free market in speculation with better forecasting powers than the secret services).

Of course it is merely a step from here to insider trading: betting on the event before you cause it is still the surest way (they say Bin Laden did this, speculating on TWA shares before 11 September). It's like taking out life insurance on your wife before you murder her.

There's a great difference between the event that happens (happened) in historical time and the event that happens in the real time of information.

To the pure management of flows and markets under the banner of planetary deregulation, there corresponds the “global” event – or rather the globalized non-event: the French victory in the World Cup, the year 2000, the death of Diana, The Matrix, etc. Whether or not these events are manufactured, they are orchestrated by the silent epidemic of the information net­works. Fake events.5

François de Bernard analyses the war in Iraq this way, as a pure transcription of film theory and practice. What we are watching as we sit paralyzed in our fold-down seats isn't “like a film”; it is a film. With a script, a screenplay, that has to be followed unswervingly. The casting and the technical and financial resources have all been meticulously scheduled: these are professionals at work. Including control of the distribution channels. In the end, operational war becomes an enormous special effect; cinema becomes the paradigm of warfare, and we imagine it as “real”, whereas it is merely the mirror of its cinematic being.

The virtuality of war is not, then, a metaphor. It is the literal passage from reality into fiction, or rather the immediate metamorphosis of the real into fiction. The real is now merely the asymptotic horizon of the Virtual.

And it isn't just the reality of the real that's at issue in all this, but the reality of cinema. It's a little like Disneyland: the theme parks are now merely an alibi – masking the fact that the whole context of life has been Disneyfied.

It's the same with the cinema: the films produced today are merely the visible allegory of the cinematic form that has taken over everything – social and political life, the landscape, war, etc. – the form of life totally scripted for the screen. This is no doubt why cinema is disappearing: because it has passed into reality. Reality is disappearing at the hands of the cinema and cinema is disappearing at the hands of reality. A lethal transfusion in which each loses its specificity.

If we view history as a film – which it has become in spite of us – then the truth of information consists in the post­-synchronization, dubbing and sub-titling of the film of history.

In the former West Germany they are going to build a theme park where the decor and ambience of the now defunct East will be re-created (Ost-algia as a form of nostalgia). A whole society memorialized in this way in its own lifetime (it has not completely disappeared).

So the simulacrum does not merely telescope actuality, but gives the impression that the “Real” will soon eventuate only in “real time” without even passing through the present and history.

As a result, history becomes once again for us an object of nostalgia, and a desire for history, for rehabilitation, for sites of memory, can be seen flourishing everywhere, as though, even as we suffer it, we are striving to fuel this same end of history.

History too is operating beyond its own end. There was a definition of the historical event and the French Revolution was its model. The very concepts of event and history date really from that point. The event could be analyzed as the high point in a continuous unfolding and its discontinuity was itself part of an overall dialectic.

It is not that way at all now, with the rise of a world order exclusive of all ideology and exclusively concerned with the circulation of flows and networks. In that generalized circulation, all the objectives and values of the Enlightenment are lost, even though they were at its origin. For there was once an idea, an ideal, an imaginary of modernity, but these have all disappeared in the exacerbation of growth. It is the same with history as it is with reality.

There was a reality principle. Then the principle disappeared and reality, freed from its principle, continues to run on out of sheer inertia. It develops exponentially, it becomes Integral Reality, which no longer has either principle or end, but is content merely to realize all possibilities integrally. It has devoured its own utopia. It operates beyond its own end.

But the end of history is not the last word on history. For, against this background of perpetual non-events, there looms another species of event. Ruptural events, unforeseeable events, unclassifiable in terms of history, outside of historical reason, events which occur against their own image, against their own simulacrum. Events that break the tedious sequence of current events as relayed by the media, but which are not, for all that, a reappearance of history or a Real irrupting in the heart of the Virtual (as has been said of 11 September). They do not constitute events in history, but beyond history, beyond its end; they constitute events in a system that has put an end to history. They are the internal convulsion of history. And, as a result, they appear inspired by some power of evil, appear no longer the bearers of a constructive disorder, but of an absolute disorder.

Indecipherable in their singularity, they are the equivalent in excess of a system that is itself indecipherable in its extension and its headlong charge.

In the New World Order there are no longer any revolutions, there are now only convulsions. As in an allegedly perfect mechanism, a system that is too well integrated, there are no longer any crises, but malfunctions, faults, breakdowns, aneurysmal ruptures. Yet events are not the same as accidents.

The accident is merely a symptom, an episodic dysfunction, a fault in the technical (or natural) order that can possibly be prevented. This is what all the current politics of risk and pre­vention is about.

The event, for its part, is counter-offensive and much stranger in inspiration: into any system at its peak, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces internal negativity and death. It is a form of the turning of power against itself, as if, alongside the ingredients of its power, every system secretly nourished an evil spirit that would ensure that system were overturned. It is in this sense that, unlike accidents, such events cannot be predicted and they form no part of any set of probabil­ities.

The analysis of revolution and the spectre of communism by Marx offers plenty of analogies with the current situation. He too made the proletariat the historic agent of the end of capital – its evil spirit, so to speak, since, with the rise of the proletariat, capital fomented the internal virus of its own destruction.

There is, however, a radical difference between the spectre of communism and that of terrorism. For capital's great trick was to transform the agent of disintegration it carried within it into a visible enemy, a class adversary, and thus, beyond economic exploitation, to change this historic movement into a dynamic of reintegration leading to a more advanced stage of capital.

Terrorism operates at a higher level of radicalism: it is not a subject of history; it is an elusive enemy. And if the class struggle generated historical events, terrorism generates another type of event. Global power (which is no longer quite the same as capital) finds itself here in direct confrontation with itself. It is now left to deal not with the spectre of com­munism, but with its own spectre. The end of revolutions (and of history in general) is not, then, in any sense a victory for global power. It might rather be said to be a fateful sign for it.

History was our strong hypothesis, the hypothesis of maxi­mum intensity. Change, for its part, corresponds to a minimum intensity – it is where everything merely follows everything else and cancels it out, to the point of re-creating total immobilism: the impression, amid the whirl of current events, that nothing changes.

Generalized exchange – the exchange of flows, of networks, of universal communication – leads, beyond a critical thresh­old we passed long ago, to its own denial, which is no longer then a mere crisis of growth, but a catastrophe, a violent in­volution, which can be felt today in what might be called the “tendency of the rate of reality to fall” (similarly, the profusion of information corresponds to a tendency of the rate of know­ledge to fall). Zero degree of value in total equivalence.

Globalization believed it would succeed in the neutralization of all conflicts and would move towards a faultless order. But it is, in fact, an order by default: everything is equivalent to everything else in a zero-sum equation. Gone is the dialectic, the play of thesis and antithesis resolving itself in synthesis. The opposing terms now cancel each other out in a leveling of all conflict. But this neutralization is, in its turn, never definitive, since, at the same time as all dialectical resolution disappears, the extremes come to the fore.

No longer a question of a history in progress, of a directive schema or of regulation by crisis. No longer any rational continuity or dialectic of conflicts, but a sharing of extremes. Once the universal has been crushed by the power of the global and the logic of history obliterated by the dizzying whirl of change, there remains only a face-off between virtual omnipotence and those fiercely opposed to it.

Hence the antagonism between global power and terrorism – the present confrontation between American hegemony and Islamist terrorism being merely the visible current twist in this duel between an Integral Reality of power and integral rejection of that same power. There is no possible reconciliation; there never will be an armistice between the antagonistic forces, nor any possibility of an integral order. Never any armistice of thought either, which resists it fierc­ely, or an armistice of events in this sense: at most, events go on strike for a time, then suddenly burst through again.

This is, in a way, reassuring: though it cannot be dismantled, the Empire of Good is also doomed to perpetual failure. We must retain for the event its radical definition and its impact in the imagination. It is characterized entirely, in a paradoxical way, by its uncanniness, its troubling strangeness – it is the irruption of something improbable and impossible – and by its troubling familiarity: from the outset it seems totally self-explanatory, as though predestined, as though it could not but take place.

There is something here that seems to come from else­where, something fateful that nothing can prevent. It is for this reason, both complex and contradictory, that it mobilizes the imagination with such force. It breaks the continuity of things and, at the same time, makes its entry into the real with stupefying ease.

Bergson felt the event of the First World War this way. Before it broke out, it appeared both possible and impossible (the similarity with the suspense surrounding the Iraq war is total), and at the same time he experienced a sense of stupefaction at the ease with which such a fearful eventuality could pass from the abstract to the concrete, from the virtual to the real.

We see the same paradox again in the mix of jubilation and terror that characterized, in a more or less unspoken way, the event of 11 September. It is the feeling that seizes us when faced with the occurrence of something that happens without having been possible.

In the normal course of events, things first have to be possible and can only actualize themselves afterwards. This is the logical, chronological order. But they are not, in that case, events in the strong sense.

This is the case with the Iraq war, which has been so pre­dicted, programmed, anticipated, prescribed and modelled that it has exhausted all its possibilities before even taking place. There is no longer anything of the event in it. There is no longer anything in it of that sense of exaltation and horror felt in the radical event of 11 September, which resembles the sense of the sublime spoken of by Kant. The non-event of the war leaves merely a sense of mystifica­tion and nausea.

It is here we must introduce something like a metaphysics of the event, indications of which we find once again in Bergson.

Asked if it was possible for a great work to appear, he replied: No, it was not possible, it is not possible yet, it will become possible once it has appeared: “If a man of talent or genius emerges, if he creates a work, then it is real and it thereby becomes retrospectively, retroactively possible”.6

Transposed to events, this means that they first take place, ex nihilo as it were, as something unpredictable. Only then can they be conceived as possible. This is the temporal paradox, the reversed temporality that designates the event as such.

As a general rule, we conceive of an ascending line running from the impossible to the possible, then to the real. Now, what marks out the true event is precisely that the real and the possible come into being simultaneously and are immedi­ately imagined. But this relates to living events, to a living temporality, to a depth of time that no longer exists at all in real time.

Real time is violence done to time, violence done to the event. With the instantaneity of the Virtual and the precession of models, it is the whole depth of field of the duree, of origin and end, that is taken from us. It is the loss of an ever-deferred time and its replacement by an immediate, definitive time.

Things have only to be concentrated into an immediate presentness by accentuating the simultaneity of all networks and all points on the globe for time to be reduced to its smallest simple element, the instant – which is no longer even a “present” moment, but embodies the absolute reality of time in a total abstraction, thus prevailing against the irruption of any event and the eventuality of death.

Such is “real time”, the time of communication, information and perpetual interaction: the finest deterrence-space of time and events. On the real-time screen, by way of simple digital manipulation, all possibilities are potentially realized – which puts an end to their possibility. Through electronics and cybernetics, all desires, all play of identity and all interactive potentialities are programmed in and auto-programmed. The fact that everything here is realized from the outset prevents the emergence of any singular event. Such is the violence of real time, which is also the violence of information.

Real time dematerializes both the future dimension and the past; it dematerializes historical time, pulverizes the real event. The Shoah, the year 2000 – it did not take place, it will not take place. It even pulverizes the present event in news coverage [l’information] which is merely its instantaneous image­-feedback.

News coverage is coupled with the illusion of present time, of presence – this is the media illusion of the world “live” and, at the same time, the horizon of disappearance of the real event. Hence the dilemma posed by all the images we receive: un­certainty regarding the truth of the event as soon as the news media are involved. As soon as they are both involved in and involved by the course of phenomena, it is the news media that are the event. It is the event of news coverage that substitutes itself for coverage of the event.

The historic time of the event, the psychological time of affects, the subjective time of judgment and will, the objective time of reality – these are all simultaneously thrown into question by real time. If there were a subject of history, a subject of knowledge, a subject of power, these have all disappeared in the obliteration by real time of distance, of the pathos of distance, in the in­tegral realization of the world by information.

Before the event it is too early for the possible. After the event it is too late for the possible. It is too late also for representation, and nothing will really be able to account for it. September 11th, for example, is there first – only then do its possibility and its causes catch up with it, through all the discourses that will attempt to explain it. But it is as impossible to represent that event as it was to forecast it before it occurred. The CIA's experts had at their disposal all the information on the possibility of an attack, but they simply didn't believe in it. It was beyond imagining. Such an event always is. It is beyond all possible causes (and perhaps even, as Italo Svevo suggests, causes are merely a misunderstanding that prevents the world from being what it is).

We have, then, to pass through the non-event of news coverage (information) to detect what resists that coverage. To find, as it were, the “living coin” of the event. To make a literal analysis of it, against all the machinery of commentary and stage-management that merely neutralizes it. Only events set free from news and information (and us with them) create a fantastic longing. These alone are “real”, since there is nothing to explain them and the imagination welcomes them with open arms.

There is in us an immense desire for events. And an immense disappointment, as all the contents of the information media are desperately inferior to the power of the broadcasting machinery. This disproportionality creates a demand that is ready to swoop on any incident, to crystallize on any catastrophe. And the pathetic contagion that sweeps through crowds on some particular occasion (the death of Diana, the World Cup) has no other cause. It isn't a question of voyeurism or letting off steam. It's a spontaneous reaction to an immoral situation: the excess of information creates an immoral situation, in that it has no equivalent in the real event. Automatically, one wants a maximal event, a “fateful” event – which repairs this immense banalization of life by the information machine. We dream of senseless events that will free us from this tyranny of meaning and the constraint of causes.

We live in terror both of the excess of meaning and of total meaninglessness. And in the banal context of social and political life these excessive events are the equivalent of the excess of signifier in language for Lévi-Strauss: namely, that which founds it as symbolic function.

Desire for events, desire for non-events – the two drives are simultaneous and, doubtless, each as powerful as the other. Hence this mix of jubilation and terror, of secret elation and remorse. Elation linked not so much to death as to the unpredictable, to which we are so partial. All the justifications merely mask precisely this obscure desire for events, for overthrowing the order of things, whatever it may be.

A perfectly sacrilegious desire for the irruption of evil, for the restitution of a secret rule, which, in the form of a totally unjustified event (natural catastrophes are similarly unjustified), reestablishes something like a balance between the forces of good and evil. Our moral protestations are directly proportionate to the immoral fascination that the automatic reversibility of evil exerts on us.

They say Diana was a victim of the “society of the spectacle” and that we were passive voyeurs of her death. But there was a much more complex dramaturgy going on, a collective scenario in which Diana herself was not innocent (in terms of display of self), but in which the masses played an immediate role in a positive “reality show” of the public and private life of Lady Di with the media as interface. The paparazzi were merely the vehicles, together with the media, of this lethal interaction, and behind them all of us, whose desire shapes the media – we who are the mass and the medium, the network and the electric current.

There are no actors or spectators any more. We are all immersed in the same reality, in the same revolving respons­ibility, in a single destiny that is merely the fulfillment of a collective desire. Here again we are not far removed from Stockholm Syndrome: we are the hostages of news coverage, but we acquiesce secretly in this hostage-taking.

At the same time we violently desire events, any event, provided it is exceptional. And we also desire just as passionately that nothing should happen, that things should be in order and remain so, even at the cost of a disaffection with existence that is itself unbearable. Hence the sudden convulsions and the contradictory affects that ensue from them: jubilation or terror.

Hence also two types of analysis: the one that responds to the extreme singularity of the event and the other whose function might be said to be to routinize it – an orthodox thinking and a paradoxical thinking. Between the two there is no longer room for merely critical thought.

Like it or not, the situation has become radicalized. And if we think this radicalization is that of evil – evil being ultimately the disappearance of all mediation, leaving only the clash between extremes – then we must acknowledge this situation and confront the problem of evil. We do not have to plump for the one or the other.

We experience the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of the event and the non-event. Just as, according to Hannah Arendt, we are confronted in any action with the unforeseeable and the irreversible. But, since the irreversible today is the movement towards virtual ascendancy over the world, towards total control and technological “enframing”, towards the tyranny of absolute prevention and technical security, we have left to us only the unpredictable, the luck of the event. And just as Mallarmé said that a throw of the dice would never abolish chance – that is to say, there would never be an ultimate dice throw which, by its automatic perfection, would put an end to chance – so we may hope that virtual programming will never abolish events.

Never will the point of technical perfection and absolute prevention be reached where the fateful event can be said to have disappeared. There will always be a chance for the troubling strangeness [das Unheimliche] of the event, as against the troubling monotony of the global order.

A fine metaphor for this is that video artist who had his camera trained on the Manhattan peninsula throughout the month of September 2001, in order to record the fact that nothing happens, in order to film the non-event. And banality went right ahead and blew up in his camera lens with the Twin Towers!

### Culture Impact

#### Pan-Capitalism destroys and assimilates culture through a process a vampiricism that attempts to replicate itself globally- this flattens all difference and destroys agency

Kroker and Weinstein ’94 (Arthur, Canada research chair in technology, culture, and theory, Michael, Professor of Political Science at Purdue, “The Political Economy Of Virtual Reality: Pan-Capitalism”, CTheory, peer-reviewed journal of theory, technology, and culture, [SG])

Virtualized capitalism is about cynical power, not profitability. Here, the virtual order of capitalist exchange is a global grid for the terminal division of the world into the shifting order of sadism. The truth-sayer of virtual capitalism as power is to be found in those dispossessed countries and surplus regions that are fully surplus to the telematic requirements of the will to technology. Residual spaces outside the operating system of the recombinant commodity, the surplus-economies scattered around the globe are preserved as sites of pleasureable abuse value, doubled scenes of what might happen to us if we fail the will to virtuality, and as potential sources of surplus flesh. If the electronic body is neither a privileged citizen of the dialectic of technology (the spiralling network of programmer/consumers across the neural network of hardware, software and wetware economies) nor a cursor in a clonal economy (the "five tigers") for quick simulations of the telematic order, then it can only be a "slaved-function": a detrital site of surplus body parts for the fatigued organic bodies of the "master-functions" as they await processing into virtualized nervous systems. Master-functions, slaved- functions, and colonial economies, therefore, as the classificatory power grid of virtualized capitalism. Consider, for example, the countries of Africa, Haiti, or Bangladesh: slaved-economies that are maintained as standing reserve for the "master-functions" of the ruling sim/porium of Japan, Western Europe and North America. Not really part of a global welfare system administered by the UN/US, but surplus nations that are sites of novel experiments in body vivisectioning and vampirism in its late capitalist phase. A whole underground global trade, then, in body parts (livers, hearts, blood) surgically cut out of the surplus flesh of the virtualized population of slaved-nations. And how could it be otherwise? The organic body knows that it will die before it can be morphed into a virtualized state, and so it desperately scans slaved-bodies, particularly of the young, for the elexir of life: kidneys, pancreas, eyes, and hearts. And why not scenes of mass innoculation as first-cut film scripts for the future of the body electronic? That's the mass injection of the AIDS virus into the blood streams of Africans, before an officially approved and hyper-charged AIDS virus could be downloaded into the bodies of gay men in New York and San Francisco under the cover of a "hepatitis vaccine." And slaved-nations, too, as marketing sites for the chronic diseases expelled from the aestheticized culture of North America: the aggressive promotion of cigarettes to the citizens of the slaved-nations under the always seductive sign of the "Marlboro economy" as providing symbolic, if not actual, membership in the master android cultures. Or, for that matter, why not copy the discarded cultural kitsch of America (Disney World) to the modernist cultures of Western and Eastern Europe as symbols of their colonial status in the lead societies of virtualized capitalism? No longer, then, the division of political economy into first and third worlds, but a more grisly dissolution of the virtualized globe into a sadistic table of sacrificial value: master-functions, clones, and slave-functions. When capitalism disappears into a power grid, then economy remains only as an illusional space, disguising the more sadistic ruse of technology as abuse value. Virtual colonialism is the end game of post-capitalism. Just when we thought that the age of European colonialism had finally come to an end, suddenly we are copied into the second age of virtual colonialism: a reinvigorated recolonization of planetary reality that reduces human and non-human matter to a spreading wake of a cosmic dust-trail in the deepest space of the blazing comet of virtual capitalism. A recolonization of everything: the virtualization of labor as jobs in the productive sector are downloaded around the globe, attracted only by the virtual scent of a slaved-work force; the virtualization of culture as the planetary noosphere, from Canada to Romania and China, are caught up in the deep-space drift-net of CNN and MTV, beaming out the pulsar code of America to the colonial cultures of the world; the virtualization of fashion as, for example, Benetton resequences the (recombinant) color and style of clothing into a designer Internet, producing surplus-virtualized exchange (for itself) by transforming the "The United Colors of Benetton" into a digital sequencer, linking child labor in the slaved- nations with the high-intensity market setting in the master triad (Japan, Europe, and America). And virtualized transportation, too, as transnational automobile producers flip into process economy: robotizing production by copying and pasting parts manufacturing to pools of cheap labor, while maintaining virtualized populations as holding pens for (ad) stimulated desire. If there could be such a fantastic display of publicity about 1992 as five hundred years after the conquest of (aboriginal) America by Europeans, it is probably because 1993 is Year One of the reconquest of the world by virtual capitalism.

### \*\*Wiltgen

#### This focus on rational economic science has created a bloodthirsty form of capitalism that erases affective engagements with desire and makes violence inevitable - neoliberalism constantly produces crisis to rationalize its capacity for control - this makes the destruction of all life the very impulse of the economy

James Wiltgen 2005 (Professor of History and Critical Theory at CalArts, "Sado-Moneatrism or Saint Fond – Saint Ford", in Consumption in the Age of Information, ed. Cohen and Rutsky, BERG, New York, p. 107-10 6 [NN])

How does digital capitalism intertwine with the concept of uncertainty? What key changes have taken place in the structuring of the world, via the digital and the biotechnological, what forces have emerged or coalesced, and ﬁnally, how do they affect the realm of subjectivity and consumption? Here, Arthur Kroker has transposed McLuhan into the twenty-ﬁrst century, performing an interrogation of what he calls the “digital nerve,” basically the exteriorization of the human sensorium into the digital circuitry of contemporary capitalism (Kroker, 2004: 81). This (in)formation, “streamed capitalism,” rests not exclusively on exchange value, nor material goods, but something much more immaterial, – a post market, post biological, post image society where the driving force, the “will to will,” has ushered in a world measured by probability. In other words, this variant of capitalism seeks to bind chaos by ever-increasing strictures, utilizing an axiomatic based on capture and control, with vast circuits of circulation as the primary digital architecture. This system runs on a densely articulated composition, similar to the earlier addressed concept of sado-monetarism, based upon extensive feedback loops running between exchange value and abuse value. This assemblage, however, has multiple levels, and not all are connected to the grid at the same speeds; a number of different times exist within this formation, including digital time, urban time, quotidian time, transversal time, etc. Spatially, the structure relies not on geography but “strategic digital nodes” for the core of the system, and connectivity radiates out from these nodal points (Kroker, 2004: 125). For example, a key site for these points would be the Net corporation, deﬁned as “as a self-regulating, self- reﬂexive platform of software intelligence providing a privileged portal into the digital universe” (Kroker, 2004: 140). Indeed, his mapping of digital capitalism has clear parallels with the shifts Katherine Hayles analyzes, in particular the underlying, driving mechanism whereby information severs itself from embodiment. Boredom and acquisitiveness become the principle markers of this new form of capitalism, which provides a rationale, or a new value set for the perpetual oscillation between the two poles, producing an insatiable desire for both objects and a continuing stream of fresh and intense experience. Perhaps the most densely argued assessment of capitalism, whose obvious parallel would be Marx’s Capital, is the two volumes by Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. With all the concern over the theoretical concepts developed in these books, it remains extremely important to understand the analysis as possessing a fundamental focus on the question of political economy. Capitalism forms, via its structural and affective matrix, a system capable of unparalleled cruelty and terror, and even though certain indices of well being have increased, “exploitation grows constantly harsher, (and) lack is arranged in the most scientiﬁc ways” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 373). Their framework for analysis targets the global, where the deepest law of capitalism sets limits and then repels those limits, a process well known as the concept of deterrorialization. Capitalism functions, then, by incessantly increasing the portion of constant capital, a deceptively concise formulation that has tremendous resonance for the organization of the planet – resources continually pour into the technological and machinic apparatus of capture and control, to the increased exclusion of the human component (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 466–7). In other words, it not only thrives on crisis but one of the principle deﬁnitions of capitalism would be to continually induce crisis; nostalgia for a “lost Sado-Monetarism or Saint Fond-Saint Ford 109 time” only drives these processes. The planet confronts the fourth danger, the most violent and destructive of tendencies, characterized as a turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 229). Deleuze and Guattari make clear this fourth danger does not translate as a death drive, because for them desire is “always assembled,” a creation and a composition; here the task of thinking becomes to address the processes of composition. The current assemblage, then, has mutated from its original organization of total war, which has been surpassed “toward a form of peace more terrifying still,” the “peace of Terror or Survival” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 433). Accordingly, the worldwide war machine has entered a post fascist phase, where Clausewitz has been dislocated, and this war machine now targets the entire world, its peoples and economies. An “unspeciﬁed enemy” becomes the continual feedback loop for this war machine, which had been originally constituted by states, but which has now shifted into a planetary, and perhaps interstellar mode, with a seemingly insatiable drive to organize insecurity, increase machinic enslavement, and produce a “peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467).7 Deleuze has analyzed these tendencies extensively in his own work, in particular with his dissection of active and reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche but also in his work on Sade and Masoch, where he points to a type of sadism that seems capable of attempting a “perpetually effective crime,” to not only destroy (pro)creation but to prevent it from ever happening again, a total and perpetual destruction, one produced by a pervasive odium fati, a hatred of fate that seeks absolute revenge in destroying life and any possible recurrence. (Deleuze, 1989: 37). This tendency far outstrips what Robert Jay Lifton has described as the “Armageddonists,” in their more commonly analyzed religious variant and in what he calls the secular type, both of which see the possibility of a “world cleansing,” preparing the way for a new world order, be it religious or otherwise (Lifton, 1987: 5–9). Embedded within the immanence of capitalism, then, one can ﬁnd forces which would make fascism seem like “child precursors,” and Hitler’s infamous Telegram 71 would be applied to all of existence, perpetually. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467). One ﬁnal complication in terms of currently emerging subjectivities, the well-known analysis in Anti-Oedipus where capitalism, as basically driven by a certain fundamental insanity, oscillates between “two poles of delirium, one as the molecular schizophrenic line of escape, and the other as paranoiac molar investment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 315).8 These two markers offer dramatically different possibilities for the issues of subjectivities and agency, and questions of consumption and the political can be posed within their dense and complex oscillations.

### Striation

#### Capitalism’s organization of the soul has produced an axiomatic of death – the linking of production and anti-production leeches the meaning from life until workers are just zombies good for work – their models of neoliberal rationality are Oedipal structures that enslaves desire to desire its own death – they extinguish the very intensity of life itself

Deleuze and Guattari 72 [AO, 330-39]

But it seems that things are becoming very obscure, for what is this distinction between the experience of death and the model of death? Here again, is it a death desire? A being-far-death? Or rather an investment of death, even if speculative? None of the above. The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming. It is in the very nature of every intensity to invest within itself the zero intensity starting from which it is produced, in one moment, as that which grows or diminishes according to an infinity of degrees(as Klossowski noted, "an afflux is necessary merely to signify the absence of intensity"). We have attempted to show in this respect how the relations of attraction and repulsion produced such states, sensations, and emotions, which imply a new energetic conversion and form the third kind of synthesis, the synthesis of conjunction. One might say that the unconscious as a real subject has scattered an apparent residual and nomadic subject around the entire compass of its cycle, a subject that passes by way of all the becomings corresponding to the included disjunctions: the last part of the desiring-machine, the adjacent part. These intense becomings and feelings, these intensive emotions**,** feed deliriums and hallucinations**.** But in themselves, these intensive emotions are closest to the matter whose zero degree they invest in itself. They control the unconscious experience of death, insofar as death is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming-in the becoming-another-sex, the becoming-god, the becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones of intensity on the body without organs. Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death, and envelops it. And it is doubtless the case that every intensity is extinguished at the end, that every becoming itself becomes a becoming-death! **Death, then, does actually happen.** Maurice Blanchot distinguishes this twofold nature dearly, these two irreducible aspects of death; the one, according to which the apparent subject never ceases to live and travel as a *One·-"one* never stops and never has done with dying"; and the other, according to which this same subject, fixed as I, actually dies-which is to say it finally ceases to die since it ends up dying, in the reality of a last instant that fixes it in this way as an I, all the while undoing the intensity, carrying it back to the zero that envelops it.From one aspect to the other, there is not at all a personal deepening, but something quite different: there is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed. For a new departure, since this I is another? The experience of death must have given us exactly enough broadened experience, in order to live and know that the desiring-machines do not die. And that the subject as an adjacent part is always a "one" who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model. For the model itself is not the I either, but the body without organs. And *I* does not rejoin the model without the model starting out again in the direction of another experience. Always going from the model to the experience, and starting out again, returning from the model to the experience, is what schizophrenizing death amounts to, the exercise of the desiring-machines (which is their very secret, well understood by the terrifying authors). The machines tell us this, and make us live it, feel it, deeper than delirium and further than hallucination: yes, the return to repulsion will condition other attractions, other functionings, the setting in motion of other working parts on the body without organs, the putting to work of other adjacent parts on the periphery that have as much a right to say *One* as we ourselves do. "Let him die in his leaping through unheard-of and unnamable things: other horrible workers will come; they will begin on the horizons where the other collapsed!"29 The Eternal Return as experience, and as the deterritorialized circuit of all the cycles of desire. How odd the psychoanalytic venture is. Psychoanalysis ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, practically, to teach us to sing life. And see how the most defeated, sad .song of death emanates from it: eiapopeia. From the start, and because of his stubborn dualism of the drives, Freud never stopped trying to limit the discovery of a subjective or vital essence of desire as libido. But when the dualism passed into a death instinct against Eros, this was no longer a simple limitation, it was a liquidation of the libido. Reich did not go wrong here, and was perhaps the only one to maintain that the product of analysis should be a free and joyous person, a carrier of the life flows, capable of carrying them all the way into the desert and decoding them-even if this idea necessarily took on the appearance of a crazy idea, given what had become of analysis. He demonstrated that Freud, no less than lung and Adler, had repudiated the sexual position: the fixing of the death instinct in fact deprives sexuality of its generative role on at least one essential point, which is the genesis of anxiety, since this genesis becomes the autonomous cause of sexual repression instead of its result; it follows that sexuality as desire no longer animates a social critique of civilization, but that civilization on the contrary finds itself sanctified as the sale agency capable of opposing the death desire. And how. does. it do this? By in principle turning death against death, by making this turned-back death *(la mort ret aurneev* into a force of desire by putting it in the service of a pseudo life through an entire culture of guilt feeling. There is no need to tell all over how psychoanalysis culminates in a theory of culture that takes up again the age-old task of the ascetic ideal Nirvana, the cultural extract, judging life, belittling life, measuring life against death, and only retaining from life what the death of death wants very much to leave us with - a sublime resignation. As Reich says, when psychoanalysis began to speak of Eros, the whole world breathed a sigh of relief': one knew what this meant, and that everything was going to unfold within a mortified life, since Thanatos was now the partner of Eros, for worse but also for better. Psychoanalysis becomes the training ground of a new kind of priest, the director of bad conscience: bad conscience has made us sick, but that is what will cure us! Freud did not hide what was really at issue with the introduction of the death instinct: it is not a question of any fact whatever, but merely of a principle, a question of principle. The death instinct is pure silence, pure transcendence, not givable and not given in experience. This very point IS remarkable: It IS because death, according to Freud, has neither a model nor an experience, that he makes of it a transcendent principle."! So that the psychoanalysts who refused the death instinct did so for the same reasons as those who accepted it: some said that there was no death instinct since there was no model or experience in the unconscious; others, that there was a death instinct precisely because there was no model or experience. We say, to the contrary, that there is no death instinct because there is both the model and the experience of death in the unconscious. Death then is a part of the desiring-machine, a part that must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions, and not as an abstract principle. If Freud needs death as a principle, this is by virtue of the requirements of the dualism that maintains a qualitative opposition between the drives (you will not escape the conflict): once the dualism of the sexual drives and the ego drives has only a topological scope, the qualitative or dynamic dualism passes between Eros and Thanatos. But the same enterprise is continued and reinforced-eliminating the machinic element of desire, the desiring-machines. It is a matter of eliminating the libido, insofar as it implies the possibility of energetic conversions in the machine (Libido-Nurnen-Voluptas). It is a matter of imposing the idea of an energetic duality rendering the machinic transformations impossible, with everything obliged to pass by way of an indifferent neutral energy, that energy emanating from Oedipus and capable of being added to either of the two irreducible forms neutralizing, mortifying life.\* The purpose of the topological and dynamic dualities is to thrust aside the point of view of *functional multiplicity* that alone is economic. (Szondi situates the problem clearly: why two kinds of drives qualified as molar, functioning mysteriously, which is to say Oedipally, rather than *n* genes of drives-eight molecular genes, for example-functioning machinically") If one looks in this direction for the ultimate reason why Freud erects a transcendent death instinct as a principle, the reason will be found in Freud's practice itself. For if the principle has nothing to do with the facts, it has a lot to do with the psychoanalyst's conception of psychoanalytic practice, a conception the psychoanalyst wishes to impose. Freud made the most profound discovery of the abstract subjective essence of desire-Libido. *But* since he re-alienated this essence, reinvesting it in a subjective system of representation of the ego, and since he receded this essence on the residual territoriality of Oedipus and under the despotic signifier of castration, he could no longer conceive the essence of life except in a form turned back against itself, in the form of death itself. And this neutralization, this turning against life, is also the last way in which a depressive and exhausted libido can go on surviving, and dream that it is surviving: "The ascetic ideal is an artifice for the preservation of life ... even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-destructing-the very wound itself compels him to live*.* . . ."32 It is Oedipus, the marshy earth, that gives off a powerful odor of decay and death; and it is castration, the pious ascetic wound, the signifier, that makes of this death a conservatory for the Oedipal life . Desire is in itself not a desire to love, but a force to love, a virtue that gives and produces, that engineers. (For how could what is in life still desire life? Who would want to call that a desire?) But desire must turn back against itself in the name of a horrible Ananke, the Ananke of the weak and the depressed, the contagious neurotic Ananke; desire must produce its shadow or its monkey, and find a strange artificial force for vegetating in the void, at the heart of its own Jack. For better days to come? It must-but who talks in this way? What abjectness-become a desire to be loved, and worse, a sniveling desire to have been loved, a desire that is reborn of its own frustration: no, daddy-mommy didn't *love* me enough. Sick desire stretches out on the couch, an artificial swamp, a little earth, a little mother. "Look at you, stumbling and staggering with no use in your legs .... And it's nothing but your wanting to be loved which does it. A maudlin crying to be loved, which makes your knees go all ricky."33 Just as there are two stomachs for the ruminant, there must also exist two abortions, two castrations for sick desire: once in the family, in the familial scene, with the knitting mother; another time in an asepticized clinic, in the psychoanalytic scene, with specialist artists who know how to handle the death instinct and "bring off" castration, "bring off" frustration. Is this really the right way to bring on better days? And aren't all the destructions performed by schizoanalysis worth more than this psychoanalytic conservatory, aren't they more a part of an affirmative task? "Lie down, then, on the soft couch which the analyst provides and try to think up something different ... if you realize that he is not a god but a human being like yourself, with worries, defects, ambitions, frailties, that he is not the repository of an all-encompassing wisdom [=code] but a wanderer, along the [deterritorialized] path, perhaps you will cease pouring it out like a sewer, however melodious it may sound to your ears, and rise up on your own two legs and sing with your own God-given voice [Numen]. To confess, to whine, to complain, to commiserate, always demands a toll. To sing it doesn't cost you a penny. Not only does it cost nothing-you actually enrich others (instead of infecting them) .... The phantasmal world is the world which has not been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain.... We are all guilty of crime, the great crime of not living life to the full.' You weren't born Oedipus, you caused it to grow in yourself; and you aim to get out of it through fantasy, through castration, but this in turn you have caused to grow in Oedipus-namely, in yourself: the horrible circle.Shit on your whole mortifying, imaginary, and symbolic theater. What does schizoanalysis ask? Nothing more than a bit of a relation to the outside, a little real reality. And we claim the right to a radical laxity, a radical incompetence-the right to enter the analyst's office and say it smells bad there. **It reeks of the great death and the little ego.** Freud himself indeed spoke of the link between his "discovery" of the death instinct and World War I, which remains the model of capitalist war. More generally, the death instinct celebrates the wedding of psychoanalysis and capitalism; their engagement had been full of hesitation**.** What we have tried to show apropos of capitalism is how it inherited much from a transcendent death-carrying agency, the despotic signifier, but also how it brought about this agency's effusion in the full immanence of its own system: the full body, having become that of capital-money, suppresses the distinction between production and antiproduction; everywhere it mixes antiproduction with the productive forces in the immanent reproduction of its own always widened limits (the axiomatic). The death enterprise is one of the principal and specific forms of the absorption of surplus value in capitalism.It is this itinerary that psychoanalysis rediscovers and retraces with the death instinct:the death instinct is now only pure silence in its transcendent distinction from life, but it effuses all the more, throughout all the immanent combinations it forms with this same life.Absorbed, diffuse, immanent death is the condition formed by the signifier in capitalism, the empty locus that is everywhere displaced in order to block the schizophrenic escapes and place restraints on the flights**.** The only modern myth is the myth of zombies-mortified schizos, good for work, brought back to reason. In this sense the primitive and the barbarian, with their ways of coding death, are children in comparison to modern man and his axiomatic (so many unemployed are needed, so many deaths, the Algerian War doesn't kill more people than weekend automobile accidents. planned death in Bengal, etc.). Modern man "raves to a far greater extent. His delirium is a switchboard with thirteen telephones. He gives his orders to the world. He doesn't care for the ladies. He is brave, too. He is decorated like crazy. In man's game of chance the death instinct, the silent instinct is decidedly well placed, perhaps next to egoism. It takes the place of zero in roulette. The house always wins. So too does death. The law of large numbers works for death."35 It is now or never that we must take up a problem we had left hanging. Once it is said that capitalism works on the basis of decoded flows as such, how is it that it is infinitely further removed from desiring-production than were the primitive or even the barbarian systems, which nonetheless code and overcode the flows? Once it is said that desiring-production is itself a decoded and deterritorialized production, how do we explain that capitalism, with its axiomatic, its statistics, performs an infinitely vaster repression of this production than do the preceding regimes, which nonetheless did not lack the necessary repressive means? We have seen that the molar statistical aggregates of social production were in a variable relationship of affinity with the molecular formations of desiring-production.What must be explained is that the capitalist aggregate is the least affinal, at the very moment it decodes and deterritorializes with all its might. The answer is the death instinct, if we call instinct in general the conditions of life that are historically and socially determined by the relations of production and antiproduction in a system. We know that molar social production and molecular desiring-production must be evaluated both from the viewpoint of their identity in nature and from the viewpoint of their difference in regime. But it could be that these two aspects, nature and regime, are in a sense potential and are actualized only in inverse proportion. Which means that where the regimes are the closest, the identity in nature is on the contrary at its minimum; and where the identity in nature appears to be at its maximum, the regimes differ to the highest degree. If we examine the primitive or the barbarian constellations, we see that the subjective essence of desire as production is referred to large objectities, to the territorial or the despotic body, which act as natural or divine preconditions that thus ensure the coding or the overcoding of the flows of desire by introducing them into systems of representation that are themselves objective. Hence it can be said that the identity in nature between the two productions is completely hidden there: as much by the difference between the objective socius and the subjective full body of desiring-production, as by the difference between the qualified codes and overcodings of social production and the chains of decoding or of deterritorialization belonging to desiring production, and by the entire repressive apparatus represented in the savage prohibitions, the barbarian law, and the rights of anti-production. And yet the difference in regime, far from being accentuated and deepened, is on the contrary reduced to a minimum, because desiring production as an absolute limit remains an exterior limit, or else stays unoccupied as an internalized and displaced limit, with the result that the machines of desire operate on this side of their limit within the framework of the socius and its codes. That is why the primitive codes and even the despotic overcodings testify to a polyvocity that functionally draws them nearer to a chain of decoding of desire: the parts of the desiring-machine function in the very workings of the social machine; the flows of desire enter and exit through the codes that continue, however, to inform the model and experience of death that are elaborated in the unity of the socio-desiring-apparatus. And it is even less a question of the death instinct to the extent that the model and the experience are better coded in a circuit that never stops grafting the desiring-machines onto the social machine and implanting the social machine in the desiring-machines. Death comes all the more from without as it is coded from within. This is especially true of the system of cruelty, where death is inscribed in the primitive mechanism of surplus value as well as in the movement of the finite blocks of debt. But even in the system of despotic terror, where debt becomes infinite and where death experiences an elevation that tends to make of it a latent instinct, there nonetheless subsists a model in the overcoding law, and an experience for the overcoded subjects, at the same time as anti-production remains separate as the share owing to the overlord. Things are very different in capitalism. Precisely because the flows of capital are decoded and deterritorialized flows; precisely because the subjective essence of production is revealed in capitalism; precisely because the limit becomes internal to capitalism, which continually reproduces it, and also continually occupies it as an internalized and displaced limit; precisely for these reasons, the identity in nature must appear for itself between social production and desiring-production. But in its turn, this identity in nature, far from favoring an affinity in regime between the two modes of production, increases the difference in regime in a catastrophic fashion, and assembles an apparatus of repression the mere idea of which neither savagery nor barbarism could provide us. This is because, on the basis of a general collapse of the large objectities, the decoded and de territorialized flows of capitalism are not recaptured or co-opted, but directly apprehended in a codeless axiomatic that consigns them to the universe of subjective representation. Now this universe has as its function the splitting of the subjective essence (the identity in nature) into two functions, that of abstract labor alienated in private property that reproduces the ever wider interior limits, and that of abstract desire alienated in the privatized family that displaces the ever narrower internalized limits. The double alienation-s-labordesire- is constantly increasing and deepening the difference in regime at the heart of the identity in nature. At the same time that death is decoded, it loses its relationship with a model and an experience, and becomes an instinct; that is, it effuses in the immanent system where each act of production is inextricably linked to the process of anti production as capital. There where the codes are undone, the death instinct lays hold of the repressive apparatus and begins to direct the circulation of the libido. A mortuary axiomatic. One might then believe in liberated desires, but ones that, like cadavers, feed on images. Death is not desired, but what is desired is dead, already dead: images. Everything labors in death, everything wishes for death. In truth, capitalism has nothing to co-opt; or rather, its powers of co-option coexist more often than not with what is to be co-opted, and even anticipate it. (How many revolutionary groups as such are already in place for a co-option that will be carried out only in the future, and form an apparatus for the absorption of a surplus value not even produced yet-which gives them precisely an apparent revolutionary position.) In a world such as this, there is no living desire that could not of itself cause the system to explode, or that would not make the system dissolve at one end where everything would end up following behind and being swallowed up-a question of regime.

### Microfacsism

#### The aff has internalized the fascistic nature of economic engagement. This is microfascism, a desire that desires its own repression. This destroys agency and allows violence to maintain itself on the level of the individual

Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")

Is it really the displacement of disguising of a true image of action, or rather is it the apprehension of the act that belongs to a new series and a new form of subjectivity that continues to resonate with the first series, causing it to become transformed, with new elements added that might allow us to apprehend the manner in which the desire associated with transformation continues to insist and become socially creative? Returning to the traditional explanations of the Foreword: Why the Revolution (of Desire) Did Not Take Place 9 defect that is made to account for great historical failures, and to desire as the ground where this defect remains as a wound that cannot be healed by the work of memory or by renewed action. ‘The workers desire their own repression’. All of the great ideology-critiques of the twentieth century begin with this fundamental premise. From very early on, Deleuze and Guattari were never satisfied with these answers and even went so far as to reject the concept of ideology itself as a causal factor (about which I will say more later on). No one ‘wants’ to be repressed; therefore, if the workers desired repression and became fascist as a result of this positive desire, the answers must be sought at another level than in the organization of collective interests. As Deleuze and Guattari write: Only microfascism provides an answer to a global question: why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they ‘want’ to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potential gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisims. It’s too easy to be antifascist on a molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. (DG 1987: 215) The above passage, which is repeated in many different variations throughout the volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, constitutes the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s intervention into the field of this historical debate, as well as what could be called their positive discovery. This concerns the positive discovery of desire itself which does not exist merely at the level of its representations, nor even at the level of the subject who feels, perceives, believes, acts. It also exists at a molecular level composed of an entirely different multiplicity, made up from all the little perceptions, feelings, habits and the little actions like an organic body. Therefore, what Deleuze and Guattari name as the molar and molecular can be seen as another variation of the two repetitions above, this time located within the two levels of what they call the socius. Early on in Deleuze’s career he edited a collection called Instincts and Institutions (1952), in which he wrote a preface under the same title. I will come back to this work often, since I consider it to be a blueprint for some of the ideas that appear in the later work by Deleuze and Guattari. Institutions are only the sedimentation of the instincts that populate and compose them, down to the desires, the habits, the dreary and mundane routines. This is what Deleuze defines as the first synthesis that constitutes the present in time, and yet it is a passive synthesis. It is made up of ‘all our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand intertwinings, the presents and the fatigues of which we are composed . . .’ (Deleuze 1994: 77). But, as Deleuze writes in a passage that immediately follows, ‘there must be another time in which the first synthesis can occur’. This refers us to a second synthesis, which is the passive synthesis of memory, more profound than the passive repetition of habit. There can be no revolution of the level of institutions without a concomitant revolution of on the level of instincts: a molecular revolution!

### Coopting Affect

#### This hierarchical understanding does not stop at the state level. Through this system of control, the state is able to coopt the material economy of affect and create a metanarrative of sameness to which we must all prescribe. This forces an understanding of difference that is necessarily outside and must be vanquished

Beasley-Murray 09 (Jon Beasley-Murray, Assistant Professor in Hispanic Studies, including social and political theory, “PART TWO: CONSTITUTION”)

Affect is, for Deleuze and Spinoza, an index of power: we may feel pain (a sad passion) when our power of acting diminishes; we may feel exultation (a joyful passion) when it is enhanced. In turn, a body’s power is itself is a function of its affective capacity or receptivity, its power to move or be moved by others. And as its power changes, so does its very essence: increases or decreases in a body’s power, changes in its affection, determine its ability to further affect and be affected, to become another body (more or less powerful). Affect marks the passage whereby one body becomes another body, either joyfully or sorrowfully; affect always takes place between bodies, at the mobile threshold between affective states as bodies either coalesce or disintegrate, as they become other to themselves. Hence, Massumi argues, affect constitutes an immanent and unbounded “field of emergence” or “pure capacity” prior to the imposition of order or subjectivity. It is another name for the continuous variation that characterizes the infinite encounters between bodies, and their resultant displacements and transformations, constitutions and dissolutions. It is only as affect is delimited and captured that bodies are fixed and so subjectivity (or at least, individual subjectivity) and transcendence emerge. But as this happens, affect itself changes: the order that establishes both subjectivity and transcendence also (and reciprocally) converts affect into emotion. The myriad encounters between bodies in flux come to be represented as interactions between fixed individuals or subjects, and affect becomes qualified and confined within (rather than between) particular bodies. This qualification of affective intensity is also its “capture and closure”; Massumi suggests that “emotion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that capture.” As affect is transformed into emotion, it founds sovereignty. Deleuze and his co-author, the psychoanalyst and activist Félix Guattari, provide an example taken from the stage to illustrate the capture and so subjection of affect. In opera, the “romantic hero,” that is, “a subjectified individual with ‘feelings,’” emerges from (and retrospectively orders and envelops) “the orchestral and instrumental whole that on the contrary mobilizes nonsubjective ‘affects.’” But this orchestration of affect, its transformation into emotion, is also immediately political: the “problem” of affect in opera is “technically musical, and all the more political for that.” The same mechanisms orchestrate subjectivity in politics as in the opera house. Massumi focuses on the ways in which contemporary regimes exploit “affect as capturable life potential.” He details how Ronald Reagan, for instance, put affect to work in the service of state power, conjuring up sovereignty by projecting confidence, “the apotheosis of affective capture.” Reagan “wants to transcend, to be someone else. He wants to be extraordinary, to be a hero.” But ideology had nothing to do with this arch-populist’s transcendence: “His means were affective.” Rather than seeking consent, Reagan achieved the semblance of control by transmitting “vitality, virtuality, tendency.” Affect, then, is more than simply an index of the immanent, corporeal power of bodies whose definition mutates according to their state of affection; it is also what underpins the incorporeal or “quasi-corporeal” power of the sovereign whose empirical body, in Reagan’s case, crumbles before our eyes. In this double role, as an immanent productivity that gives rise to transcendent power, affect is “as infrastructural as a factory.” Like labor power, it is a potential that can be abstracted and put to use, a “liveliness” that “may be apportioned to objects as properties or attributes,” an “excess” or “surplus” that “holds the world together.” Just as Latin America has long supplied raw material to feed the global economy, so the region has also been exploited for its affective potential. Gold, silver, copper, guano, rubber, chocolate, sugar, tobacco, coffee, coca: these have all sustained peripheral monocultures whose product has been refined and consumed in the metropolis. And parallel to and intertwined with this consumer goods economy is a no less material affective economy, also often structured by a distinction between the raw and the refined. After all, several of these substances are mood enhancers, confected into forms (rum, cigarettes, cocaine) that further distill their affective powers. Others have inspired their own deliria: gold fever, rubber booms. But there has always been a more direct appropriation and accumulation of affective energy: from the circulation of fearful travelers’ tales describing cannibals and savages, to the dissemination of “magic realism” and salsa, or the commodification of sexuality for Hollywood or package tourism. Latin America marks the Western imagination with a particular intensity. And the figures who stand in for the region are therefore distinguished by their affective charge: the “Brazilian bombshell” Carmen Miranda, for instance, her headdresses loaded with fruit signifying tropical bounty, served in films such as Week-End in Havana (1941) and The Gang’s All Here (1943) as a fetishized conduit for the exuberance and sexiness that Hollywood captures, distils, and purveys as “Latin spirit.” At the same time, and despite the elaborate orchestration typifying a Carmen Miranda number, some disturbing excess remained, not least in the ways in which Miranda’s patter upset linguistic convention. She blurred English and Portuguese and dissolved both, (re)converting language into sounds that were no longer meaningful, only affectively resonant. In film scholar Ana López’s words, “Miranda’s excessive manipulation of accents . . . inflates the fetish, cracking its surface while simultaneously aggrandizing it.” So there is a complex relationship between Latin affect and Western reason: both reinforcement and subversion. Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz suggests that at stake in the exploitation of Latin affect is a colonial pact with the devil: he says of tobacco and chocolate from the Americas, as well as Arabian coffee and tea from the Far East (“all of them stimulants of the senses as well as of the spirit”) that “it is as though they had been sent to Europe from the four corners of the earth by the devil to revive Europe ‘when the time came,’ when that continent was ready to save the spirituality of reason from burning itself out and give the senses their due once more.” An economy of the senses saves reason, gives it a shot in the arm, but also demonstrates reason’s addicted dependence upon sensual as well as spiritual stimulation.

### Extinction

#### Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life

Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)

However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.

### Baudrllard Dictionary cuts

#### Consumption

Clarke 10 [(David B. Clarke, Professor in Human Geography at Swansea University) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

A society in which ‘an ever-accelerating procession of generations of products’ results in a ‘luxuriant growth of objects’ (SO, 3) calls for the kind of taxonomical effort normally reserved for flora and fauna, Baudrillard suggested – not least because such an abundance of goods marks ‘something of a fundamental mutation in the ecology of the human species’ (CS, 25). Baudrillard’s initial forays into the prosperity and profusion of the affluent society sought to take stock of the brave new world of consumerism, capturing the sense in which we now live ‘beneath the mute gaze of mesmerizing, obedient objects which endlessly repeat the same refrain: that of our dumbfounded power, our virtual affluence, our absence one from another’ (CS, 25). While ours is far from the first society dedicated to excess, as Georges Bataille revealed, it is nevertheless a striking development in capitalist society, one detected in Thorstein Veblen’s study of the leisure class, but now extended to the masses in a manner unanticipated by Marx: ‘The bourgeoisie negated itself as such (and capital along with it), engendering a classless society’ (Baudrillard, 1992a: 237). Accordingly, Baudrillard’s analysis of consumption incor- porates an appreciation, critique and extension of Marx’s analysis of the commodity, and a radical retheorisation of our relation to objects. In a quasi-structuralist vein, Baudrillard refuted conceptions of consumption ￼defined in terms of individual pleasure, insisting on the importance of a system of objects as a means of grasping consumption’s increased centrality to the reproduction of capitalism. The ‘fundamental theorem of consumption’, Baudrillard proposed, is ‘that the latter has nothing to do with personal enjoyment . . . but that rather it is a restrictive social institution that determines behavior before even being considered in the consciousness of the social actors’ (CPS, 31). This does not, therefore, entail that perennially unlikely scenario whereby capitalism reduces consumers to dupes. Rejecting ‘simplistic ideas like “the manipulation of needs” and denunciations of “artificial needs”’ (CPS, 136) as naive conceptions that assume the existence of ‘real’ needs in some idealised social arrangement elsewhere, Baudrillard argues that the very notion of ‘needs’ – and the corresponding conception of ‘use-values’ geared to their satisfaction – arises from a peculiarly modern relation to the world, one Marx failed to do more than reflect in natural- ising use-values and needs rather than recognising their role as alibis of the system of exchange-value. Thus ‘consumption does not arise from an objective need of the consumer, a final intention of the subject towards the object’ (CPS, 75), which would be analogous to explaining language in terms of an individual need to speak, nor from an intrinsic finality of concrete objects in their ability to serve as use-values, which would be analogous to the pre-Darwinian argument that eyes have the properties they do because people need to see with them. Just as Marx demonstrated that ‘production is no longer in its present finality the production of “concrete” goods, but the expanded reproduction of the exchange value system’ (CPS, 134), for Baudrillard consumption has become ‘the most advanced form of the rational systematization of the productive forces at the individual level’ (CS, 75). Hence his insistence that, ‘[f]ar from the indi- vidual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the economic system that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of objects and needs’ (CPS, 133). Because ‘needs are not produced one by one, in relation to the respective objects, but . . . as a consumption power, as an overall propensity within the more general framework of the productive forces’ (CS, 74–5). Whereas Marx distinguished productive from unproductive consumption, a consumer society marks ‘no fundamental difference between “productive” consumption (direct destruction of utility during the process of production) and consumption by persons in general’ (CPS, 133). The latter was classically regarded as the ‘reconversion of economic exchange value into use value’ (CPS, 113). However, insofar as Baudrillard demonstrates that use-value accords to a logic of equivalence in precisely the same manner as exchange-value – use-values are not the natural properties of objects but emanate from a system – the Marxian distinction breaks down: ‘no more “productive” or “unproductive” consumption, only a reproductive consumption’ (SED, 28) to which even conspicuously unproductive consumption contributes. In demonstrating that use-values, like exchange-values, have ‘no more meaning than a phoneme has an absolute meaning in linguistics’ (CPS, 64), Baudrillard shows that consumption involves not only the reconversion of exchange-value into use-value but also ‘the conversion of economic exchange value into sign exchange value’ (CPS, 113). To recognise only the functional aspect of the object, as a use-value and a source of individual satisfaction, is to fail to recognise the priority of the system of objects. Rather than its meaning deriving from its use-value (functionality) in relation to the subject, ‘[the object] finds meaning with other objects, in difference, according to a hierarchical code of significations’ (CPS, 64). As such, the object is ‘reified into a sign’ (CPS, 65): we should speak of ‘sign-objects’ rather than ‘objects’. And ‘sign-objects exchange among themselves’ (CPS, 66), possessing the structural properties common to all sign systems. The ‘functionality of goods and individual needs only follows on this, adjusting itself to, ration- alizing, and in the same stroke repressing these fundamental structural mechanisms’ (CPS, 75). The repression entailed by the naturalisation of use-values and needs simultaneously disavows that dimension of consumption detected in Marcel Mauss’s and Bataille’s accounts of archaic consumption practices – the gift, potlatch, sacrifice: the ‘accursed share’. For the ‘act of consumption is never simply a purchase (reconversion of exchange value into use value); it is also an expenditure . . . it is wealth manifested, and a manifest destruction of wealth’ (CPS, 112). Such profligate expenditure once served to symbolise an ambivalent social relation – for example, in the inalienability of the gift and the giver – whereas the sign-object ‘only refers to the absence of relation itself, and to isolated individual subjects’: ‘it is no longer the mobile signifier of a lack between two beings, it is “of ” and “from” the reified relation (as is the commodity at another level, in relation to reified labor power)’ (CPS, 65). The alienation achieved in commodity production is thus paralleled by ‘a labor of expanded reproduction of use value as an abstraction’ in the sphere of consumption (CPS, 134). And so the mythology of consumerism prevails: ‘Affluence does not exist, but it only has to make us believe it exists to be an effective myth’ (CS, 193). Only the consummation expressed in expenditure ‘escapes recycling in the expanded reproduction of the value system – not because it is the destruction of substance, but because it is a transgression of the law and finality of objects’ (CPS, 134).

#### Culture

Lane 10 [(Richard J Lane, author who studies Baudrillard)“The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

Consumer, postmodern, popular or mass-media culture: all these are synonyms that describe the same phenomenon, one that Baudrillard calls ‘cultural consumption’ (CS, 99). If culture is thought of simply as ‘an inherited legacy of works, thought and tradition’ (CS, 101), one which undergoes dynamic and productive self-reflective critique, cultural consumption is something quite different: it is the resurrection through caricature and parody of that which has been lost or destroyed. Culture may be defined in the traditional sense as ‘the creation and use of mean- ings’ (Tester, 1994: 128); in comparison, cultural consumption is a ‘consummation’ of meaning – the completion of meaning and the movement￼to something new. Cruising America, Baudrillard goes in search of this newness; with the flattening of hierarchies in popular culture, where everything is perceived as having equal value, the result is akin to the beauty of the Californian desert (A), or ‘the fascination of the very disappearance of all aesthetic and critical forms of life in the irradiation of an objectless neutrality’ (A, 124). European cultural theatricality gives way here to the flat desert or city surface (television screen rather than theatri- cal stage), upon which an endless play of signifiers can circulate. In other words, Baudrillard discovers in the desert cities of California a culture that has replaced the real with signs. Mass culture is constituted as such through the process of mass ‘communication’, the irony being that in the process nothing is communicated at all. In consuming the fashionable, up-to-date signs of mass culture, Baudrillard argues that the one thing not present is culture itself; instead, an immense process of cultural recycling takes place, whereby one’s knowledge of culture – its latest fashionable manifestation – stands in for actual content. Culture (with a large ‘C’), in effect, has been replaced for Baudrillard with culture (with a small ‘c’), where the latter is cyclical, produced by the medium (television) rather than autonomous human subjects. Mass culture follows the same logic of the hyper-real, where the authentic gives way to the simulation. Baudrillard’s apparent nostalgia for content is apparent in his term ‘lowest common culture’ or LCC, a minimum quotient of knowledge lacking in intrinsic value but required to pass entry into contemporary society, engaged via media quizzes or, in our time, ‘reality’ television shows. Starkly, Baudrillard asserts that ‘Mass communication excludes culture and knowledge’ (CS, 104). He suggests that this is so because ‘There is no question of real symbolic or didactic processes coming into play’ (CS, 104) during the preordained answer-and- question response of the quiz or other testing arenas, such as the shopping mall. The LCC rules, and as McLuhan suggests, the medium is now the message/mass(age). LCC is available on instalment plan, and this frag- mentation and dumbing-down of Culture follows the pattern suggested by Benjamin (2008); parodying Benjamin’s Angel of History, Baudrillard writes that ‘A great democratic wind has blown through the heavenly Jerusalem of culture and art’ (CS, 105). What Benjamin’s Angel sees, of course, is ‘one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet’ (Benjamin, 2003: 392). And this catas- trophe is our notion of ‘progress’. While it is true that Baudrillard follows this mode of thinking, he also simultaneously recoils from such linearity, arguing that with the implosion of meaning a new fascinating, non-linear culture emerges, one where the masses are not so much controlled by the media, but gain autonomy through their lack of response to the media. This fascination with the culture that has destroyed Culture pervades Baudrillard’s work, leading to an awareness of points of resistance against the hyper-real: ‘sending back to the system its own logic by doubling it; to reflecting, like a mirror, meaning without absorbing it’ (SSM, 108). Mass culture, then, does have political force, but such force is fragile, fleeting and temporary. Baudrillard argues that ‘All the repressive and reductive strategies of power systems are already present in the internal logic of the sign’ (CPS, 163). Turning that logic back upon itself can lead to implosive outcomes – witness 9/11 – but whether turning culture against culture leads to a return to value remains to be seen.

#### Evil

Hegarty 10 [(Paul Hegarty)

The world of simulation is entirely bound up with ‘Good’ – the real, the true, the safe, the hygienic, the politically correct, and the notion that we ￼can all be part of a global community under the perceived Good of western liberal capitalism. Simulation, or hyper-reality, is relentlessly positive and positivist – everything ‘is’, and its realness is a test of its goodness (hence the hyper-realism of the Gulf wars, hence the misunderstanding of Baudrillard’s critique thereof). Baudrillard consistently argues that we live in a sanitised world, where all that is threatening, unpredictable, genuinely new, non-real, mysterious or other must be reduced, ignored or destroyed. Gradually, he introduces the idea that Evil is something other than the system of simulation, this principally in The Transparency of Evil (1993b [1990a]). Evil is not moral but structural – with simulation we already inhabit a world ‘beyond good and evil’. But this condition of being beyond is not the ferocious opening of possibility envisaged by Nietzsche – instead it looks something like that, it seems to have been realised, visu- alised, modelled, mapped out (alternatively, it has failed to come to be, because Good and Evil merged (F)). So for there to be any radicality, there must be an Other, and this can be thought of as Evil. Given Baudrillard’s take on Islamist terrorism as something that breaks through simulation, we might imagine his position to be a perverse rethinking of Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’, but this is where we need to note that the terms ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ are not attributes of one side or another. Good and Evil are not moral, and Evil is not just a way of dramatising attacks on the West, it is a structural critique of anything all-pervasive that ema- nates from simulation and a hygienised reality. Commenting on the title Transparency of Evil, Baudrillard clarifies that it is not about the visibility or obviousness of Evil, rather it is about Evil appearing everywhere, just where it is most excluded (PW). For a concrete example we can look to the overuse of antibiotics which allows the possibility of new bacterial evolution, or how excessively clean environments heighten vulnerability to infection. But it is also ‘transparency itself that is the Evil’ (PW, 36). Here the complexity of the idea of Evil begins to appear: transparency is of course ‘good’ – who can refuse transparency, openness, glasnost – or best practice, excellence, quality? Goodness and transparency meet up in a mutually reinforcing spiral, and all else, all that would be secret, or must now be done away with (things deemed inefficient, no longer desirable), will be seen as Evil. Simulation flattens, ‘makes good’ continually, and this is ‘another world in which things no longer even need their opposites’ (Baudrillard, in Clarke et al., 2009: 25). Baudrillard is in fact using Evil as a deconstructive term, one that restores duality, and through confronta- tion, the duel. At the same time, Evil is fundamentally caught up with simulated versions of goodness that are actually the thing that is bad. ‘Evil’ is the more positive force, though: ‘the principle of Evil is not a moral principle but rather a principle of instability and vertigo, a principle of 64 evil complexity and foreignness, a principle of seduction, a principle of incom- patibility, antagonism and irreducibility. It is not a death principle – far from it. It is a vital principle of disjunction’ (TE, 107). Baudrillard returns to the idea of Evil, this time relating it to unhappi- ness. Instead of Evil (le Mal), we have its reduced, curable form, unhap- piness (le malheur) (F). Even better than being cured, it can be managed, prolonged – misery as a perpetual precursor to happiness – as seen in the hyper-realism of ‘misery memoirs’, but also at the international level, where every nation wants to be someone else’s victim (F). The past is recast as the unhappiness underpinning today’s shiny happy real, tinged with a halo of moral superiority for either being a victim or apologising for having made someone a victim. As the phrase has it, ‘it’s all good’. Attempts to resuscitate Evil fall into the cheapest simulation – like the low-budget special effect of the ‘Axis of Evil’ idea. When individuals, such as paedophiles, are deemed evil, they have a greater utility, which is to reinforce the sanitised goodness of everyone else, as we all agree that Evil exists, but not here, not me, not us. Meanwhile, the victims can ‘rebuild their lives’ according to one of many models available in the media or in psychological advice in general. As for national victims (or victimisers) of slavery, colonialisation and so on, they can work out the value of unhappiness as malheur is part of an economy where all can be bought, exchanged and traded, just so long as nothing interrupts that virtuous circle (F) – and for Baudrillard, all economic value is not only a mystical supplement, as it is for Marx, but is a replacement for the thing valued. The thing itself need never have been there, and valuing is an exact equivalent of de-valuing. Overall, unhappiness replaces Evil, because for all the rhetorical value of, say, the ‘Axis of Evil’, the attempts to extirpate that Evil can only bring the Evil more to the fore, and in a world where ‘it’s all good’, there is no Evil, only malheur, and this is the slow living death of Evil as a crea- tive principle. Baudrillard’s hope is that the drive to render all transpar- ent, good and clean can only encourage the possibility of disruption, of Evil.

#### Extreme – system that attempts at perfection causes destruction

Woodward 10 [(Ashley, )

In a way, all of Baudrillard’s work is an exploration of extremes. Extremes pertain both to the subject matter of Baudrillard’s reflections – the extreme phenomena of contemporary culture – and the form these reflections take – the adoption of an extreme vantage point, an extreme form of thought, in order to take stock of an extreme situation. Baudrillard’s critical diag- nosis of contemporary culture rests on the contention that the animating ideals and values driving the West – in particular, those deriving from the Enlightenment dream of perfecting the world through the progressive development and application of reason – have been pushed to extremes. In this extreme state, the Enlightenment dream has not been realised. To the contrary, the extreme realisation of these values and ideals has in fact destroyed them.

For Baudrillard, ‘extreme’ is to be understood in the specific sense of that which occurs ‘beyond the end’. According to him, extreme = ex ter- minis (VI). Thus extremes are what occur beyond (ex) a boundary or limit

￼extremes 67

￼(terminis). Baudrillard insists that this movement to extremes is not simply a change in quantity, an increase in degree. Rather there is a real qualita- tive change in systems once they achieve extreme points: ‘It’s not a matter of being more expanded or extensive – it’s more intensive in gradation. It’s a kind of power, an upgrading of power – a movement to extremes, an increase in power of effects . . .’ (BL, 84). Systems move to extremes by pursuing their own perfection, attempting to incorporate or eradicate everything which limits them. The qualitative change in extreme systems involves ‘a state of unconditional realisation, of total positivity (every negative sign raised to the second power produces a positive), from which all utopia, all death and all negativity have been expunged (VI, 46–7). The equation ‘extreme = ex terminis’ also suggests a link between ‘extreme’ and ‘extermination’. For Baudrillard, when systems move to extremes, the very attempt at perfection leads to destruction.

Extreme phenomena are explored in Baudrillard’s work through many of his critical concepts, but are perhaps most evident in the various per- mutations of the formulae ‘more x than x’ and ‘trans-x’. Examples of the former include the masses (more social than the social), simulation (truer than true), hyper-reality (more real than real) and so on (VI). The latter is explored in Baudrillard’s book The Transparency of Evil (1993b [1990a]), which is subtitled ‘Essays on Extreme Phenomena’ (TE). Here Baudrillard characterises contemporary culture as a vast orgy in which every sphere of value moves to extremes insofar as it attempts to incor- porate everything into itself, to make everything exchangeable in its own terms. The political becomes the transpolitical (everything is political), the economic becomes the transeconomic (everything is economic), the aesthetic becomes the transaesthetic (everything is aesthetic), and so on. According to Baudrillard, this movement to extremes leads to a gen- eralised confusion of categories and a breakdown of distinctions in all spheres of culture. Thus, through seeking to extend its form of value to everything, each sphere in fact destroys its value because it no longer has a clearly delimited, coherent domain of application.

Baudrillard’s own theory is deliberately extreme, both in its proposi- tions and its style. At times he argues for the necessity of extreme theory by asserting that theory must correspond to the world in order to speak meaningfully about it: ‘why are people going to those extremes, if you don’t suppose that at some point the world, and the universe, too, is in the grips of a movement to extremes’ (BL, 115). In this sense, he suggests, theory cannot just be fiction; it must offer something like an objective, rational hypothesis, and there must be a point in the real to which it can stick (BL). At other times, however, the justification he gives for extreme theory rests on a more radical hypothesis about the relation between theory and the

68 fashion

word. In this sense, the role of theory is to push itself to extremes beyond, or in a contrary direction to, states of affairs in the world. Speaking of the Gulf War, he asserted that: ‘If the war doesn’t go to extremes, then writing must be allowed to, one way or another. That is its role . . . a transfigura- tion brought about by writing’ (BL, 180). As such, theory engages in a duel, or an antagonistic relationship with, the world. The aim of extreme theory is then not simply to describe the world, but to change it.

#### Politics bad

Wernick 10 [(Andrew, )

The notion of fatal strategies is most associated with Baudrillard’s book of that title (FS). But the idea, interwoven with what he called ‘the turn to the object’, can be traced in his work from the mid-1970s onwards, a journey reflected on in The Ecstasy of Communication (1988c [1987b]). Though he drops the language of ‘the fatal’ it also provides a key for understanding much of his subsequent oeuvre.

In its guerrilla-like provocativeness, pataphysical extremism and aspi- ration for a form of theorising that would be performative rather than descriptive, analytic or (in its various senses) critical, Baudrillard’s espousal of ‘fatal theory’ remains distantly marked by his earlier sympa- thies for Situationism (of the kind that flowered at Nanterre in 1968). But it also marks his exit from leftism, as well as from Frankfurtian negative dialectics, towards a kind of irony in which he swims in, mirrors and exag- gerates the excesses he describes, provocatively drawing them to their limit. All takes places after the ‘dead point’ at which ‘things have found a way of avoiding a dialectics of meaning’ (FS, 25). He had already moved from situationist contestation (minority action to unconceal the contradic- tions and provoke a ‘situation’) to its reinterpretation in terms of the gift, the counter-gift and the move to ‘the symbolic’ (SED). He now abandons the terrain of oppositional/emancipatory politics altogether in favour of

￼fatal 71

￼perversely embracing the vertiginous movement of what he continues to call ‘the system’. As with Nietzsche, he will push the nihilism actually in train to the limit. However, this ‘theoretical terrorism’ – fatal theory – is not thought of as wilful or unlitateral but, on the model of gift giving, as a duel. It is a duel, moreover, between unequal contestants, in which the aim of the weaker is to throw judo moves in which the object’s power turns against itself.

Fatal, it should be noted, carries a double sense. Like the moment of death in his story about the ‘soldier at Samarkand’ (FS) the fatal is that which is both mortally destructive and pertaining to fate. Fate or destiny is counterposed both to the order of causation (Newtonian or dialectical) and to that of probability and chance, and it works amorally against both. The fate and fatality in question are those of the system, as one of general exchange, simulation and metastatic proliferation in every direction, and of the system considered as ‘object’: an object that has wholly vanquished (its) subjects, and incorporated them as relays and as agent-supports.

Fatal as opposed to banal strategy (any strategy of the subject; politics as project or calculus) takes the side of the object. In doing so, such a strategy presupposes that the object can always outwit the subject, but that it can also outwit itself. That is the game that fatal strategies enter into. In the first instance, indeed, the agents of such strategies are not human subjects, individually or collectively, at all. They are strategies, if that is the right word, deployed blindly and ironically by the system/object itself. They result from the system’s excrescent growth, in combination with the rule that a challenge must be answered by a challenge, by an overbidding, or suffer defeat. As Baudrillard puts it: ‘This is no longer the irony of the subject faced with an objective order, but the objective irony of things caught in their own devices – no longer the historical workings of the neg- ative, but the workings of reduplication and the rising stakes’ (EC, 83–4).

Just as the more real than real, the hyper-real, makes the real disappear, the obscene (the more visible than visible) puts an end to the scene – and so puts an end also to illusion which, following Nietzsche, Baudrillard takes to be vital for life. Likewise, sex, individualised and normatised as the right and duty of liberated desire, is eclipsed by the more sexual than sexual. Whence porno – a half step which neutralises desire by remov- ing all prohibitions except that of its code – and the transsexual which volatilises sex as signs, but restores a form of seduction in the play and challenge of appearances. In similar terms, politics disappears behind the transpolitical, and the social is sucked into the black hole of the mass, polled incessantly for yes/no opinions on rigged questions, yet evincing an abstentionism and ‘refusal of meaning’ that challenges the whole electoral game by rendering it weightless.

72 feminism⁄feminine

Altogether, after general exchange has suppressed symbolic exchange, the fractal multiplication of simulacra exterminates the real in all its forms – all of them essentialist illusions and projections of the code – and rein- states reversibility.

At the catastrophe point implosive growth is checked by redundancy – the abundant becomes the obese – and entropy sets in. Baudrillard’s wager is that even so, the symbolic, reversibility and a kind of cosmic uncertainty principle precipitated by these same developments offer the possibility of a metamorphic challenge. In an initial formulation (SED) self-death is offered to the system as a way to get it to suicide. Notoriously, what fascinated Baudrillard here were ‘terrorism’ and hostage taking. But he also highlights passive and abject forms of fatal counter-gifts, such as over-obedience, and political apathy as the defiance of meaning. After the turn to the object such examples fall away, leaving fatal theory itself – of the kind Baudrillard was pursuing – as the only clear instance of a fatal strategy from the side of the subject.

#### Baudrillard’s critique of Foucault

Butler 10 [(Rex, has written books on several theorists, such as Slavoj Žižek and Jean Baudrillard, and is currently working on a critical biography of Colin McCahon) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

What exactly is the problem with Foucault’s analysis of power and sexuality, as Baudrillard outlines it in Forget Foucault? Baudrillard at this point in his career was in the middle of the development of his theory of simulation, which was to reach its climax with ‘The Precession of Simulacra’ (Baudrillard, 1978), which formed part of the book Simulacra and Simulation (1994a [1981]). In that essay, Baudrillard elaborates a so-called third stage of simulation, which he had previously identified in ‘The Orders of Simulacra’ (SED). In this stage, the various systems of control and reason do not work directly but only by positing an other to themselves. The famous example of this is Disneyland, which through its fantasy would imply a contrasting reality (SS). And so it is with Foucault. Baudrillard’s point is that Foucault’s argument for the inseparability of power and resistance in Discipline and Punish (1977) is only to go towards a power that would be proved by its resistance. The same thing can be seen with Foucault’s brilliant inversion in The History of Sexuality (1978), in which it is not sex that is repressed but sex that represses. Here too, for all of Foucault’s distance from any liberatory hypothesis, his argument implies that there remains some natural body and its pleasures that would be proved by its repression by sex. Foucault has still not broken with the idea that there is some reality of the body or use-value to pleasure.

What does Baudrillard oppose to this? Here is where the real complexity and interest of his text arises. Against that aporetic logic in which power is proved by its resistance and the body by its repression, Baudrillard puts forward what he calls at this stage of his work ‘seduction’, which is the reversibility or exchangeability of power or the effects of domina- tion so that the one in power can never be separated from the one who is dominated. As Baudrillard puts it: ‘The one-sidedness of a force rela- tion never exists, a one-sidedness upon which a power “structure” might be established’ (FF, 53). But, of course, the question might be asked: why is seduction in its opposition to power not another extension of it? Why does it not constitute another limit that it will inevitably leap over? Indeed, at certain moments in his discourse, Baudrillard does appear to speak of seduction as opposed to production, a seduction that simply comes before or resists power (FF). And yet, in another way, Baudrillard does not do this. Seduction is not a limit or an outside to power. It is not opposed to it and does not arise as result of it. Rather, it is that reversibil- ity between power and its other without which there would not be power in the first place. It allows that aporia between power and its other which means that power has no limit. Seduction therefore is a kind of ‘void’ (FF, 54), both an imaginary catastrophe that cannot occur without falling back into power and a ‘revolution’ (FF, 58) that has already taken place insofar as there is power. In a certain ‘double strategy’ – Derridean echoes intended – Baudrillard at the same time speaks of the limits to power and sexuality and of the fact that they have no limits. Paradoxically, the ‘absolute beyond’ (FF, 89) of seduction would be ‘absolute’ only in not being ‘beyond’.

#### Hyperreality

Gane 10 [(Mike Gane, )

Baudrillard’s work involves a consistent effort to chart and theorise what happens to the idea of ‘reality’ in western cultures. For most readers this is paradoxical since it is assumed that ‘reality’ is universal and it might seem absurd to think there are societies which do not encounter the real world. For Baudrillard, however, the idea of the real and the real world is a cultural construction, certainly linked to the birth of the sciences and technology. When the real is born it engenders a profound modification from the primordial cultures which are symbolic to modern cultures that are organised around signs. The sign in the classic form theorised by Saussure is made up of the triad: signifier, signified and referent. The ‘referent’ here indicates the outside of thought – the real world (the ‘sig- nifier’ refers to the word, the ‘signified’ refers to the concept). Evidently there is a perennial problem in this formulation – does the real refer to a representation (is it inside the sign) or is it merely that which is outside the sign? Clearly, as science passes through stages of development, even revolutions within science, earlier ideas of what constituted the real are abandoned and even treated as scientific illusions even if they once appeared impregnable. It is one of Baudrillard’s most provocative ideas that in contemporary cultures from the middle of the twentieth century there is a return to a situation in which the reality principle is once more questioned and abandoned. But this does not lead to a situation in which there is no referent (as with the symbolic order), but to a state in which the sign conditioned by the mass media and the entertainment industry increasingly posits its own basis and non-reality. And this ‘negation’ is absorbed into the sign itself (BL, 142). This identification of the hyper-real as a stage in the cultural devel- opment marked by the appearance of the mass media is framed by Baudrillard’s general theory of the transition from the bourgeois culture of drama and the spectacle to that of a mass culture mediated by televi- sions and computers. Hyper-reality is a precursor of virtual reality. But Baudrillard also drew on other sources for the development of this term. In fact the concept of hyper-reality brings three of Baudrillard’s thematics together. The first is the crisis of the sign already indicated: hyper-reality￼is born with third-order simulacra, that stage in which the real absorbs the image. The second is the way in which modern cultures implode, in which they wipe out age-old boundaries or transgress boundaries (towards the ‘transpolitical’). Here the hyper-real is that which moves towards the ‘more real than real’. Indeed, as reality decamps into the image the image ironically absorbs the space of the real – and that, Baudrillard concludes, the hyper-real can ‘no longer [be] the mirror of reality’ (AA, 12). It is from this perspective that Baudrillard examines the modern art world – not just the phase of the image that is more real than real, but the disappearance of illusion in abstractionism and simulationism. It is important to note here that Baudrillard does not simply chart this as a negative development but distinguishes between artists who can genuinely explore this development (for example, early Warhol) and those whose work simply adds to disillu- sion and banalisation. This evidently has consequences that go far beyond the question of transaesthetics (see TE). The third is the emergence of a popular culture which breaks down the difference between the real and the artifice. An example of the third is popular American culture and Disneyland, the ‘perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulacra . . . the first great toxic excrement of a hyper- real civilization’ (SS, 12 and13). Baudrillard thus here moves beyond an ideological analysis of Disneyland as alienated idealisation of American life, to his provocative analysis suggesting that it ‘exists in order to hide that it is . . . “real” America that is Disneyland’ (SS, 12). The reversal has taken place and the separation between the fun world and the ‘real’ world simply conceals the fact that ‘the real is no longer real’ (SS, 13). Baudrillard provides a long list of the institutions that reinvent and recycle lost dreams and illusions as a new hyper-real social ‘function’ (SS, 13). Underlying this whole analysis of the emergence of the hyper-real is therefore an important continuation of the idea of alienation. Baudrillard locates classic Marxist theories of alienation in the phase of second-order simulacra when societies were marked by the threat of dialectical progres- sion and social and political revolution. Marxist theories and practices belong to this epoch often referred to by Baudrillard ironically as ‘the golden age of alienation’. Hyper-reality on the other hand belongs to third-order forms. Whereas alienation theories identified traumatic loss in a world that stood against the subject, Baudrillard sees the contemporary problem as belonging to a different order. Now, he suggests, the problem is the very lack of distance, the ‘universe has swallowed its double, and it has lost its shadow’ (AA, 13) – hyper-reality produces proximity, trans- parency, the absorption of the subject. In art it leads to hyper-realism in which the representation of the naked body is so realistic, says Baudrillard, that it is ‘an image where there is nothing to see’, an ‘obscenity of the real’ (EC, 31). This movement towards a hyper-real culture invades all spheres but especially information. Baudrillard rejects the theory that this is driven simply by profit-making culture industries, and suggests that it is aligned with the fatal strategies of the silent majorities (SSM). A new sociality is produced, a hyper-real sociality which reflects not the alienation of the masses, held in check by repression as in the Marxist theories, but hyper-conformity and terrorism. The latter are conceived by Baudrillard as hyper-real forms that correspond to the hyper-real culture – indeed as vital responses to hyper-real culture.

#### Symbolic exchange and death – impact to labor/symbolic violence

#### Defense of baudrillard’s method – uses individual examples and analyzes them, like Foucault – shows how they’re indicative of larger motifs; opposed to scientific method which is controlled by these motifs

#### Illusion

Pawlett 10 [(William, )

Illusion and its cognates – appearance, image, double, mirror, simulation, shadow – are terms woven throughout Baudrillard’s writings, from his earliest studies of consumption to his last provocations on evil and the ‘dual form’. In his early studies Baudrillard understands the consumer society as presenting the illusion of freedom, and he suggests that Marxist and psychoanalytic theory produce only the illusion of critique. Yet illu- sion is often used in a positive sense, for example in Baudrillard’s argu- ment that symbolic ritual is the illusion that conjures away the opposition of life and death, and concerning seduction he insists ‘to seduce is to die as reality and reconstitute oneself as illusion’ (S, 69). Baudrillard defines the simulacrum as the illusion ‘that hides the truth’s non-existence’ (S, 35), and his final works suggest a stage beyond the orders of simulacra, that of ‘integral reality’. Integral reality or ‘virtuality’ is, for Baudrillard, the ‘final solution’ that seeks to dispel illusion forever; however, the dual form is ‘indestructible’, he argues, and even virtual technologies preserve some- thing of the ‘original illusion’ (LP, 85).

It is useful, heuristically, to distinguish three senses of illusion in Baudrillard’s work. However, these are always in tension, spiralling together and cannot be isolated; this is more than a polite caveat as Baudrillard insists on ‘the interconnection of appearances’ (FS, 210). First, there is radical or original illusion. Second are the ‘degraded’ forms of illusion including representation and simulation which is ‘the lowest degree of illusion’ (P, 3). Between these are the symbolic forms, ritual,

￼I

￼100 illusion

￼seduction, play, the trompe l’œil, destiny: the cycles of appearance and disappearance. On radical illusion Baudrillard states:

One can imagine the world even before the appearance of human beings and thought, when there’s nothing there to give it meaning, when it is, strictly speak- ing, without truth or reality – hence in a state of radical illusoriness . . . that’s what I mean by ‘radical illusion’. (ExD, 44)

Rational thought, for Baudrillard, attempts to exert control over the world by reducing its power of illusion. Yet the world will not be controlled or ordered by human thought, indeed thought is plunged ‘beyond objec- tive reality, which is an unstable form, into integral reality . . . into a total elimination of illusion and of the dual situation’ (ExD, 46). And it is illusion itself ‘profound’ and ‘indestructible’ that ‘takes its revenge by plunging the real into simulation, then into the virtual and integral reality’ (ExD, 46).

Radical illusion should not be confused with the symbolic order or symbolic exchange, yet symbolic ritual does enable the play and meta- morphosis of appearance and disappearance. In elaborating this sense of illusion, Baudrillard stresses the etymology of the term ‘Il-ludere is to put into play, to put oneself into play. And for that you have to create the rules of the illusion’ (ExD, 44). To engage in the play of illusion is to be ‘initi- ated’ within a set of rules, a convention ‘in which something other than the real is at stake’ (FS, 211). Illusion works against the real and truth, it is their enemy. In the play of illusion the sign becomes ‘pure’, charged with a uniqueness or singularity, ‘art, theatre, language have worked for centuries to save illusion . . . to maintain the tiny distance that makes the real play with its own reality, that plays with the disappearance of the real while exalting its appearance . . . they have kept something of ceremony and ritual in the violence they do to the real’ (FS, 211). Whether in poetic language, in the gestures of seduction, in ritual or gaming, symbolic forms are ‘vectors of a vital illusion’ (VI, 29).

With the progressive loss of banal, transcendent or degraded illusion in the contemporary age we face the prospect of ‘unhappy uncertainty’, yet Baudrillard raises the alternative of a ‘happy uncertainty’, the embracing of the world as pure form, as immanence, as ‘poetic illusion’. Here the world is accepted as ‘wholly enigmatic’ (IEx, 9): ‘illusion, being par excellence the art of appearing, of emerging out of nothing, protects us from being. As the art of disappearance, it protects us from death. The world is protected from its end by its diabolical indeterminacy’ (IEx, 10). For Baudrillard illusion is enchanting as well as protective, it ‘creates a kind of absolute gain by removing causes, or by distorting effects and causes’ (IEx, 11). In

image 101

this way it opens up the play of destiny, ‘the passion of illusion and appear- ance’, the encounter with ‘that which comes from elsewhere, from others, from their face, their language, their gestures . . . outside of you, without you . . . without your having anything to do with it’ (FS, 172–3). By con- trast objectivity and subjectivity, the prerequisites of rational thought, are for Baudrillard twin illusions of equal banality. Though they might seem self-evident, the situation is never certain. We experience great pleas- ure, Baudrillard asserts, in denying or suspending reality, and the world and human consciousness live in a state of complicity, reciprocity and ‘entangling’ which prevents a final resolution. Influenced by Nietzsche, Baudrillard states ‘representation, this superstition of an objective reality . . . is itself a part of the general illusion of the world, of which we are a part at the same time as we are its mirror’ (LP, 40). Thus knowledge itself is part of the illusion of the world. An acceptance and embracing of this complicity constitutes, for Baudrillard, the ‘lucidity pact’ (LP).

The world in its immanence is an appearance, an illusion, a play of forms. We can only attempt to capture the illusion through techniques of representation, or alternatively attempt the replacement of illusion through the modelling techniques of simulation and virtualisation. In either case we cannot move beyond the play of appearances to the absolute, to truth or reality, and this, for Baudrillard, is itself a positive outcome as we remain free from the unbearable burdens of reality and absolute truth. And further, Baudrillard insists ritual, ceremony, seduction, the play of illusion and metamorphosis are ‘in no sense an illusory mastery, but a mastery of illusion’ (IEx, 88).

### Baudrillard

#### Poetry alt

Pawlette 7 [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

Symbolic Exchange and Death claims a site of resistance and defiance at both the socio-economic level and the level of language and writing. The principle of symbolic exchange, according to Baudrillard, operates at the level of words and meanings. 'Poetic language' is a site of the sacrifice or extermination of linguistic value, a place of the suspension and annulment of the fixed, referential meaning of word-signs. Symbolic or poetic language is, for Baudrillard, a non-expressive, anti-discursive 'beyond' of the economy of signification. Within the poetic or symbolic operation words do not signify or represent, signs are cancelled or 'sacrificed'. The ordered, regulated opposition between signifier and signified and sign and referent is dissolved in ambivalence by poetic resonances that play on both sides of the bar simultaneously (1993a: 198-205). Here Baudrillard reads 'Saussure against Saussure'; not the Saussure of the Course in General Linguistics (1966), his well known study assembled posthumously by students, but the far less well known Saussure of the anagrams, termed Saussure's 'abandoned hypothesis' by Baudrillard. Briefly, Saussure's hypothesis , at least as Baudrillard renders it, consists of two 'hidden' laws of poetry. The first is that the numbers of vowels in a verse should be 'countered' by a given number of non-vowels in a fixed pattern. In other words, meaning is not free to be developed at will by the poet, it is constrained by a rule of composition that ensures there are no remainders, no leftovers; all must b\*>&cchanged. The second rule is that a 'theme word', such as the name of a god or hero, Bfe generated by anagram through emphasised phonemes. Put simrMy, as the poem is spoken out loud (as poetry always should be) the sound produced by recital will suggest a name through the repetitftm of certain sounds. Such poems, found widely in ancient Greece and Rome, are thought to be offerings. Baudrillard opposes Saussure's understanc&ig of the anagrams secreted in ancient poetry in two main ways. First, Baudrillard criticises Saussure for ignoring the symbolic relations between poet and reader in his focus on the poet and 'artistic inspiration'. According to Baudrillard this understanding participates in the severing of symbolic relations, abstracting the greatness of the individual poet while ignor- ing the 'ecstasy' that can sweep over the reader of a great poem in a symbolic exchange. In other words, the greatness of a poem resides in the pact formed by reader and poem, not unilaterally in the figure of the poet. Second, Baudrillard contends that the rule of no remainders does not merely reinforce the meaning or message of the theme words through repetition, but actually cancels the theme word by 'doubling' it. For Baudrillard such poems are sacrificial: the god is put to death, symbolically, through the poem by dispersal into phonemic elements. The signifier - the name of a god - is sacrificed by the splitting away of the signifiers, the word-sound from the supposed referent - the god in a dispersal into sound, a 'cancellation by the double' (1993a: 199). The poetic form, according to Baudrillard, 'shatters' the equivalence of signifier and signified, it shatters the 'linearity of the signifier' (the ￼accumulation of meaning) and it shatters the boundlessness or infinity of meaning, bringing it under strict regulation. But these principles of regulation, the laws of the anagram, are not a code. The poetic has a form but not a code - an important distinction. Poetry 'ruptures not only the arbitrariness of the sign, but also the Law of equival- ence (signifier/signified) and the function of representation' (1993a: 214). This is a complex point and must be dwelt on. The sign, as unit of meaning or value, acts as a 'stand-in' for reality. Representation works by requiring us to believe that the sign/stand-in actually emanates from a reality that, so to speak, 'makes signs at you' (1993a: 214). This Baudrillard terms 'the Linguistic Imaginary'. Representational mean- ing or signification takes place in the imagination of the science of linguistics, not 'out there' in the world. Poetry does not operate in this way, Baudrillard asserts, but linguistic science attempts, unsuccessfully, to code poetry. Poetry, according to Baudrillard, is. generally misinter- preted as a 'better' or higher type of equivalence, as offering a more apposite expression o&meaning - not merely arbitrary but artful in its ability to tie together sigm'fier and signified. But this interpretation remains locked within the code of representatiolr^and equivalence. Baudrillard follows standard structuralist and poststructuralist theory here but also adds something distinctive in his insistence that the rule- bound or ritual-like use of language leads to a"sacrificial annulment of referential value. The following of rules as a mode of breaking with coded models of subjectivity is explored in Baudrillard's later work (see Chapters 5 and 8 of this volume). Taking the example of Swinburne's poetry\* where Ss sound like s-nakes hi-ss-ing, Baudrillard argues that the 'Linguistic Imaginary' reduces poetry to an artful technique used to reinforce meaning, to bolster the metaphysics of representation. Without a logic of equival- ence there can be no representational meaning, there is 'nothing': 'if the poem refers to something, it is always to NOTHING' (1993a: 209). The something that is nothing cannot be coded, it cannot be ren- dered into equivalence. It is not a 'thing' but a 'no(t)-thing'; that is, it is not an abstract unit but a relation, an experience, a possibility. To clarify, a person can be given a number and treated as a number - indeed, this happens all the time in modern bureaucratic societies. A number is a thing, an abstract unit of coding, but a person is not a 'thing', to be a person is to exist in relations with other. Our sense of personhood, of who we are, cannot be separated from our relations to others. A per- son, then, is not a thing but a not-thing, not an abstract, isolatable unit but a relation, a form. Poetry, for Baudrillard, or at least 'good poetry', is akin to gift- exchange and sacrifice. Indeed, poetry is to language what gift- exchange is to economics: its sacrificial annulment, its resolution without remainder, its 'anti-value'. Value, whether economic or seman- tic, is, according to Baudrillard, merely a residue that has escaped or 'not been exhausted' in the cycle of gift exchange. Such residues are the source of power struggles and conflicts. The 'rational' economic, productivist worldview dominates when we believe ourselves 'free' to use words without 'ritual, religious, or poetic restriction of any kind' (1993a: 201). The illusory freedom to use words as we please to produce referential meaning enables, and is mirrored by, the later situation where capitalists are free to use labour as they please to produce profit. Baudrillard's argument here 'mirrors' Marx, even as he suggests that Marx mirrors capitalism, in that Baudrillard seeks to expose empty, formal rather than actual, freedoms in the sphere of representation, as Marx had done in the sphere of economics. Baudrillard's theories pass beyond Marxism, but, initially at least, by way of Marxism. The unlimited productivity of goods and labour, of words and meanings, does not deliver freedom or progress, Baudrillard insists. Instead modernity is 'caught in an endless escalation at every level' (1993a: 201), an accumulation and profusion of residues - of objects, capital, meaning and psychic debris. For Baudrillard everything that is symbolically exchanged is a 'mortal threat' to the dominant order because the dominant order in all its dimensions - linguistic, economic and political - is built upon the expulsion, barring or denial of symbolic exchange. Systems of representation and meaning, systems of political economy and finance, systems of communication and mediation can only function as commodity-signs if symbolic exchanges are barred. Accumulation, hierarchy, social power and control occur when the cycle of symbolic exchange is brought to an end; during the cycle they are in a state of flux. The capitalist system has the distinction of effecting a permanent, though partial and always unstable, cessation of the cycle of exchange. Gift exchange continues in circumscribed form at the individual level, but is barred at the systemic level. Ambivalence is not an opposing or alternative 'code' but 'the incessant potentiality of the annulment of value' (1981: 210), nothing more, nothing less. The various forms of symbolic exchange - willed, suicidal, accidental, poetic - 'shatter' these systems.